MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION
AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

UNIVERSITY OF BABYLON

COLLEGE OF EDUCATION FOR
HUMAN SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH

A COGNITIVE SEMANTIC STUDY OF NARRATIVE STRUCTURING SYSTEM IN J. K. ROWLING'S *HARRY POTTER*

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE COUNCIL OF THE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION FOR HUMAN SCIENCES, UNIVARSITY OF BABYLON IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTORATE OF PHILOSOPHY IN EDUCATION, ENGLISH LANGUAGE, LINGUISTICS

BY

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September **Muharram**

2021 AD 1443 A.H

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

﴿نَحْنُ نَقُصُّ عَلَيْكَ أَحْسَنَ الْقَصَصِ بِمَا أَوْحَيْنَا إِلَيْكَ هَذَا الْقُرْآنَ وَإِن كُنتَ مِن قَبْلِهِ لَمِنَ الْغَافِلِينَ﴾

(سورة يوسف: 3)

In the Name of Allah the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.

﴿We do relate unto thee the most beautiful of stories, in that We reveal to thee this (portion of the) Qur'an: before this, thou too was among those who knew it not.﴾

(Yusuf: 3)

(Translated by Yusuf, 1946)

Dedication

To those whom death did not allow to complete their doctoral dissertations....my friends...Ali Muhammad Al-Waeli and Hussam Kamel Hamza

Acknowledgement

Firstly, I would like to thank Allah for taking care of me through all the difficulties. I have experienced Your guidance day by day. You are the one Who let me finish my work.

I would like also to acknowledge and give my warmest thanks to my supervisor Prof. Qassim Abbas Altufaili (PhD) who made this work possible. His guidance and advice carried me through all the stages of writing my project. I would like also to express my thanks and gratitude to all my professors in the University of Babylon / College of Education for Human sciences / Department of English.

وزارة التعليم العالي والبحث العلمي

جامعة بابل

كلية التربية للعلوم الانسانية

قسم اللغة الانكليزية

دراسة معرفية دلالية لنسق الهيكلة السردية في رواية هاري بوتر للكاتبة ج. ك. رولينغ

اطروحةقدمت

مجلس كلية التربية للعلوم الانسانية

جزءاً من متطلبات الحصول على درجة دكتوراه فلسفة

في التربية/ اللغة الانكليزية/ اللغة

من قبل

ضيف الله زامل حربي

بأشراف

الأستاذ الدكتور قاسم عباس الطفيلي

محرم 1443هـ

ايلول 2021م

Abstract

Narrative is one of the prominent literary forms that our minds deal with in different ways. In fantasy novels, many events are not derived from our real life and contradict with our logic. In addition, events in novel are not unfolded directly to intensify mystery and adventure. The ways and tools of constructing and connecting these events are valuable to be searched. Narrative structure is one of the literary aspects that have received great number of studies that reflect different perspectives. As far as the researcher knows, the process of structuring fantasy novels has not been investigated from a cognitive semantic point of view. The current study, thus, comes to fill the gap in this context to make a cognitive semantic study of the narrative structuring system in Rowling's Harry Potter.

The study aims at studying the subsystems that build the narrative structuring system to see how they work; the way in which events are compressed at the different levels of construction; and the way in which fantastical concepts are constructed through narration of the events. In this regard, the researcher hypothesizes that narrative structuring system consists of three subsystems: the first is directed to forming events and relating them to each other; the second compresses events and fills the missing pieces of language at different levels and the third structures the fantastical concepts. Fantastical concepts are formed either by importing features from real concepts or by inventing new features that are not found in the real concepts.

The study attempts to achieve its objectives through the following procedures: (1) making an account for the theoretical background. This account includes a brief presentation for the main theses of cognitive semantics and the main theories and concepts that can be exploited in

building the model of analysis. (2) Exploiting the theories and concepts that have been represented in the literature review and his observations to develop a workable model of analysis that is used to analyze the data which is selected from the novel. (3) Data are collected from the first part of Harry Potter novel. The developed model is applied to the data in order to analyze its various aspects qualitatively. Moreover, the results of the qualitative analysis are discussed in terms of descriptive statistical analysis.

The study concludes that the narrative structuring system consists of three subsystems that tackle different aspects of the narrative. The first one is responsible for constructing events at different levels. The second prepares the perceived language pieces to be processed through filtering them from the redundant parts and compensating the missing parts. The third system (concept structuring system) works partially in this study; it includes formation processes that are devoted for forming the fantastical concepts in the current study. The three systems above, work simultaneously. The fantastical concepts are formed by a number of formation processes. There are many fantastical concepts in Harry Potter novel and all of them are formed by modifying the related real concepts.

المستخلص

يعد السرد من ابرز الاشكال الادبية التي يتعامل معها العقل البشري بشكل يومي وبأشكال مختلفة. ان الكثير من الاحداث في الروايات الخيالية لا تشتق من حياة الانسان اليومية وتصطدم في كثير من الاحيان مع المنطق. فضلا عن ذلك، تمتاز الاحداث في هذا النوع من الروايات بطابع المغامرة والغموض حيث تتكشف الاحداث او تفهم بشكل مباشر. أن الطرق والادوات المستعملة في تشكيل الاحداث وربطها موضوع يستحق البحث. يعد هيكل السرد من ابرز المواضيع التي تناولها الباحثون بمختلف مشاربهم وتوجهاتهم. ان عملية هيكلة السرد في الروايات الخيالية لم تبحث من وجهة نظر دلالية معرفية على حد علم الباحث. تهدف الدراسة الحالية لسد الفراغ من خلال عمل دراسة دلالية معرفية لنسق هيكلة السرد في رواية هاري بوتر.

تهدف الدراسة الحالية الى استقصاء الانساق الثانوية التي تشكل نسق هيكلة السرد بشكل عام وكيفية عمل هذه الانساق، كما تبحث كيفية ضغط الاحداث وتلخيصها على مختلف مستويات الهيكلة، تبحث الدراسة كذلك كيفية تشكل المفاهيم الخيالية اثناء عملية السرد. يفترض الباحث أن نسق هيكلة السردي يتكون من ثلاثة انساق فرعية: النسق الأول موجه لتكوين الأحداث وربطها ببعضها البعض، فيما يقوم الثاني بضغط واختصار الأحداث كما يملأ الأجزاء المفقودة من اللغة على مستويات مختلفة، اما النسق الثالث فيقوم ببناء المفاهيم الخيالية. تتشكل هذه المفاهيم من خلال عمليات مختلفة؛ بعضها يستورد خصائص محددة من مفاهيم حقيقية لتشكيل مفاهيم خيالية، اما البعض الاخر فيقوم بابتكار خصائص جديدة غير موجودة في المفاهيم الحقيقية.

يحاول الباحث تحقيق أهداف الدراسة من خلال الإجراءات التالية: (1) تبدأ الدراسة بمناقشة الخلفية النظرية والدراسات السابقة التي يتعلق بها موضوع الاطروحة، حيث يتضمن هذا النقاش عرضًا موجزًا للأطروحات الرئيسية للدلالات المعرفية والنظريات والمفاهيم الأساسية التي يمكن استثمارها في بناء نموذج التحليل. (2) استثمر الباحث النظريات والمفاهيم التي عرضها الباحث لتطوير انموذج عملي للتحليل يستخدم في تحليل البيانات التي يتم اختيارها عشوائياً من الرواية. (3) طبق الانموذج المطور على البيانات من أجل تحليل جوانبها المختلفة نوعياً. علاوة على ذلك ، تمت مناقشة نتائج التحليل النوعي من حيث التحليل الوصفي.

ويخلص الباحث إلى أن نسق الهيكلة السردية يتكون من ثلاثة انساق فرعية تتناول جوانب مختلفة من السرد؛ الأول هو المسؤول عن تشكيل الأحداث على مستويات مختلفة؛ والثاني يهيئ المدخلات اللغوية ليتم معالجتها من خلال تشذيبها من الأجزاء الزائدة عن الحاجة وتعويض الأجزاء المفقودة. النظام الثالث (نسق هيكلة المفهوم) يعمل بشكل جزئي في هذه الدراسة حيث يتضمن عمليات التشكيل المكرسة لتشكيل المفاهيم الخيالية في الدراسة الحالية. تعمل الأنظمة الثلاثة المذكورة أعلاه في وقت واحد، كما تتشكل المفاهيم الخيالية من خلال عدد من عمليات التشكيل المفاهيمية. هنالك العديد من المفاهيم الخيالية في رواية هاري بوتر تتشكل جميعًا من خلال تعديل المفاهيم الحقيقية ذات الصلة.

تتكون الرسالة من خمسة فصول تتناول جوانب مختلفة من الدراسة. يمثل الفصل الأول مقدمة شاملة للأطروحة ككل، تشمل مشكلة الدراسة وأسئلة البحث وأهداف الدراسة والفرضيات

والإجراءات وقيمة الدراسة والحدود. الفصل الثاني يتضمن الخلفية النظرية للدراسة والتي يعرض الباحث من خلالها النظريات التي تستند إليها الدراسة. يتضمن الفصل الثالث المنهجية التي تم من خلالها تطوير الانموذج حيث يستعرض نسق الهيكلة السردي المستعمل في تحليل البيانات. الفصل الرابع يتضمن وصف البيانات وتحليلها، كما يتضمن الفصل الأخير الاستنتاجات والدراسات المقترحة.

Tables

Figures

Abbreviations

CBT	Conceptual Blending Theory
CMT	Conceptual Metaphor Theory
InfAct	Inferred Act
LogAct	Logical Act
NCS	Narrative Cognitive System
P (A, B, C) -Dom	Participation Domains
PerAct	Perceived Acts
PFSS	Pattern-Forming Structuring System
Pr	Process
S	Scene
SE	Simple Events
TypAct	Typical Act

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Chapter Four: Data Analysis



Figure (18): Narrative Structuring System as a Model of Analysis

Chapter One

Introduction

1. Preliminaries

Cognitive linguistics is one of the linguistic schools that have achieved wide fame within linguistics and cognitive science. It includes different approaches that share number of commitments and theses. The scope of study in this school does not stop at the boundaries of linguistic meaning, but also the extensions of meaning within cultural and social phenomena. It draws heavily on meaning; therefore it is viewed as semantically based. One of the main tents of cognitive linguistics is that language is related to the other faculties of human mind. Therefore it is part of cognitive science which attempts to explain how the human cognition works. The basic tents of cognitive linguistics are derived from the pioneers' works like Fillmore (1982), Fauconnier (1985) Lakoff (1987), Johnson (1987), and Langacker (1987). The paradigm has started to be more complex and sophisticated when other scholars have posited their theories and ideas within the framework of cognitive linguistics. Those scholars are Sweetser (1990), Gibbs (1994), Talmy (2000) and others.

Cognitive linguistics is divided mainly into cognitive grammar and cognitive semantics. Each of the two fields includes number of theories and approaches. The two fields are closely related because form and meaning are represented as overlapped in one box. So, there are many concepts and theories in cognitive linguistics that have reflections in semantics and

grammar at the same time; for example, construal operation (Talmy, 2000 and Langacker, 2009), conceptual blending (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002) and others. However, meaning has special status in this school; therefore, there are many theses directed to meaning. One of these theses postulates that meaning is encyclopedic; linguistic meaning is open on human knowledge in its diverse aspect. The second most important thesis is the thesis of embodiment in which meaning is embodied. Language is not disconnected from reality; our cognition simulates what happen (our experiences) in reality (Evans, 2017: 286). Recently, cognitive linguistics have received a special interest in applied linguistics through applying the cognitive linguistic theories in many fields like second language acquisition, translation, literary studies and others.

Cognitive linguistics has been applied to stories and storytelling within the field of narrative analysis. The main concern in this context is how people comprehend narratives. Narrative is one of the prominent literary forms that our minds always deal with in different ways. In every day we tell and receive stories at different levels; the story may be represented as an episode, short story, life story or lengthy novel. Therefore, Talmy (2000: 417) refers to the existence necessity of a cognitive system determined for narrative structure. He configures this system by exploitation of other general cognitive system. The current study follows Talmy's study in configuring the system in question. This system exploits some general systems that have different functions in various cognitive faculties. It also draws heavily on the cognitive semantic theses, concepts and theories. The system is schematic because it deals with the general features or components that represent the skeleton of any scene or event. These schematic components are subjected to

the systems in question. In fantasy novel, there are many concepts that are not found in our daily life need to be structured, so the structuring system requires additional subsystem to construct such concepts.

2. Statement of the Problem

In fantasy novels, many events are not derived from our real life and they contradict with logic. In addition, events are not unfolded directly; they reflect mystery and adventure. The ways and tools of constructing and connecting these events are valuable to be searched. Narrative structure is one of the phenomena that have received great number of studies that reflect different perspectives. As far as the researcher could investigate, the process of structuring fantasy novels has not been investigated from a cognitive semantic point of view. The study comes to fill the gap to make a cognitive semantic study of the narrative structuring system in Rowling's Harry Potter. This problem can be investigated through finding answers to the following questions:

1. What are the subsystems that form the narrative structuring system; and how do they work in the novel under analysis?
2. What are the cognitive semantic units that build the narrative as a whole?
3. What are the schematic components and structures that figure out narrative structure; and what are the most prominent ones in Harry Potter novel?
4. How do boundaries of scenes and events be identified?
5. How do events at different levels relate to each other and sequenced?
6. How are events compressed at the different levels of construction?

7. How are the contextual aspects of the novel under study tackled through the structuring processes?
8. How are fantastical concepts constructed through the events narration?
9. What is the way in which events are structured in terms of mystery?

3. Objectives of the Study

The study objectives can be achieved through the current study, the central ones can be formulated as follow:

1. Identifying the subsystems that build the narrative structuring system; and how they work in the novel under analysis.
2. Investigating the semantic units that build the narrative as a whole.
3. Indicating the schematic components and structures that figure out narrative structure; and Identifying the most prominent ones in Harry Potter novel.
4. Illustrating how boundaries of scenes and events can be identified.
5. Illustrating how events at different levels relate to each other and how they are sequenced.
6. Finding out the way in which events are compressed at the different levels of construction.
7. Investigating how the contextual aspects of the novel under study tackled through the structuring processes.
8. Showing the way in which fantastical concepts are constructed through the events narration.
9. Indicating the way in which evens are structured in Rowling's Harry Potter; are they mysterious or direct.

4. Hypotheses of the Study

1. Narrative structuring system consists of three subsystems: the first forms the events and relates them to each other; the second compresses the events and fills the missing pieces of language at different levels; and the third structures the fantastical concepts. All the sub-systems work in a parallel way in which every event is formed and compressed at the same time.
2. Scene is the unit of narrative; scenes connect to form events and events connect to form event continuums which represent the novel as whole.
3. The schematic components that represent the basis for the structuring system are the components of any real event. These components are time, place, participants, causality and contextual frame. The most prominent schematic components and structures in framing and relating scenes and events are time and place because they are prominent in any event.
4. Events boundaries are identified by the process of framing on the bases of the schematic components and structures.
5. Events and scenes relate to each other through the extension of the schematic components and structures. They are arranged by the sequencing process which is based on time and causality.
6. An event is compressed by selecting the most prominent scenes that can reflect the core meaning of the event as whole.
7. The contextual aspects of an event are added to its scenes by the gap-filling process and the conversion process that trace the speaker/writer's attention.

8. Fantastical concepts are formed by different processes; some of them import features from real concepts to form the fantastical concepts. Other processes invent new features that are not found in the real concepts.
9. Most of the events in Harry Potter novel are mysterious and do not unfold directly to the reader.

5. Procedures of the Study

The researcher attempts to achieve the above objectives through the following procedures:

1. Presenting a literature review which includes a brief introduction to the main theses of cognitive semantics and the main theories and concepts that can be exploited in building the model of analysis.
2. Developing a workable model of analysis that is used to analyze the data which is selected from the novel.
3. Collecting data to analyze its various aspects qualitatively. Moreover, the results of the qualitative analysis are discussed in terms of descriptive statistical analysis.
4. Discussing the results that are derived from the analysis in order to verify or refute the hypotheses above. On the basis of this discussion, the research questions are answered.
5. Giving some conclusions, recommendations and suggested studies for further research.

6. Limits of the Study

1. Cognitive semantics is the general framework of the study which (the study) is based on construal operations, cognitive approach to the analysis of narrative, mental space theory and schema theory.
2. The data is restricted to the first part of Rowling's Harry Porter (Harry Potter and The Philosopher's Stone).

7. Value of the Study

The study has theoretical and practical values:

1. The study supplies the theoreticians, especially the cognitive ones, with the way in which different cognitive theories can be employed in narrative and literary analyses.
2. It provides a new view on how different events are construed in a unified framework.
3. It unifies different cognitive aspects in one framework.
4. It shows how cognition employs different operations and tools for construing and constructing fantasy novels.
5. Scholars of literary studies are provided with new tools for analyzing literary works.

Chapter Two

Theoretical Background

2.1. Introduction

Cognitive linguistics is one of the linguistic approaches that have been directed to find answers to the main questions of linguistics about the nature of language. This approach or a group of related approaches attempt to investigate language as a cognitive system which is overlapped with the other cognitive faculties. Recently, some works have studied literature or literary language by means of cognitive linguistic views. These studies are divided into two types: the first group has employed some cognitive linguistic aspects to analyze literary texts for different purposes (see Semino and Culpeper, 2002 and Harrison et al., 2014: 4-5). The second group of studies has been directed to examine the underlying processes of the literary language. The current study comes in this context; it looks at narrative structure from a cognitive semantic point of view. This chapter includes all the aspects and theories that can contribute to the current study.

The chapter starts with giving a general overview about the main ideas of cognitive semantics. Then, it discusses one of the main concepts in cognitive semantics, such as construal operations, schematicity, conceptual blending and integration, frame, domain, and mental space. The last section tackles the cognitive semantic framework of narrative structure.

2.2. Cognitive Semantics: An Overview

Cognitive semantics is a fundamental branch of cognitive linguistics which is in turn a discipline within the framework of the cognitive science. This branch has appeared in the scene in the 1970s as a reaction to the mainstream views: the objectivist world-view, which has been developed within the western philosophy and truth-conditional, the main thesis of formal semantics. Sweester (1990: 4) criticizes the truth conditional semantics that deletes the cognitive organization from the language structure. Formal semanticists view meaning as the relationship between the world and the lexical items. Cognitive semantics, in contrast, puts language in an overlapping relationship with the other cognitive systems and faculties. According to this approach, language meaning reflects the conceptual structure in all its diversity and richness and this makes it complicated and idiosyncratic approach. Leonard Talmy, a pioneer cognitive linguist, looks at the '[r]esearch on cognitive semantics is research on conceptual content and its organization in language' (Talmy, 2000:4).

The main theses of cognitive semantics are formed as follows:

1. Conceptual structure is embodied

   This thesis is divided into two sub-theses: (1) embodied experience: reality is not perceived objectively; perception of reality is restricted by human beings' physical nature. This thesis is formulated in theories and works like Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 56), Lakoff (1987: 269) and Tyler and Evans (2003: 23). (2) Grounded cognition: this thesis refers to the grounding of mental representation in human embodied mental states. This means that meaning is not static in our minds, our

cognition simulates reality. This sub-thesis is discussed in Gallese ansd Lakoff (2005: 4), Barsalou (2008: 617-45) and Evans (2017: 287-8).

2. Semantic structure is conceptual structure

   This thesis indicates that language encodes not what is found in the external world, but what is found in the speaker's mind. In other words, semantic structure (the meanings related to lexical items) is part of the conceptual structure (Evans, 2006: 158).

3. Meaning representation is encyclopedic

   There are two aspects within this thesis: (1) the semantic structure within language system interfaces with conceptual representation. There are some details that differ from one theory to another, for instance, Langacker's (1987) insists on the previous idea in which semantic structure is equated with the conceptual structure, whereas Evans (2012) indicates that the two structures are distinct but related. The semantic structure facilitates access to some parts of the conceptual structure. (2) The conceptual structure includes a huge network of constructed knowledge. This encyclopedic knowledge is considered as a background to the semantic structure; it is called semantic potential (Evans, 2017: 289).

4. Meaning construction is conceptualization

   Language comprehension involves a kind of interaction between conceptual and semantic structures. This interaction is mediated by different conceptual and linguistic processes and mechanisms. Cognitive linguists reject the view of compositionality in which the meaning of the whole is derived from the inherent meaning of its parts (see Evans, 2009:3-4). Cognitive linguists view that linguistic or

semantic meaning involves conceptualization which is nonlinguistic process in most of its parts (Evans, 2017: 289-90).

2.3. Construal Operations

'Construal operations' is one of the central concepts in cognitive linguistics: grammar and semantics. It is connected with the cognitive linguistic thesis in which the world is subjectively (not objectively) perceived and conceptualized (Evans, 2017: 284). Construal operations refer to the way of viewing and interpreting the world (things, events, etc.). There are different ways to cognize and various corners from which we look at the same thing or action. These various interpretations or conceptualizations are achieved by the construal operations (Kovecses, 2006: 227). Construal operations are part of cognitive semantics, they are exploited in sociolinguistics (see Harder, 2011: 305-6), in grammar (see Talmy, 1988: 166), in language and literature (see Popova, 2002: 52 and Harrison et al., 2014: 4-5), in artificial intelligence (see Croft, W. and Wood, 2006), in language change (see Ekberg, 2012), and in narratology (see Herman, 2015: 122). These operations have been proposed and classified differently by the pioneer cognitive linguists, like Ronald Langacker (1987), Leonard Talmy (1988), and William Croft and Alan Cruse (2004). This section represents these three classifications with an expansion for Croft and Cruse's classification because it is comprehensive; it encompasses the other two classifications with some additions.

Langaker (2007) puts the concept of 'construal' in the center of his framework, cognitive grammar. According to him, it "relates to the way a language user chooses to ‘package’ and ‘present’ a conceptual representation

as encoded in language, which in turn has consequences for the conceptual representation that the utterance evokes in the mind of the hearer" (Evans, 2007: 40-1). Langacker (2007: 435-8) revised his classification and divided construal operations into four operations under the title "focal adjustment"; they are:

a. Specificity: it relates to the human capacity of building commonalities between different phenomena and organizing concepts into categories.
b. Prominence: it is the process through which a language user selects some conceptualization aspects and ignores others. It consists of mainly the Figure/Ground phenomenon.
c. Perspective: it is related to how a language user views a situation or thing which is linguistically manifested. It has four subcategories: (1) subjectivity/objectivity, (2) viewpoint, and (3) deixis.
d. Dynamicity: it refers to the conceptualization progression through time. Conceptualization takes place through processing time and it develops through this processing. During processing, different aspects of the total conception are highlighted or activated (Langacker, 2009: 341).

Talmy (2000: 40-84) also revises his classification to include four main "schematic systems" that are connected with what he calls "Domain". The domain is a "schematic category" of 'time' and 'space' which are the major dimensions of construal. These four schematic systems are: configurational structure, perspective, distribution of attention and force dynamic. These schematic systems are explained in the next classification of construal operations under different titles.

Table (1): Linguistic construal operations as instances of general cognitive processes (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 46)

I. Attention/salience
  A. Selection
    1. Profiling 2. Metonymy
  B. Scope (dominion)
    1. Scope of prediction 2. Search domains 3. Accessibility
  C. Scalar adjustment
    1. Quantitative (abstraction) 2. Qualitative (schematization)
  D. Dynamic
    1. Fictive motion 2. Summary/sequential scanning
II. Judgment/comparison (including identity image schema)
  A. Categorization (framing)
  B. Metaphor
  C. Figure/ground
III. Perspective/situatedness
  A. Viewpoint
    1. Vantage point 2. Orientation
  B. Deixis
    1. Spatiotemporal (including spatial image schemas)
    2. Epistemic (common ground)
    3. Empathy
  C. Subjectivity/objectivity
IV. Constitution/Gestalt (including most other image schemas)
  A. Structural schematization
    1. Individuation
    2. Topological/geometric schematization (container, etc.)
    3. Scale
B. Force dynamics
C. Relationality (entity/interconnection)

The more comprehensive classification of construal operations is that proposed by Croft and Cruse (2004: 40-69). They criticize the previous classifications which are arbitrary and some logically related concepts are excluded. They point out that the sophisticated classification should correspond to the psychological capacities and processes. However, most of these correspondences have been achieved by Langacker and Talmy's

classifications. Thus, it is not surprise to find great overlap between Croft and Cruse's classification and the other classifications (see Verhagen, 2007: 53-8).

2.3. 1. Attention and Salience

Attention is a well-known cognitive process and a basic concept in cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics. Attention can be defined as the "focus of consciousness" (Chafe, 1994: 140). It is not one degree; attention is distributed over the different parts of one entity with various degrees. Psychologically and neurologically, it is modeled in terms of the conceptual activation; concepts are activated in different degrees. The phenomenon of attention is not detached from the external world; it is based, in most of its work, on the **salient** properties of the world. Visual ability can illustrate various aspects of attention like the following four aspects: (1) one can focus on or directs his attention to a specific entity among many other entities to be **selected**. (2) The focus of attention is not free; it is restricted by the **scope** of attention. (3) One can gaze at the details of the scene (fine-grained) or take a general view (coarse-grained). (4) The viewer can fix his sight on the scene or move his eyes over it (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 46-7). These four aspects are formulated in the following concepts:

a. Selection: it can be explained in terms of relevance (almost in the same use of this term proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1995) and prominence that our cognition is based on. The human beings have the ability to attend to some prominent aspects of their experience that are relevant to the context and ignore all the other aspects. The phenomena of concept profiling and metonymy are the prominent examples of selection. Within a semantic

domain or frame, different words guide our attention to or **profile** different facets or parts of the frame; for example, the words *circumference*, *radius*, are in the frame of CIRCLE. Metonymy, within the cognitive linguistics framework, is the ability of selecting some prominent contextual features by the language user rather than the features that the words usually symbolize (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 47-8).

b. Scope of Attention: the selected entity through the process of selection is circled by a scope of attention that Chafe (1994:29) defines as the accessible entities to attention within the periphery of consciousness. In the scope of prediction, the profiled concept makes the immediate presupposed domains accessible more than the indirect ones. This means, as a matter of construal, that the scope of attention can shift in the suitable context (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 50). Langacker (1987:119) mentions the example of "knuckles" which are conceived as the immediate parts of the finger, fingers as the immediate parts of the hand, the hand is the immediate part of the arm, and the arm is related immediately to the body as whole. The profiled concept of "knuckles" will make the scope of "fingers" accessible more than the "body", because it is acceptable to say "knuckles of the finger" but not "knuckles of the body".

c. Scalar adjustment: this subcategory is not new, it reformulate Langacker's Abstraction and Talmy's Schematization.

d. Dynamic attention: all the above three aspects of attention (focus, scope and scale) are static, while the fourth is dynamic. Sometimes, the attention is not fixed on a specific area, but it moves across the scene (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 53). Langacker distinguishes between static and dynamic construal in

terms of summary scanning and sequential scanning. The former points out to perceiving a scene as a chunk such as perceiving a photo. The latter refers to the attention movement across the different connected parts of the scene as in watching a scene of a film (Langacker, 1987:144–45, 248–49).

2.3.2. Judgment/comparison

The category of judgment/comparison indicates how a phenomenon or thing be construed in terms of its relationship with other phenomena or things. It includes the following subcategories: categorization, metaphor, and figure/ground; these are explained in the next chapter.

a. Categorization: it is one of the fundamental mechanisms that work at different levels of language structure. Words are construed on the bases of the category to which the words belong. This point is explained with more details in the next chapter (see 3.2.1.5).

b. Metaphor: it is widely discussed in cognitive linguistics and formulated in different theories like Conceptual Metaphor Theory by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Conceptual Blending Theory by Fauconnier and Turner (2002). In metaphor we have two domains, source and target. The source involves the literal meaning of the expression and the target involves the entity being described by the metaphor. In metaphor, one thing is perceived in terms of another.

c. Figure-ground alignment: this subcategory is derived from the category of Attention/Prominence that is formulated in Langacker's and Talmy's works. Figure-ground alignment seems to be based on the objective features of the scene, although the subjective properties may play a role. Talmy (2000: 311-41) discusses the spatial relations in terms of the figure-ground distinction in

which all the spatial relationship (motion or location) are manifested by determining the position of one object (figure) according to its relation with another one (ground) as in (1) and (2).

(1) The laptop [figure] is on the table [ground]. (location)

(2) The boy [figure] went into the school [ground]. (motion)

Talmy (2000: 315-16) mentions some of the objective salient properties that figure and ground may have. Unlike ground, the figure can be: location less known, structurally simpler, more recently in awareness, smaller, more prominent, and more moveable.

2.3.3. Perspective/situatedness

Perspective/situatedness is the most obvious representative category of construal operations. Perspective is so essential for spatial descriptions perspective is basically about the viewpoint and position of the speaker from which he perceives reality. This does not mean that perspective cannot be found in non-spatial domains. It exists in attitudes, belief and knowledge. This category is formulated in three subcategories: viewpoint, deixis and subjectivity; these are explained in 3.2.1.2.

2.3.4. Constitution/Gestalt

This category of the construal operations includes the most structural aspects of the entity in a scene. The construal operation inserted under this category represents the elements that **constitute** experience and give it structure or **Gestalt**. The Gestalt principles are derived from psychology which explains how the human mind unifies fragmented perceptual sensations in one complex entity. In cognitive linguistics, the constitutive construal is

discussed in details by Talmy (2000: 40) under the two titles: "imaging system" and "force dynamics". Three operations will be discussed within the framework of constitutive construals, they are: structural schematization, force dynamics and relationality. Constitutive operations differ from the other types of construal operations; they provide experiences with structures.

a. Structural schematization: it refers to "the conceptualization of the topological, meronomic and geometrical structure of entities and their component parts" (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 63). This subcategory includes three schematic subgroups: individuation or boundedness, topological/geometric schematization and scale. Individuation refers to the nature of the perceived entity, whether or not it is individuated. If the entity is individuated, individuation describes its unity and relation between its parts. Individuation describes multiplicity of an entity when that entity consists of more than one individual. Count nouns and mass nouns are good examples for individuation. Some of the alternative expressions, that seem to refer to the same entity, have different construal of structure. For example, the countable word *leaf* in (3a) construes the entity as an individual with clear boundaries (bounded entity), while the mass noun *foliage* in (3b) construes the entity as an unbounded.

(3)

a. leaves on the tree

b. foliage-Ø on the tree

Surfaces and containers as image schemas illustrate a consrual of a more specific **geometric** or **topological** structure of entities. The entities can be construed naturally by lending themselves to being flat entities or containers,

such as *on the table* or *in the bag*. But there are entities that have alternative construals:

(4) a. There is milk in the bowel.

b. There is dust on the bowl.

If the dust is a lot and the milk is few, the figure/ground configuration in the two examples is not that much different. But since the bowl has the function of containing liquids, it is construed as a container in (4a) and as a surface in (4b) (Herskovits 1986:76).

The last concept within the category of structural schematization is the **scale** image schema. This type of schema provides the domain, which may or may not be measurable, with a gradable dimension. The same domain can be construed with scale, as in (5a-b), and without scale as in (6a-b) (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 65).

(5) a. Sally's pregnant.

b. Sally's very pregnant.

(6) a. This Sauternes has a fragrant bouquet.

b. The bouquet of the Fargues is twice as fragrant as that of the Climens.

b. Force dynamics: it is the second category of the constitutive construal category. Force dynamics is proposed by Talmy (2000: 409-70) as a model for the conceptualization of events. This model is considered as a generalization of the causation notion that is one of the most important aspects of the human mind. It is explained in the next section.

c. Relationality (entity/interconnection): the final subject to construal is the most basic constitutive properties of entities. Many semanticists differentiate between **relational** and **nonrelational** entities. A relational entity suggests finding another entity. In other words, a relational entity is meaningless without another related entity. For example, the relational adjectival concept IMPORTENT is meaningless without existing an entity that is described by the adjective. On the other hand, the nonrelational nominal concept like BOOK can exists as a meaningful concept without existence of another entity (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 65). Langacker (2013: 23-4) shows that nouns ('things' in his terminology) differ from verbs or adjectives ('relation' in his terminology) in which the nouns are nonrelational while the verbs and adjectives are relational. Nouns profile the interconnected entities while the verbs and adjectives profile the interconnection between entities.

2.4. Schematicity

2.4. 1. Schematic Systems

In some cognitive linguistic approaches, such as Langacker's cognitive grammar and Talmy's conceptual structure, there are two types of systems. The first one includes the schematic (abstract) or closed systems, and the second includes the content or open systems. The former systems work to structure our everyday linguistic and conceptual experiences. They include the general abstract features that build the skeleton of any experience. The second group of systems deals with the flesh of the skeleton; they process the details of an experience. Talmy (2000: 21-96) suggests four schematic systems which provide the basic structure of the cognitive representation. Each of the four schematic system deals with different structural aspects of the scene. These systems are parts of what Talmy calls conceptual

structuring system. The four systems are: the configurational system, the perspectival system, the intentional system and the force-dynamics system.



Figure (1): Talmy's Schematic Systems

2.4.1.1. Configurational System

This system is related mainly to the two prominent schematic categories: space and time. It is divided into six categories construct the scenes that language encodes and the participants that the scene involves (Evans, 2007: 39). These categories are:

a. **Plexity**: this category refers to "the number of comparable elements in any given quantity. This refers to objects in space" (Talmy, 2018: 12). Talmy substitutes the traditional terms 'singular' and 'plural' by the terms '**uniplex'** and '**multiplex'**. His justification for this substitution is that the new terms cover not only the number or amount of objects in space, but also iterative (the technical term for a group of events in time) for events in time. In other words, the two categories of 'number' and 'aspect' are unified in one category of 'plexity'. For example, the word *bird* (an object in space) is uniplex, but when we add 's' to the word, the word *birds* becomes multiplex. The process of multiplexing

involves copying the single object (bird) into many points of space. The same occurs in the events domain. For example, the intransitively uniplex verb *sigh* can undergo the multiplexing process in saying *He kept sighing*. This process copies the single event into many points of time (ibid. 12-3).

b. **Boundedness**: this category relates the boundaries of entities and it has two members, **bounded** and **unbounded**. A quantity is viewed as unbounded when it has no intrinsic boundaries and it is viewed as bounded when it has clear boundaries that make it as distinct entity (Talmy, 2007: 505). Roundedness can be found in nouns and verbs and there is a test for discovering whether the verb or the noun is intrinsically bounded or not by using the preposition *in*. The bounded entities can be used with *in* while the unbounded cannot. For example, a speaker can say *We flew over a sea in one hour*, but not *We flew over water in one hour*, because water is unbounded. The same thing can apply to actions or verbs. *She dressed in one hour* is accepted while *She slept in one hour* is not. The former verb, *dressed*, is bounded, while the latter, *slept*, is unbounded. The unbounded entities can become bounded by the bounding operation, for example, the word water became bounded by adding some in *Let's take some water* (Talmy, 2018: 14).

c. **Dividedness**: this category refers to an internal segmentation of quantity. If the quantity has interruptions or breaks, it will be conceptualized as discrete or composite. Otherwise, it will be conceptualized as continuous. There is a kind of confusion between this category and the previous category. The main source of this confusion is the normal meaning of the word 'continuous' which

covers the meaning of the word ‘boundlessness’. However, each of the two categories has its own idiosyncratic features. The lexical examples unboundedness in the previous section, *water* and *sleep*, are also internally continuous. But 'unboundedness' can be found also in the two words *timber* and *breathe* which are internally discrete (Talmy, 2007: 508-9).

d. **Degree of extension**: this category is placed in the vertical dimension of the schematic configurational structure. It relates to the way of 'stretching' the quantities of space or time over distance. It, like the category of dividedness, interacts with the category of boundedness, but deals with more details (Evans, 2007: 513). This category has three members: Point, Bounded extent, and Unbounded extent.

e. **Pattern of distribution**: this category relates to the way of distributing matter through space and action through time. It includes five patterns illustrated in Figure (3). They are: (1) one-way non-resettable: it represents a change from State A to State B, whereas the participant cannot return to State A, as in the action of dying. (2) One-way resettable: according to this pattern, the participant can go back to State A, as in the act of falling. (3) Full-cycle: in the cyclical change of flashing, light goes to and returns from dark. (4) Multiplex: this pattern refers to repeating the cyclical change which is intrinsic in actions like breathing and beating, but not so in the act of flashing. (5) Steady-state: in contrast to all the previous patterns which involve internal change, this pattern represents static or unchanging state, as in the act of sleeping (Evans, 2007: 159).

f. **Axiality:** it is related to how a quantity of space or time is constructed in relation to a directed axis. For instance, the two contradictory

adjectives *sick* and well are points on the health axis. The word well represents the end point on the axis, while sick represents the remainder. This explains the restricted distribution of slightly and almost (the closed class degree modifiers). It is possible to say almost well or slightly sick, but not *almost sick or *slightly well. The impossibility of the latter expressions is due to the impossibility of putting 'slightly' at an end point of an axis, nor 'almost' on a point before the end (Evans, 2007: 7).

g. **Scene partitioning**: all the previous members of the configurational structure work on the level of an individual quantity within a scene. The current category deals with the scene as whole. It involves partitioning a scene into its main parts participants. Such partitioning can be inherent in a lexical item. In other words, some lexical items involve partitioning the scene that they encode. For example, the verb *serve* partitions the act that it encodes into four parts: an action of serving, an item served, host and guest (Talmy, 2007: 517-8).

2.4.1.2. Perspectival System

There are many ideas have been mentioned about 'perspectival' as a category of construal operations. Here, some points will be added to it as a schematic system. "Perspective point is where you mentally put your eyes to conceptualize the scene that is structured in terms of the first schematic system (Talmy, 2018: 16)." Talmy (2007: 519-25) divides this system into four categories: perspectival location, perspectival distance, perspectival mode and direction of viewing. These categories are explained in the next chapter (see 3.2.1.2).

2.4.1.3. Attentional System

This system determines the way in which a speaker directs a hearer's attention towards specific entities within a scene. Attention can be directed toward one part of the scene or more (Evans and Green, 2006: 198). The distribution of attention is governed three factors: the **strength of attentio**n, the **pattern of attention**, and the **mapping of attention**. This system is explained in chapter four.

2.4.1.4. Force-Dynamic System

It is the second category of the constitutive construal category. Force dynamics is proposed by Talmy (2000: 209-70) as a model for the conceptualization of events. This model is considered as a generalization of the causation notion that is one of the most important aspects of the human mind.

2.4.2. Image Schemas

Cognitive linguistic theses remove the boundaries between language and the other faculties in our minds. It overlaps with our knowledge and conceptual structure. Such theses have led some cognitive linguists to ask about how our knowledge is structured and how our minds handle meaning. One of the most significant claims in this context is that our perceptual interactions, bodily experiences and manipulations of objects play a fundamental role in structuring our knowledge by different patterns. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Johnson 1987, 1993; Lakoff 1987) formulated these patterns in what are called image schemas. "They emerge throughout sensorimotor activity as we manipulate objects, orient ourselves spatially and temporally, and direct our perceptual focus for various purposes (Gibbs, 1996: 41)."

Many cognitive linguistic investigations refer to the regular appearing of many image schemas and image schemas transformations during people's daily reasoning, thinking, and imagination. Some of the pervasive image schemas in everyday experiences are found in Table 2. These schemas represent the internal structure of any experience and they contribute to our understanding of the abstract concepts and explaining abstract domains of language like grammatical forms (see Langacker 1987, 1991). Some recent linguistic and philosophical studies indicate the role that image schemas play in activating abstract metaphorical concepts, such as death, morality, and causation (Johnson 1993; Lakoff 1990; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Turner 1991). It seems that image schemas represent the bases for many different aspects in language and cognition (Gibbs and Colston, 2006: 239). They are also related to the main theses of cognitive linguistics such as embodiment (see Johnson and Lakoff, 2002). Our everyday embodied experiences are manifested in the human cognition in terms of image schemas (Hedblom, 2020: 33). We can say that the units of the conceptual structure are the image schemas.

Table. 2: A partial list of image schemas (Evans and Green, 2006: 190)

- **SPACE**: UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK, LEFT-RIGHT, NEAR-FAR, CENTER-PERIPHERY, CONTACT, STRAIGHT, VERTICALITY
- **CONTAINMENT**: CONTAINER, IN-OUT, SURFACE, FULL-EMPTY, CONTENT
- **LOCOMOTION**: MOMENTUM, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL
- **BALANCE**: AXIS BALANCE, TWIN-PAN BALANCE, POINT BALANCE, EQUILIBRIUM
- **FORCE**: COMPULUSION, BLOKAGE, COUNTERFORCE, DIVESION, REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT, ENABLEMENT, ATTRACTION, RESISTANCE
- **UNITY/MULTIPLICITY**: MERGING, COLLECTION, SPLITING, ITERATION, PART-WHOLE, COUNT-MASS, LINK (AGE)
- **IDENTITY**: MATCHING, SUPERIMPOSITION
- **EXISTENCE**: REMOVAL, BOUNDED SPACE, CYCLE, OBJECT, PROCESS

Hampe (2005: 1-2) sums up the main characteristics of image schemas as follows:

1. Image schemas are directly meaningful (experiential/ embodied), preconceptual structures, which arise from, or are grounded in, human recurrent bodily movements through space, perceptual interactions, and ways of manipulating objects.
2. Image schemas are highly schematic gestalts which capture the structural contours of sensory-motor experience, integrating information from multiple modalities.
3. Image schemas exist as continuous and analogue patterns beneath conscious awareness, prior to and independently of other concepts.
4. As gestalts, image schemas are both internally structured, i.e., made up of very few related parts, and highlyflexible. This flexibility becomes manifest in the numerous transformations they undergo in various experiential contexts, all of which are closely related to perceptual (gestalt) principles.

2.5. Blending, Integration and Mental Spaces

Fauconnier and Turner (2002) propose a new framework, known as Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT), as a competent model to Lakoff's Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT). This new theory postulates that meaning construction basically includes "the integration of mental structures". "The network model is concerned with on-line dynamical cognitive work people do to construct meaning for local purposes of thought and action" (Fauconnier and Turner, 2006: 312). Fauconnier and Turner mention that the operation of conceptual integration is general and basic to

the way we think (Pálinkás, 2014:615). Contrary to CMT, this model is not restricted to metaphor; it represents a uniform mechanism to literal and metaphorical expressions (Clousion and Oakley, 2000: 182).

> Conceptual blending is not a compositional algorithmic process and cannot be modeled as such for even the most rudimentary cases. Blends are not predictable solely from the structure of the inputs. Rather, they are highly motivated by such structure, in harmony with independently available background and contextual structure; they comply with competing optimality constraints. (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998: 137).

The main aspects of CBT are: mental spaces, on which it draws heavily, emergent structure, integration processes, vital relations, compressions, integrations networks, and optimality principles of integrations.

CBT has found plausible remedies to the problems of CMT, such as: (1) MCT does not capture the central feature of metaphor: "a metaphor involves not only the activation of two domains, not only correspondences, but also a species of blending of two domains" (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 207). (2) It is central to CBT to decode the creative examples, whereas CMT focuses on conventional examples and mappings, i.e. in what people have already stored in their minds (Handl and Schmid, 2011:7). (3) The basic units of CBT are mental spaces that can account for the dynamic and contextual aspects of meaning construction, rather than two stable pre-existing domains of knowledge. (4) CBT has a fourth blended space contains the new inferred meaning that is not found in the inputs. CMT does not show how the new inferred meaning consists (Evans and Green, 2006:403). (5) The problem of unidirectionality in CMT has been solved in CBT by allowing multidirectional mappings. (6) Blending operations general to the human

thought. They can be applied to metaphor, metonymy, literal language, counterfactuals, irony, grammar, etc., while CMT can be applied only to metaphor and metonymy (Koller, 2004:14). There are also other detailed advantages will be shown in the next discussions.

2.5.1. Mental Spaces

Mental space is one of the concepts that occupy a great area in cognitive linguistic research. This term was coined by Fauconnier in his publication in 1985, *Mental Spaces*. These mental spaces are the basic units in CBT (Harder, 2003: 91). The main motivation for mental spaces is to find "how little of the rich meanings we construct is explicitly contained in the forms of language itself" (Fauconnier, 2014:230). Fauconnier and Turner (1996: 83) define mental spaces as "small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding". It is also defined as "scope of awareness" (Fauconnier, 1985, as cited in Langacker, 2009:208). It is not a condition to consider these spaces "logically consistent". The construction of a mental space is cognitive, it is a thing used to indicate real or imaginary worlds, not a thing that is being referred to. Mental spaces contain elements with no direct reference in the world (Fauconnier, 1994: xxxvi). Mental Space Theory aims to capture what Possible Worlds Theory in conditional semantics deals with, to some extent (Dancygier & Sweetser, 2005: 11).

Each utterance in our daily life employs a mental space, which represents the speaker perspective; perhaps the other participant in the speech event shares him that perspective. Fauconnier calls this space *the base mental space* (space 0). It works as a key to open new spaces as in the following example: *I dreamt I was Marlyn Monroe and kissed me*. In this example, the part of the

space builder is *I dreamt* and the verb *dream* is a space builder by which another space (space 1) of an imagined world is opened. In this imagined world, the second *I* (*I was Marilyn Monroe*) is not identical with that in the base space. Space 1 is part of a different frame in which the speaker is kissing Marilyn Monroe (Dervin, 2005: 33-4).

2.5.2. Conceptual Integration Networks

2.5.2.1. The Four Spaces

Instead of the Lackoffian domains, Fauconnier constructs his model with settings up four mental spaces which are connected by vital relations and blending operations. Integration networks involve **two input spaces** that may have shared or similar structure, to some extent, to make cross mapping possible. The degree of similarity differs from one situation to another. A projection takes place selectively through blending elements from structures of the two inputs to form a new space, called a **blended space** (or a blend). The blended space contains new information, not found in the two inputs (Coulson & Oakley, 2000: 178). However, the blend does not rely only on the inputs, but "is characterized by a new, emergent conceptual structure in its own right, whose set-up differs from those of the two input spaces" (Ungerer & Schmid, 2006: 259). This blending process is based on a "skeletal construct", called a generic space. It supplies the blend, which is newly structured, with its coherence (Dancygier, 2006: 5). The generic space builds counter connections between the two inputs. Establishing these connections is achieved by a conceptual operation, called matching. It is "responsible for identifying cross-space counter parts in input spaces". Establishing connectors between "matched elements" can be based on

identity, role, metaphor, etc. (Evans & Green, 2006: 409). Blending is restricted by selective projection. According to this projection, specific information only can be selected from the inputs, while other information is inhibited. For example, a reader can easily infer that ghosts are dead, but it seems unlikely to select from the GHOST space a conversation with the ghost in Hamlet (Oakley, 1998:338).



Figure 2: A basic integration network (adopted from Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 46)

2.5.2.2. Emergent Structure and Integration Processes

Emergent structure comes as a result to the three blending processes: composition, completion and elaboration. **Composition** "involves attributing a relation from one space to an element or elements from the other input spaces" (Coulson and Oakley, 2000: 180). For instance, composition operation in (8) juxtaposes the two concepts, *idea* and *gem*,

(8) *I realized the new idea was a gem*. (Coulson and Petten, 2007:110)

to construct a new conceptual category by determining two different category domains, have yet to be integrated. This juxtaposition or partial composition establishes a generic space and a blended space. The blend inherits general information from the IDEA space, such as its value, clarity, beauty, effect, and so on. The blend also inherits some information from the GEM space, such as its beauty, shine, purity, and so on. **Completion** "occurs when structure projected from the inputs matches information in long-term memory" (Coulson, 2001: 122). In the case of our previous example, information about properties of *gem* that overlap with *idea*, only analogically, can project onto the blend. For instance, the two concepts can be described as beautiful, although the standards of beauty differ; the two, idea and gem, can bring wealth to their owners; and so on. The closely related operation to completion is **elaboration**. Coulson (2001:122) defines it as "a process that involves performance and/or mental simulation of the event in the blend and constrained by the logic of the blended domain itself". One can elaborate the completion result of our example, in which *ideas* can bring wealth, by considering ideas as banks.

2.5.2.3. A Linguistic Example

The famous metaphor '*This surgeon is a butcher*' can show how conceptual integration accounts for metaphor. This metaphor is said as a reference to an "incompetent practitioner". One of the input spaces accounts for the *surgeon* and the other for the *butcher*. The projection takes place between the shared elements in the two spaces. This direct projection from the source to the target results a fixed mapping between the following counterparts: butcher maps onto surgeon; animal (e.g. cow) maps onto human being; commodity maps onto patient; cleaver maps onto scalpel; abattoir maps onto operating room; and cutting meat maps onto cutting flesh. However, this does not show how the inference of incompetence comes. A butcher is competent in his job, though a surgeon has more social prestige than him (Oakley, 1998: 326).

CBT explains the inference of incompetence as follow: First, constraining by the integration principles (explained in section 3.3.4.8), the blend evokes some structures from the inputs. It evokes elements from the target space which is constructed by the SURGERY domain. Some of these elements are: the identity a specific person "being operated on" (i.e. the speaker), the identity of the person who is acting the operation, and probably some information about the operating room. The bled also evokes some structures from the source space which is structured by the BUTCHERY domain, such as the role of *butcher* and some related activities. The shared structure of the inputs is represented in the generic space as an individual performs an operation on some other being by using sharp instrument (Grady, et al., 1999: 105-6) Depending on the inherited structure from the inputs; the blend develops a new structure of its own. The inference of incompetence comes as a result to this developed structure which is not found in the two input



Figure 3: Integration network: This surgeon is a butcher (Tendahl, 2009: 133)

spaces. This structure relates to the surgeon who uses the skills of butchery in performing an operation and, therefore, is incompetent. Precisely, the inference of incompetence comes as a result to "the mismatch between the goal (healing) and means (butchery)", which is found only in the blended space (Evans and Green, 2006: 405-6).

2.5.2.4. Vital Relations and Compressions

Conceptual integration networks contain four mental spaces that relate one to another by mappings. "The mappings between the input spaces are called **vital relations''** (Oakley and Hougaard, 2008: 10). These relations are found as interrelated constituents of meaning, and they are so because of their repetition in scenarios, their ability in linking scenarios, and their ability to be compressed into other vital relations during conceptual integration. One of the significant conclusions of metaphor theory and blending theory is that "integration networks achieve systematic compressions" (Fauconnier and Turner, 2008: 54). Compression is the central goal of integration process, by which conceptual complexity of inputs is reduced (Ungerer and Schmid, 2006: 260). Fauconnier and Turner (2000: 296) indicate that people "integrate and compress vital relations such as Identity, Time, Space, Cause-Effect, and Part-Whole" because of variation and diffuseness of life, which is "running over large expenses of time and space". The system of constructing meaning is basically achieved by the continuous compression over vital relations. They consider blending and selective projection as tools of compression.

2.5.2.5. Types of Integration Networks

This section represents briefly the four types of integration networks:

1. Simplexes network: in this network, one of the inputs is represented as a frame and the second as particular elements. Typically, the two inputs are a frame with roles and elements fit those roles. For example, the conventional roles of father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter, and so on, can be filled by John, Mary, etc. (Kövecses, 2005: 277).
2. Mirrors Networks:. The famous example for such network is *the riddle of the Buddhist monk*. If a monk starts a journey at one morning by climbing a mountain in order to reach its top, and returns at the next morning on the same path. Is there a specific place occupied by the monk at the same time in the two journeys? Mirror network finds a solution through imagining the monk starts the two journeys at the same time and the place where it meets himself is the occupied place. This is the blended space (Kövecses, 2005: 278).
3. Single-Scope Network: This network takes place when a structured mental space gives elements to fill roles with them in another space. The receiving space will construct the blended space and the space that gives the elements. For example, given that a company "knocks out" another (in the BUSSINESS IS BOXING metaphor), there is a single-scope network, in which the BOXING space constructs the blend (Kövecses, 2005: 278).
4. Double-Scope Network: it "can resolve clashes between inputs that differ fundamentally in content and topology. The blend is constructed by materials from the two inputs, for instance: *Anger is hot fluid in a container*. Multiple-Scope Networks may contain more than two inputs. These are the most important networks (Kövecses, 2005: 278). Consider the three inputs of the GRIM REPER blend. They relate to the following AGENTS: (1) a REPER, who cuts plants down by a

scythe; (2) a KILLER, who kills a victim; and (3) DEATH, "which brings about a death of an individual". Note that the abstract agent, death, is "itself a metaphoric blend", in which death is personified. In the blended space of the GRIM REAPER, DEATH is the AGENT and it uses killing as a cause of death. REAPER is the manner of killing; therefore the reaper is GRIM (Evans and Green, 2006: 432). This example is illustrated in Figure 4.

2.5.2.6. Optimality Principles of Integrations

CBT constrain the construction of the blend by strict principles. Fauconnier and Turner (2002:312) state that the central goal of integration principles is to 'achieve human scale', which means making "the conceptual blend successful in communicating meaning". This goal includes five sub-goals, they are:

• Compress what is diffuse.

• Obtain global insight.

• Strengthen vital relations.

• Come up with a story.

• Go from Many to One.

Sweetser (2000:312) points out that one of these principles, as an example, is to compress many things in the blended space. Sometimes, people compress the human life as whole, metaphorically, into the little time of walking up a flight of stairs.



Figure 4: Death the Grim Reaper (adapted from Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 292)

Džanic (2007: 177) summaries Fauconnier and Turner's principles as follow:

1- Integration: the blend is regarded as being an integrated unit and it can only be manipulated.
2- Web: the web of suitable mappings to the input spaces must be preserved in case of manipulation of the blend.

3- Unpacking: the blend can permit the reconstruction of the entire network.
4- Topology: relations of the elements in the blend should be connected with the relations of their counterparts in other spaces.
5- Good reason: every element in the conceptual integration network must be connected to other spaces and it must have a significant function in running the blend.
6- Metonymic tightening: when elements that are metonymically related are projected to the blend, their metonymic connections decrease the distance between them.

2.5.2.7. The Model of networks: In Brief

This model of dynamic meaning construction consists of four connected mental spaces: two input spaces, a generic space, and a blended space. The two inputs are connected by vital relations, and there are cross-space mappings of counterpart connections between the two inputs, such as metaphoric connections, identity connections, and so on. During the construction, the generic space maps onto the inputs to define the cross-space mapping between them. The shared structure of the inputs projects to the blend. The blend itself develops another structure to construct an emergent structure. The projection from the inputs to the blend is restricted by the selective projection, which allows for specific information to be selected. Construction of the blend also involves three processes: composition, completion, and elaboration, that lead to emergent of a new structure in the blend.

2.6. Categorization: Frames and Domains

2.6.1. Frames

The concept of 'frame' has been used in different fields, like linguistics, psychology and artificial intelligence, for many years. This concept has played a vital role in cognitive linguistics. It traces back to Charles J. Filmore who used it as an analytical tool in the linguistic description. Then, he extended its use to characterize the structures of knowledge and to link the linguistic analysis with cognition. He formulated his theory under the title "Frame Semantics" (see Filmore, 1982 and 1987). Filmore defines a frame as "a schematisation of experience (a knowledge structure), which is represented at the conceptual level and held in long-term memory" (Evans and Green, 2006: 222).

The frame creates relations between entities and elements associated with a specific scene which is culturally embedded. According to the frame semantics, a word's meaning can be understood only through the frame to which it belongs. Filmore (1985) employed the Gestalt psychological terms, figure and ground, to make a difference between the lexical meaning (the dictionary meaning of a word) and the frame on which the lexical meaning is based. The lexical meaning that a word encodes represents the figure, the prominent part of the frame. The frame, the ground, represents the background related knowledge to the word meaning. Frames are complex knowledge constructions that enable us to understand, for instance, a network of related lexical items and their grammatical behavior (Evans and Green, 2006: 222).



Figure 5: A partial frame for CAR (Barsalou 1992: 30)

Barsalou (1992:30-5) refers to the two aspects of frames: attribute and value. The concept of attribute illustrates an aspect of some members of the frame. For instance, the concept ENGINE, as in Figure 5, reflects one aspect of the CAR category. This means that the attributes represent an aspect of the whole category. An attribute includes some subtypes which are called values. For example, the concept ENGINE has three values: 4 CYLINDER, 6 CYLINDER, and 8 CYLINDER. He also points out to 'structural invariants' which means that attributes within a frame are not independent. Every attribute relates to the other ones consistently. For example, the attribute ENGINE, in Figure (5), relates to the attribute DRIVER because the driver controls the engine speed. These attributes represent also the points of connection between frames; they relate one frame to another.

2.6.2. Domains

The notion of 'domains' overlaps with the notion of 'frames' in many aspects. It has been employed within two prominent cognitive linguistic theories: Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Cognitive Grammar. Lakoff (1993) indicates that, in conceptual metaphors, the mappings take place between two domains: target and source. The former is understood in terms of the latter. The nature of these domains is not obvious in Lakoff's theoretical framework. The theory concerns with the shared elements between the domains. However, this theory suggests that the domains encompass many different aspects of an experience. The nature of domains has been widely discussed in Cognitive Grammar. The notion of domains is based on the cognitive linguistic thesis of encyclopedic knowledge. Domains are conceptual units of different levels of organization and complexity. The prior condition for considering a structured knowledge as a domain is that this knowledge represents a background against which language users understand lexical items. For instance, the domain of TEMPRETURE represents the background structured knowledge that facilitates understanding lexical items like cold, hot and lukewarm. In this respect, there is no difference between Langacker's domains and Filmore's frames (Evans and Green, 2006: 230).

However, Evans and Green (2006, 230-1) mention the four basic respects that the theory of domains added to the theory of frames:

(1) Filmore indicates that structuring concepts can be realized in terms of multiple frames. This type of structure is the typical arrangement for Langacker, who argues that a single lexical concept can be structured

by a **domain matrix**_ the array of domains that structure a concept. Clausner and Croft (1999: 7) point out that the concept of 'bird' includes many aspects related to our commonsense knowledge. These aspects are: its external shape, the nature of its physical material, it activities like flying, its lifecycle, etc. All these aspects are included within different domains such as PHYSICAL OBJECTS, LIFE, TIME, SPACE and so on.

(2) Langacker suggests an additional conceptual organization level which was implicit in Filmore's frames. The basic motivation this level is to differentiate between abstract and basic domains. This distinction is based on the embodiment and experiential grounding that are mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. There some domains are more abstract than the others. For example, some domains such as SPACE and TIME, which derive directly from human embodied experience, are classified as basic domains. Other domains, like LOVE and MARRIAGE, derive also from our embodied experience, but their nature is more abstract and complex. These abstract domains may relate, in some of their aspects, to other basic domains. For example, the abstract domain of LOVE relates to some basic domains like touch, physical proximity and others. Filmore addresses only the abstract domains, while Langacker refers to abstract and basic domains.

(3) According to Langacker's theory, the domains are hierarchically organized, as in Figure 6. This means that a specific lexical concept is a subdomain of an upper lexical concept in the hierarchy. At the same time, this lexical concept presupposes a lower domain. The concept ARM represents a subdomain of the concept BODY and presupposes

the concept ELBOW. The relation between these domains is part-whole relation.

(4) Fillmore and Langacker emphasize different aspects in their theories. Fillmore and Atkins (1992) focus on the role of frames in accounting for the grammatical behaviors, while Langacker's domains are directed mainly to explain our organization and structure of knowledge.



Figure 6: the lexical concept KNUCKLE in a hierarchy of domain complexity (Evans and Green, 2006: 232)

2.7. The Cognitive Framework of Narrative Analysis

Talmy (2000: 417) invokes the cognitive linguistic thesis of cognitive systems to be included in his approach. The putative cognitive system in this context is pattern-forming system that is applicable to sequencing experiences over time. It integrates different related events to form one comprehensive pattern. Version of this system within the current approach is called Narrative Cognitive System (NCS). It operates in connecting and integrating conscious content components over specific period to form "coherent ideational structure". This system overlaps with other cognitive systems in different ways. It has its own unique structural properties and other ones that it shares with other systems (Talmy, 2000: 418-20).

The cognitive framework consists of three parts or aspects: the domains, the strata and the parameters. The parameters are the general principles that govern the narrative cognitive system. The strata are the structural features that apply to narrative. The domains are the different areas of narrative that parameters work within and the strata are located in. Each of the three aspects involves different concepts.

2.7.1. The domains

Talmy's (2000: 423-31) five domains represent the background to all the other elements of narrative, these domains are:

a. The spatiotemporal physical world: it indicates all the conceived properties and characteristics of the world around.

b. Culture or Society: it includes norms, values, identity and so on.

c. Narrative or Work: these two terms are used instead of 'book' to refer to any experience not only to the traditional sense of narrative. The Ideational cognitive works in this context; it forms concepts and organizes the conceptual structure.

d. Experiencer or Addressee: it does not refer to the reader of a novel, but to experiencer of any kind of experiences or events over time.

e. Producer or Author: it is not the traditional author of a novel, but producer of any experience. In addition, it is not a necessary condition of existing narrative.

2.7.2. The Strata

a. Temporal Structure: progression is the unique feature of temporal structure. Events and textures represent its internal structure. The two cognitive processes conceptual partitioning and ascription of entityhood together operate in temporal structure. By means of these cognitive processes, the human mind extends boundaries around an experience that is bounded by time and space, to be a separate entity (event). Temporal texture indicates relativity of one event to the progression of narrative as whole and to each other event (ibid: 431-6).

b. Spatial Structure: it consists of two subsystems: the first one includes all the schematic properties or delineations that can be found in any volume of space. This subsystem encompasses dynamic concepts (**path** and **placement**) and static concepts (**region** and **location**). While the first subsystem represents the skeleton of the spatial structure, the second subsystem reflects the flesh of the structure. The latter subsystem consists of the interrelationships and configurations of material within the framework

that is formed by the former subsystem. The contents, that the second subsystem governs on, can be an **object**_ a part of the material that has clear boundaries_ or a **mass**_ an entity that has not obvious edges (ibid: 436-8).

c. Causal Structure: this stratum encompasses physics of energy and matter that are restricted by time and space. The causal structure consists of any conceptual system characterizes the entities behaviors. Such causal properties are described as nonsentient. The causal structure can extend to include the psychological causal effect like intention, desire, motivation and volition (ibid: 438-9).

d. Psychological Structure: this stratum has associations with or distributed over the other strata (the temporal, spatial and causal). At the same time, it has its own identity that makes it a separate stratum. This stratum is viewed from two points: the categories of organization and levels of organization. The psychological structure is divided into six heuristic categories; they are as follows: (1) the basic heuristic category includes perception, attention, memory, perspective, and motor control. (2) The executive functions category encompasses decision, volition, agency, planning, intention and goal pursuit. (3) The ideational category consists of the sense of logic, reasoning and inferenceing; worldview; concepts, conceptualization and thought; probability, the assessment of familiarity, veridicality and normativity; explanatory understanding, belief and knowledge; attitude and opinion; and hidden assumptions and presupposition. (4) The effective category encompasses aesthetic reactions, mood and emotion, wish and desire, and driving and motivation. (5) The values category includes all what can be classified within the frameworks of goodness and importance like

moral, priorities and ethics. (6) Character, personality and temperament represent the last category of "composite" (ibid: 439-46).

Within these categories, *Perspective Point* received special interest because of its importance in narrative studies. This concept includes both assessment and location. The latter is classified into physical or concrete location (time and space) and abstract location that is found as a cognitive model of time and space. The system of assessment in the perspective point location works in assessing characteristics of a phenomenon situated in another location. The levels of the psychological structure are three: individual, group or society and atmosphere. The individual is the sentient and cognitive entity that the psychological categories, discussed above, are located in. The group psychology is considered from two points of view: first, psychology of the group as one unit will be manifested at the higher level. Second, the psychological properties of the group as a collectivity are based on cognition and interrelation of its members. The atmosphere is our experience in which some psychological aspects are noticeable in some portion of the space, physical region or event (ibid: 439-46).

2.7.3. The Parameters

a. Relating one structure to another: all the strata and domains and their parts are related one to each other to form a coherent structure. The connecting process is guided by a group of parameters. Mereology is one of these parameters that involve four relations: inclusion (the structure A, as whole, is located inside the structure B), coextension (two structures, A and B, occupy the same region), partial overlap (part of the structure A and part of the structure B occupy the same region), and separation (the structure A is

located out of the structure B). The other parameter is the parameter of parity in which two structures are conceptualized as one entity or two entities. This parameter is applicable to the four relations discussed above. The third parameter is that of equipotence in which the two structures have the same value or one (main) has the priority over the second (secondary) (ibid: 446-54).

b. Relative Quantity**:** realization of this general parameter is at three levels; the smaller level is embedded in the next larger level. These levels are: (1) the **scope** indicates the relative portion or quantity of some structure in the narrative context. Magnitude of the scope is reckoned in two different ways: first, with consideration of the proportion out of the entity as a chunk. It is classified into global (by looking at narrative as whole) and local (by looking at a relatively small part of the narrative). The second reckoning way is designed on the basis cognitive capabilities that lead to two scope sizes: first, what is determined by a single span of attention. The second size involves assembling what is perceived or experienced with things in memory. (2) The **granularity** is the subdivisions of the scope that is realized by someone's attention. (3) The **density** represents the elements that structure the subdivisions in question (ibid: 455-7).

c. Degree of Differentiation: It includes a number of sub-parameters that apply to different way in which any structure or entity is prominent or distinguished in comparison with the other entities within the whole narrative context. These parameters are not completely autonomous, they might overlap or correlate (ibid: 457-63). These parameters are:

1. The Continuous-Discrete Parameter: It represents the axis that extends from the continuous (the typical) to the discrete (the distinguished)
2. The Uniplex-Multiplex Parameter: Plexity parameter postulates that a structure is uniplex if only one entity manifests it. The structure is multiplex if more than one entity manifests is.
3. The Distributed-Concentrated Parameter: This parameter indicates whether an entity occupies a small area or distributed over a large one.
4. The Approximate-Precise Parameter: Approximateness refers to the general characterization of an entity and precision designates the fine-structural properties of that entity.
5. The Vague-Clear Parameter: It applies to whether the narrative presentation that reflects the author's or addressee's understanding of a concept is clear or vague.
6. The Sketchy-Elaborated Parameter: It pertains to the degree to which an entity is explained, described or dealt with.
7. The Implicit-Explicit Parameter: It applies to the extent to which a system or factor is explicit or implicit.

d. Combinatory Structure: This parameter is directly related to the pattern-forming cognitive system that has been discussed at the beginning of the current section. It pertains to combining different elements to form one unit. The combinatory process is based either on a temporal association like the general atmosphere of the narrative or on temporal association as in the plot of a story. Talmy uses 'sequential structure' as a term to designate the patterns that consist of combined elements through time. However, they involve a temporal association (ibid: 463-76). These sequential structures are:

1. The Sequential Structure of Identity: It refers to the ability of circling part of consciousness contents (involving what is perceived) and ascribing single entityhood to the material within the circle. Anything can be described as an entity such an event, a physical object (animate or inanimate), personality, and so on. Human cognition ascribes a unique identity to any entity on the basis of its special properties.
2. Ideational Sequential Structure: This parameter is related to the conceptual content. On one hand, concept may be experienced in a specific point of time; therefore, time will lead the sequencing process. On the second hand, some concepts are embedded within a single conceptual structure on the basis of their content rather than time.
3. Epistemic Sequential Structure: This parameter is decisive for the mastery novel because it works as an engine for the plot progression. In sum, it is about "who knows what when".
4. Perspectival Sequential Structure: it is about the way of construing a particular situation relying on the perceiver's point of view.
5. Motivational Sequential Structure: this structure is related to the category of 'effect'. "Motivation consists of the tendencies toward particular types of action undertaken by a sentient entity that are thought to be associated with or caused by particular psychological states within that entity" (ibid: 475). For example, one tends to distance himself from an object when that object is related to his/r fear.

f. Interrelation between different parameters: It seems that not only the cognitive systems are overlapped, but also the elements inside these systems are also overlapped. The parameters that have been discussed above overlap with each other; for instance, in the scope parameter, two structures can alternate globally or locally. In this point, this parameter overlaps with parameter applying to alternation. The parameter of continuous-discrete can pertain to the parameter of granularity (ibid: 480-1).

Chapter Three

Developing the Model of Analysis

3.1. Introduction

Narrative is one of the literary concepts that have received great interest from different disciplines like linguistics, psychology and cognitive science. Within the framework of cognitive linguistics, Talmy (2000: 417-82) proposes a cognitive linguistic approach to narrative context. In this approach, he adopts what has already been found in cognitive psychology and cognitive science in the existence of a mind that produces narrative as well as the mind that cognizes it. In other words, the producer of the narrative is a perceiver of it at the same time. At the same time, a sentient author or producer is not a necessary condition for structuring or finding a narrative. The perceiver mind can cognize some information that are restricted by space and time as narrative. Accordingly, the concept "narrative" in the cognitive linguistic context refers to wider than its traditional sense. It points out to any space-time experience such as history, an individual's life, and so on.

Cognitive linguists rejects Fodor's (1983) paradigm of modularity; instead, it adopts the paradigm of the overlapping cognitive systems (Talmy, 2018: 263). Accordingly, Talmy (ibid.) invokes the cognitive linguistic thesis of cognitive systems to be included in his discussion about narrative structure. The putative cognitive system in this context is pattern-forming system that is applicable to sequencing experiences over time. It integrates different related events to form one comprehensive pattern. This system has different

versions and one of them is Narrative Cognitive System (NCS). It operates in connecting and integrating conscious content components over specific period to form "coherent ideational structure". This system overlaps with other cognitive systems in different ways. It has its own unique structural properties and other ones that it shares with other systems (Talmy, 2000: 418-20).

The current study attempts to formulate narrative structuring system and how it forms narrative at different levels. The most prominent feature of this system is its schematicity because it deals with the most general and schematic aspects of narrative. This system consists of two main cognitive systems, these are: pattern-forming structuring system and idealization cognitive system. In the current study, the researcher suggests 'the concept formation processes' which construct fantastical concepts.

3.2. Pattern Structuring System

Pattern-forming structuring system (PFSS) is the system in which different related forms are connected systematically to form a specific pattern. This system is described as schematic because it involves the abstract and general elements, processes and relations. The structured patterns are at different levels; some of these patterns represent primitive units for larger patterns. It is classified as a background system in which different cognitive faculties can exploit it for different purposes. Therefore it has linguistic and nonlinguistic realizations. It plays a fundamental role in structuring narrative, where it has special existence because of the special nature that narrative has. It consists of three components: schematic event structures,

background schematic relations and nesting processes. This system is based on Talmy's system of pattern forming system (Talmy, 2000: 418-20).

The system in question is formulated differently in theories and employed in different fields within linguistics and out of it. There is a logical necessity for existence of such system; this necessity is represented by existence of different units that have perceived boundaries. These units connect with each other to construct a pattern. PFSS occupies a core position in the current model of analysis because narrative consists of different units that form different levels of patterns. It is formalized in the present study as consisting of components/structures, units, levels and processes which work on the bases of different relations.

3.2.1. Schematic Components and Structures

Language is not structured in vacuum; it reflects our reality and its components. As it is mentioned in the previous chapter (Section 2), cognitive linguistics adopts the thesis in which our cognition simulates our experiences in real life (Evans, 2017: 286). This leads us to look at language as reflecting the main components of our real life experiences. These experiences involve some components that represent their underling structure. These components are time, space, participation, causality and contextual frame. Events occur in specific time and place and they are performed by specific participants for specific reasons within a specific frame of actions. Language reflects all these components explicitly or implicitly and through grammatical forms or expressions. These schematic components are abstract and general; therefore, they are integrated in most of natural languages grammars.

In English, for example, the general aspects of time are grammaticalized and the detailed aspects are expressed in common expressions. Space and the different spatial relations between the participants within an event are encoded by the prepositions, demonstratives and other expressions. Participants of any event are ascribed by different grammatical forms and semantic roles according to their functions. Causality is one of the most fundamental cases in language; it connects the different actions that interact with each other within a specific event. It can be manifested explicitly through function words (such as because of, therefore, etc.), grammatical structures (like conditional constructions) or general expressions. In most cases, causality is found implicitly in language and it can be inferred from the context. Contextual frame is not grammaticalized because its features are mercurial, but it can be gassed relying on the general theme that all the event's actions go around.

These schematic components play a fundamental role in configuring units of narrative. In other words, pattern-forming structuring system relies on these components in forming events at different structuring levels. They ascribe boundaries of events and connect them to form larger units. The schematic components in the individual scenes connect with each other across an event to form structures. So, the spatial components, for example, of related scenes connect to form a spatial structure. These components and structures do not have the same status; some of them play greater roles than the others. Talmy (2000: 431-6) includes the temporal, spatial and causal structures differently in his framework. The researcher explains and illustrates these components in Figure (7).



Figure (7): Diagrammatical analysis of Scene Structure

3.2.1.1. Temporal Component/Structure

Time is one of the most important schematic component of any event in our real life that is reflected in our language. Time occupies a fundamental position in cognitive linguistics because it is one of the main components of reality that is reflected in language (see Evans, 2013). It has a special nature in language in which it is not expressed in its own terms but in terms of space and motion (see Evans, 2003). This is justified by its highly abstract nature in reality; so our cognition facilitates its understanding by expressing it by means of tangible entities. Time is not expressed always by language but our cognition can guess it from context. The expression of time or temporal deixis by language is divided into two types: **schematic expression** and **detailed expression**. The former includes the grammaticalized aspects of time, for example, the indication of past time by –ed suffix. The latter involves different forms of time expressions, for example, *yesterday*, *before two days*, *after Christmas*, etc.

Temporal component/structure has two functions: **ascribing** and **sequencing**. The former function involves identifying boundaries of scenes and events at different structuring levels. Time ascribes event boundaries when a group of the scenes of an event take place at the same time and the next group happens at another time. In other words, because the group A of scenes takes place at the same time and the group B occurs at another time A is ascribed as an event and B is another event. The latter function indicates that time play a vital role in arranging scenes and events. Events are arranged on the arrow of time which is directed toward future.

3.2.1.2. Spatial Component/Structure

Cognitive linguists put space in the centre of language structure because it represents a basic component of our reality that is reflected in language (see Zlatev, 2007). Space is one of the main schematic components that configure the pattern form structuring system. Every event in our life takes place in a particular place. The spatial relation can be formulated in terms of perspective and situatedness that have been mentioned in the previous chapter. Perspective and situatedness are explained in terms of viewpoint and deixis (subjectivity is not mentioned here because it has no role in relating an event to the others).

a. Viewpoint: it is derived from Langacker's focal adjustment which has two types: vantage point and orientation. For example, to describe someone's position relative to a tree *in front of the tree* or *behind the tree* relies on the speaker's vantage point. Vantage point is related to figure/ground alignment in which the former imposes a specific figure/ground alignment on the scene (Langacker, 1987: 122-26). Orientation is related to the vertical dimension,

represented in the upright position of the human body. Choosing one of the two prepositions *above* and *below* in (14a-b) is relative to the speaker's canonical orientation.

(14) a. The chimney is above the window.

b. The window is below the chimney.

b. Deixis: it refers to the common linguistic phenomenon of designating a specific entity in the scene by using some indicative elements. Deixis has been widely investigated in pragmatics and, here, we focus on this concept as construal. Using different deictic expressions leads to different construals, for example, defining the personal pronouns (*I*, *you*, *he/she/it*, *we*, and *they*) is relative only to who is speaking. Such variation is an instance of alternative construals that are defined by the situation of the speech act (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 59-60).

Talmy (2018: 34) identifies four categories, within the perspectival system, which form the spatial relations between participants, they are:

a. Perspectival location: there are some lexical items that specify the perspective point from which a scene is viewed. This issue can be discussed with respect to deixis which specifies the speaker's location.
b. Perspectival distance: according to this schematic category, closed-class forms can identify the perspectival distance (the distance between the viewer and the scene). This category has three members: distal, medial, or proximal. These three members correlate with the degree of extension members: reduced, median, magnified.
c. Perspectival mode: this category relates to state of a perspectival point, **stationary** or **moving**. Members of this category relate to the members of

perspectival distance category: the proximal with the moving and the distal with the stationary. This category overlaps also with factors from the next schematic system which are the global and local scope of attention. The two members of the perspectival mode category can be termed the synoptic mode and the sequential mode. The former refers to adopting "a stationary distal perspective point with global scope of attention." The latter points out to adopting "a moving proximal perspective point with local scope of attention." The two terms are shown in 15 (1 and 2).

(15) 1. Tom had looked at some dogs [synoptic] through the car window.

2. Tom kept looking at dogs through [sequential] the car window.

d. Direction of viewing: the other application of the sequential perspective within the domain of time is sequencing events or continuation of one event. This application involves forming a new schematic category by linking between location of perspective point and the focus of attention factor (from the system of attentional distribution). This category is about the direction of viewing a particular event relative to a specific perspective point. There are two types of direction: ‘prospective’ and ‘retrospective’. The former indicates the event-sequence in which the event A is viewed temporally first. The speaker looks 'forward' to the second event. The latter refers to the event-sequence in which event B is viewed early; the speaker looks 'backward' to the first event. These two types of directions are illustrated in following example (16) mentioned in Evans (2007: 56-7).

(16) a. Edith finished the glass of rosé before she went home

[prospective]

b. Before she went home, Edith finished the glass of rosé [retrospective]

It seems that there are some differences between Talmy's categories and Langacker's ones. The former is more detailed because it tackles the distance between the entities and the mode of that viewing in addition to the sequential perspective within the domain of time. The current study adopts Talmy's categories with some modifications and additions. The study discusses the last category in a latter section as a part of the process of sequencing. It seems that the two categorizations of the spatial categories have not tackled all the spatial aspects. So, the current study takes into consideration all the schematic aspects of space. The spatial component involves two spatial relations: the first one is between entities and their place and the second is between the entities themselves.

The spatial component in the current model is based on Talmy's (2018: 34) explanation in some positions. It consists of the following:

1. Entities locations: this category refers to the points within space that entities or events are located in. The place of an event or an entity is expressed by different spatial deixis (prepositional phrases headed by different prepositions) to encode different forms of the relation between places and participants. For example, the preposition *in* encodes the relationship between a participant and the place in which the participant is contained and the place is a container; while *on* refers to the flat places. This category encodes the relation between the entities and their locations.
2. Arrangement of the entities: this category formulates the second spatial relation between the entities. There are different forms that are

encoded with different spatial deixis. For example, the spatial expressions such as *before*, *after*, *front*, *toward*, etc. encode different arrangement of an event parts and participants. In other words, this category indicates the distribution of entities on a specific place and the relation between these entities. It also refers to how the speaker arranges the scene relying on his viewpoint. The sentences in (17) encode the same arrangement of the scene entities but from different points of view.

(17) a. The boy was standing behind the tree.

b. The boy was standing in front of the tree.

3. Entities mode: this category refers to the dynamicity and stationary of the entities arrangement. In the dynamic scenes, entities change their places and there are different expressions that encode this change. In (18), the configuration of the entities changes because of the patient (the key) moves from one location to another.

   (18) The girl take the key from the drawer and put it in his bag.

4. Viewing distance: this category involves the distances between the entities of a scene. The distance is encoded by demonstratives and expressions. In (19), *this* refers to the short distance between the speaker and the tree while *that* refers to the long distance between them.

   (19) a. This tree is tall.

   b. That tree is tall.

Spatial component is divided into **macro** and **micro** in which the former includes the general properties of the space and the relation between the participants. The latter indicates more detailed schematic properties of the

space and the spatial relation. In most of time, micro locations ascribe different related events and macro locations connect these event. For instance, a group of events happen in a city (macro location) and at the same time every event takes place in a particular area (micro location) in that city. Spatial component, like temporal component, plays a vital role in structuring any event. Sometimes it is expressed explicitly by language and in other times is found implicitly, so it can be guessed from the context. Some general events can be narrated without mentioning time and space; so they are not always fundamental even they are found in reality.

3.2.1.3. Participation Component/Structure

One of the most important schematic components in ascription and connection of scene and event structures is the participation component. Events involve participants that perform different semantic roles. A participant can ascribe the starting and end points of an event and it can connect a group of events. For example, the participant A can be involved in an event with the participant B; the he leaves this event to interact with the participant C and so on. The participant A connects all these events. The current study identifies two levels of **participation domains** (P-Dom) and **participants**. In every event, there is a group of acts that go around a particular participant/s. In other words, every event involves one or more than one prominent participants. Every act in an event relates to domain of a specific participant. At the same time these acts, which belong to participation domains include their own participants. Because the current study focuses on the schematic part of language, it uses the basic elements of the sentence. These elements are the verb (process) and its arguments, agent (action doer) and patient (the entity which is effected by the process). These

three elements represent the core for the sentence and all the other elements, like adjectives and adverbs, add some details to the basic elements. This treatment of participation structure, in its general aspects, is based on the semantic roles and Fauconnier's (2002) *base mental space* (space 0) (see section 2.5.1).

3.2.1.4. Causality Component/Structure

Causality is one of the most fundamental schematic components in the narrative structuring system because it connects, ascribes and sequences scenes and events at different levels. There are different treatments of causality within and out cognitive linguistics. In cognitive semantics, Talmy (2000: 409-70) has generalized the notion of causation in his framework of force dynamics. He suggests that the processes of causation are conceptualized as having different types of forces which act in different ways upon the the event participants. Talmy has examined many different patterns of force dynamics, some of them are illustrated in the following examples:

(19) a. I kicked the ball.

b. I held the ball.

c. I dropped the ball.

Example (19a) illustrates the canonical type of causation: the causer (antagonist) forces the causee (agonist – the ball) to move. In the example (19b), there is an extension to the notion of causation to sustain a rest state: the antagonist has resistance against the moving tendency of the agonist. In

the example (19c), the antagonist enables or allows the agonist to succeed its tendency towards movement (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 65).

Mulder (2007: 295) clarifies the steady-state force-dynamic pattern in the following situations:

a. A stronger Antagonist forces the Agonist to move while it has internal tendency toward rest. As in *The ball kept rolling because of the wind blowing on it*.

b. The Agonist's tendency toward rest is stronger than the force opposing it. The Agonist has strong inherent tendency toward rest that overcomes the opposing force. As in *The shed kept standing despite the gale wind blowing against it*.

c. The Agonist has strong tendency toward motion that cannot be stopped by the Antagonist; as in *The ball kept rolling despite the stiff grass*.

d. The Agonist has weak tendency toward motion that is blocked by the Antagonist's strong force. As in *The log kept lying on the incline because of the ridge there*.

It seems that this theory is designed to work at a lower level of language structure, level of clause. However, this theory does not work with the same efficiency at the upper levels, text or event level. It shows us how the entities within a clause interact, but not how this interaction leads to another interaction in other clauses or sentences. So, the current study suggests a new treatment of causality to deal with the upper level of event structure. This new model of causality is called **Causal Interaction of Acts**.

In Talmy's model, the interaction is between entities within a clause or a sentence. The current model posits an interaction between acts that involve interaction between entities. This means that there are two levels of interaction the lower level (between entities) and the upper level (between acts). According to this model, an event is viewed as a series of interacted acts. Every act consists of a verb (process) and one, two or a group of arguments. In the transitive processes, the act consists of an agent (A) with its process and a patient (P) with its process. In other words, the act structure consists of two states, one state encodes the agent's state (S1) and the second encodes the patient's state (S2). In the case of intransitive process, there is only one state (S0), the agent's state. The two situations, transitive and intransitive, are based on Croft's (2017) aspectual states. The researcher illustrates the states in Figure (8).



Figure (8): Diagrammatical Analysis of Act Structure

The researcher classifies the interacted acts into the following types:

1. Logical Act (LogAct): this type of act is not found explicitly in the text, but it is part of the human logic or subjects to it. For example, in the sentence *the horse sings a wonderful song* there is an interaction between this act in which *horses sing* and a logical act in which *horses cannot sing*.

2. Typical Act (TypAct): it is derived from our daily interaction with world around. For example, how boys go to school, how one eats in a restaurant, what happens when a person goes to dentist, etc. Such acts can be formulated in terms of script (see Koppel and Berntsen, 2014).
3. Inferred Act (InfAct): these acts can be named contextual acts because they are not expressed explicitly by language, but they are derived from context relying on the contextual clues. Although inferred acts are not expressed explicitly, they can be manifested later. The inferred acts, which are expressed explicitly by language in a later time, are called **actualized acts**. Inferred acts exist in mysterious events when something needs to be discovered.
4. Perceived Acts (PerAct): such acts represent the most common acts used in our language. A perceived act is the act that is expressed explicitly by language. These acts divide into two types, **real** and **fantastical acts**. Real acts subject to the real life laws, while fantastical events violate these laws. Sometimes a speaker expresses an act indirectly and with different details. The speaker's expressions can be reformed to show the speaker **intended act**.

These different acts interact with each other on the basis of different notions or forms of causality. Causality in this context consists of three parts: causer, cause, result. Causer refers to the act that makes the cause act performed. The following detailed treatment of causality is based mainly on Johnson;s (1987) image schemas (section 2.4.2) and Talmy's (2000: 419) force dynamics (section 2.4.1.4). The researcher represents the relationship between causer and cause in Figure (9). The different forms of causality are as follows:

1. Motivator and Motivatee: these terms refer to the situation in an act motivates another act to be performed. The sentence in (20) consists of two interacted acts: the act of traveling and the act of *seeing* that are performed by the same participant, *Tom*. The act of *seeing* motivates the act of *travel* to be performed.

   (20) *He traveled to London to see his family.*
2. Inhibitor and Inhibitee: this situation of causality is opposite to the previous one. In this situation, one act causes another act to stop or to prevent it from undertaking. The sentence in (21) involves two interacted perceived acts. The first act of *the weather* inhibited the second act of *travel*.

   (21) *The weather was so bad, so he couldn't travel to London.*
3. Facilitator and Facilitatee: the situation of facilitation is close to the situation of motivation in which the two lead to performing an act. In this situation, one of the interacted acts facilitates the second act to undertake. The sentence in (22) involves interaction between two perceived acts. The act of *switching on* facilitates the act of *seeing* to be performed.

   (22) *He could see the armed man when he switched on the light.*
4. Resistor and Resistee: this situation is close to the situation of inhibition in which the two lead to stop or prevent performance of an act. In (23), the sentence includes interaction over the concept of resistance between two acts. The act of *the weather being bad* was supposed to stop the act of *travel* but this act resisted and proceeded.

   (23) *He traveled to London although the weather was so bad.*
5. Maker and Makee: this situation encompasses the mechanical affection between two interacted acts. In other words, the effect of the

maker on the makee is presupposed and identified. There are two interacted acts in (24) in which the scene starts with the act of *explosion* which leads to the act of *demolish* as a presupposed and mechanical result.

(24) *The house demolished when the bomb exploded.*



Figure (9): Diagrammatical analysis of Acts Interaction

3.2.1.5. Contextual Frame Component/Structure

Any piece of language cannot be understood in vacuum, its meaning relies on its relation with the other pieces of language. One of the main theses in cognitive linguistics is that our cognition classifies concepts and lexical into frames (see Filmore, 1982 and 1987) or domains (Langacker, 1987: 488). Concepts are classified through the operation of classification which is the most fundamental subcategory of judgment of comparison. The process of categorization involves comparing the perceived experience with prior experiences and judging that the experience in question belongs to a particular class of experiences. This means that the perceived experience

will be construed in terms of previous related experiences. Langacker uses the term sanction to indicate the process of comparison between the current experience or thing and the category to which it belongs. He distinguishes between full sanction and partial sanction. The former is unproblematic because the current experience has all the typical features to belong to a particular category. In the latter there is a kind of creative extension from the category (Langacker, 1987: 66–71). Categorization includes schematization in which some of the perceived situation features will be attended and the others will be ignored.

So any piece of language is understood through the frame or the domain to which it belongs. These frames/domains are stable in the conceptual structure within the long term memory. However, there are complex meanings and concepts that emerge through language using relying on the context. Such meanings relate one to each other temporarily because they tackle a unified related idea or issue. So, the current study posits a **contextual frame** which is temporary and it works within the short term memory. The researcher formulates the contextual frame in Figure (10); it consists of a core concept and a group of related concepts that together represent one situation. This situation can be formed in terms of Fauconnier and Turner's vital relation of category (in the next section) (Džanic, 2007: 175-6)

The contextual frame is the fifth schematic component that plays a role in structuring scenes and events at all level of structuring. A contextual frame is established when an expression or a sentence sets out a new situation by tackling a new issue or enrolling in a new experience. The narrator, in (25), sets out a new situation when she starts describing Mr. Dursley. The frame

of Mr. Dursley's description starts with indicating his job; then the narrator refers to his physical appearance which also belongs to the contextual frame of Dursley's description. Setting out this new situation ascribes the starting point of a new event which ends with establishing another situation. On the basis of the contextual frame, acts divide onto two types: basic acts and supporting acts. The former contains the scene theme and they determine whether the scene belongs to the contextual frame or not. The latter connect the basic acts and they do not determine the basic theme of the whole event.

(25) *Mr. Dursley was the director of a firm called Grunnings, which made drills. He was a big, beefy man with hardly any neck, although he did have a very large moustache…* (Rowling, 2004: 7)



Figure (10): The contextual frame structure

3.2.2. Narrative Schematic Units and Levels

Narrative, like the other forms of language, is structured from primitive units at different levels. The first complete unit in narrative is the **scene** (primitive event) which corresponds to clause and draws a complete meaningful situation in our minds and it is determined by and related to verb (Gisborne,

2020: xi). The scene consists of the five schematic components which have been explained above, they are: spatial component, temporal component, causal component, participation component and contextual frame component. In other words, the scene involves interaction between two or more acts which belong to one or more domains of participation; and this interaction takes place in specific time and space within a specific contextual frame. Boundaries of a scene are ascribed by the five schematic components. Scenes connect by means of the schematic components to from events at different levels of structuring. Narrative consists of different levels of events starting from primitive or simple events, and through a process of complication, reaching the narrative as a unified complicated event. Talmy (2000: 432) indicates that "an event may be discrete, with a clear beginning and ending point, it can be continuous, experienced as unbounded within the scope of attention that has been partitioned off the cognitive processes of event formation."

The current study adopts Talmy's treatment of events with modifications and additions. The first level of structuring is represented in **Simple Events (SE)** which consists of a group of related scenes. The simple event is structured through the connections between the schematic components of the scenes. The schematic components of the scenes connect to establish schematic structures. For example, the spatial components of the scenes connect to form the spatial structure of the event. So, structure of a simple event is the sum of the five schematic structures: spatial, temporal, participation, causal and contextual frame structures. These structures ascribe the boundaries of the event. Ascription of boundaries takes place when one of the five structures breaks out. For example, end of an event and starting another

event is ascribed when the causal chain of scenes breaks in which there is no causal relation between a particular scene and the next one. Talmy uses four schematic structures to ascribe events; these are temporal, spatial, causal and psychological structures (ibid, 432-46).

The second level of event structure is the **Event Continuum** which consists of a series of simple connected events. These events represent unites that build an event continuum which deals with specific participants and themes and reflects a specific line within the narrative as whole. So an event continuum is structured through the connection between the simple events by the two schematic structures: participation and contextual frame (theme). Commonly, these events are joined by a participant domain in which the prominent participant participates in all the simple events that build the continuum. The first event in the continuum is called the **Initiating Event**. Initiating events are those events which initiate a particular continuum of closely related events. An initiating event sets out a new situation that extends to the next simple events within the continuum. The next events are the **Developing Events** in which the situation is elaborated. The continuum ends with a **Closing Event** which is the last event in the continuum. In this event, the situation which has started in the initiating event ends. The last level of event structure is the level of the **Complex Event** which refers to the combination of different event continuums. This level represents the point at which all event continuums meet to form the narrative as whole. Structure of the complex event is the sum of the event continuums structures.

3.2.3. Nesting Schematic Processes

Schematicity is one of the most important concepts in cognitive linguistics and cognitive science. This concept is the basis of almost all cognitive linguistics theories. There are many linguistic phenomena that have been explained by means of schemas. The concept of schema is not new, but it has been used in cognitive linguistics in different ways and directions. Eysenck and Keane define schemas as “well integrated chunks of knowledge about the world, events, people, and actions” (2000: 352). These chunks of knowledge are retrieved from the long memory and integrated with the information produced at the time of speaking in the working memory. They are viewed as complex clusters of concepts with general highly abstract relations that connect these concepts to form the basic structure of the long term memory (Culpeper, 2009: 128).

In cognitive grammar, schematicity has a central role and the process of schematization is one of the processes that represent the basis for grammar. The process of schematization means "extracting the commonality inherent in multiple experiences to arrive at a conception representing a higher level of abstraction" (Langacker, 2008: 17). This means that the process of schematization derives the most general abstracts properties of entities and actions to create patterns and according to these patterns many concepts are understood. Such abstract patterns are actualized by different entities and actions. For example, the schematic (less specific) properties of the concept ring are: piece of jewelry, circular, and worn on the figure. These properties can be objectified differently according to other specific properties such as material, size, the wearer identity, and so on.

3.2.3.1. Framing

According to the previous sections, narrative is structured at different levels and it consists of interacted acts which form scenes which in turn build simple events; these events configure event continuums; and the continuums connect to structure a complex event (the narrative). Boundaries of all these levels and units need to be identified through the process of framing. It can be defined as the process which identifies boundaries that separate one entity from the others. So the key term in this context is the **ascription** of **boundaries**. This process starts with the framing scenes as the first level of narrative structure.

Talmy's attentional system can be used to explain how boundaries of scenes are ascribed. This system determines the way in which a speaker directs a hearer's attention towards specific entities within a scene (an event in the current study). Attention can be directed toward one part of the scene or more (Evans and Green, 2006: 198). The distribution of attention is governed by the pattern of attention factor (among other factors) which refers to the arrangement of attention in different patterns. These patterns are: **focus of attention**, **window of attention** and **level of attention**. The focus of attention pattern involves placing greater attention on the center reign than the surrounding region. The second pattern, window of attention, includes placing attention one some selected regions of the scene to be more prominent than the others. In (26a) three regions of the scene are selected while only two regions are selected in (26b). The last pattern,

(26) a. The boy shot out of the bottle, through the air and into the old man's head.

b. The boy shot out of the bottle into the old man's head.

level of attention, refers to the level of detail at which focus is placed with respect to a specific event, participant or participants. For instance, in (27a) the focus is placed on the group as whole, while the focus is placed on the friends as individuals (Evans, 2007: 123).

(27) a. The group of friends.

b. The friends in the group.

Talmy's study is directed into distribution of attention on different parts of the scene, while the current study tackles an upper level in which scenes as whole represent the focused parts within events. The key concepts here are the concepts of window of attention and focus of attention. Scenes are ascribed when the window and focus of attention change move from one entity or situation to another. The window of attention can be connected with the clause that has a complete meaning and encodes a complete situation or idea. There are two perfect clauses in (28); they represent two separate scenes. Each of the two clauses encodes a complete situation that can stand alone without any other clause. In terms of attention, the first clause opens a window of attention on a specific situation and puts the focus on the agent (the man) and his action (read). Then, the speaker opens another window of attention to encode another situation with new agent and new action; so, in (28), there are two scenes.

(28) The man was reading a book and his boy was playing football.

Sometimes one clause is not enough to encode a scene because it does not illustrate a complete situation. In (29), there are two clauses that encode a complicated scene.

(29) The man was looking at the boy who was playing football.

The process of framing works also at the second level of event structure which is the level of simple events. As it has been mentioned above, the process framing ascribes the boundaries of a simple event by the five schematic components of its scenes. Change or end of any schematic structure of an event leads to ascribing the end of that event and the beginning of the next event. For example, an event end can be ascribed when its causal chain breaks at one of its scenes. Boundaries of the upper level, event continuum, are ascribed when all the schematic structures that connect its events end or change. For example, simple events of a continuum can be connected by the participation structure; so this continuum ends when this structure the ends. The process of framing can be viewed as a complementary element for Filmore's (1985) frames and Langacker's (2009) domains.

3.2.3.2. Blending

In the previous sections scenes and events at different levels have been framed, but putting boundaries between unites without joining them does not lead to a unified meaningful narrative. So, these units have to connect at all levels through the process of blending. This process is a cover term for different processes that tackle different issues in connecting units. It involves the processes that connect and arrange scenes and events. The first process in this context is the process of **extension** which has basis in some of its aspects in Talmy's degree of extension. Talmy (2007: 513) discusses the degree of extension as one of the schematic categories that form the configurational system. This category is placed in the vertical dimension of the schematic configurational structure. It relates to the way of 'stretching'

the quantities of space or time over distance (Evans, 2007: 513). The process of extension involves extending the four schematic components from one scene to the next one to form the schematic structures of the event as whole.

There are two types of extension: first, full extension indicates that the schematic component as whole extends from one scene to the next. For instance, most of time two scenes take place at the same time; so, the first scene's component of time extends to be part of the second scene. Second, partial extension involves extending some features of a schematic component of one scene to a next scene. For instance, most of time the causal component of one scene extends to the second scene through deriving one of the interacted acts in scene A and inserting it to be part of the interaction in scene B. The researcher forms Figure (11) to illustrate the two types in which the circle represents a schematic component which widens in the full extension because the component is extending into the next scenes. The schematic component in the partial extension is extended through one or more aspects; the small black represents a component aspect. The process of extension goes out of the boundaries of the simple events in which one or more schematic structure extend to connect a group of related events. For example, a participation domain may move through a group of events playing different semantic roles in these events.



Figure (11): Types of Schematic Components Extension

The continuums are connected by the process of extension which takes the form of relating in which one structure within the continuum A relates to a structure in the continuum B. In other words, the continuum A extends by relating the schematic structures of the continuum B to its schematic structures. Talmy (2000: 420) refers to this process in which all the strata and domains and their parts are related one to each other to form a coherent structure. In the current study, this process is employed to relate one continuum to another through the five structures of these continuums. Relating these continuums to each other is based on the different relations that connect one structure in one continuum to the counterpart structure in another continuum. This process is found in Fauconnier and Turner's conceptual blending theory which is based on the vital relations that Džanic (2007: 175-6) summaries as follow:

1. Change: a vital relation that connects one element to another element and sets of elements to other sets; mental spaces are not static, and because of that this vital relation can be present within a single mental space.
2. Identity: a product of complex, unconscious work; despite their differences, mental spaces are connected with relations of personal identity; objective resemblance and shared visible characteristics are not criteria for identity connections across spaces; it is not obligatory for the identity connectors to be one-to-one across spaces.
3. Time: a vital relation connected to memory, change, understanding the relationship of cause and effect.
4. Space: a vital relation that brings inputs separated in input spaces into a single physical space within the blended space.

5. Cause–Effect: a vital relation that connects one element, as a cause, with another element that counts as its effect.
6. Part–Whole: a vital relation that fuses part–whole mappings across spaces into one.
7. Representation: it is possible for one input to have a representation of the other; in the conceptual integration network one input corresponds to the item represented and the other to the element that represents it.
8. Role: within the conceptual integration network one element, as a role, can be connected to another element that is regarded as being its value.
9. Analogy: a vital relation that connects two different blended spaces that through blending obtain the same frame structure.
10. Disanalogy: a vital relation that is based on Analogy; Psychological research has shown that people find it much more difficult to tell the difference between two things that are completely different than between those that are similar in some way.
11. Property: an inner-space vital relation that links certain elements with their property; an outer–space vital relation of some kind is compressed into an inner space vital relation of Property in the blend.
12. Similarity: an inner-space vital relation that connects elements with properties they have in common.
13. Category: an inner-space vital relation that links elements with categories they belong to; Analogy as an outer-space vital relation can be compressed into an inner space vital relation of Category in the blend.
14. Intentionality: a vital relation that includes vital relations connected with hope, desire, fear, memory, etc.; this vital relation is extremely

important, because our every action thought, feeling is based on relations it applies to.

15. Uniqueness: a crucial vital relation because many vital relations are compressed into Uniqueness into blend.

In Fauconnier and Turner's (2002: 89-106) theory, blending occurs on the bases of the above vital relations. Some of the above vital relations do not work in the current study because they at more detailed levels of language structure. The process of relating in this study is based on some of the above relation in a relatively different way. It is based on the five schematic structures that are mentioned in a different way above.

1. Extension through time: the continuum A extends to the continuum B through time when one event (or events) in A takes place at the same time with an event (or events) in B. In another situation, the extension happens when the two events in question occur sequentially.
2. Extension through space: continuum A extends to continuum B when the two continuums have an event or events take place in the same micro or macro places. The second situation of extension happens when the two events occurs in different but related places. The relatedness takes different forms like part-whole, closeness or any other relation.
3. Extension through participation: this kind of extension takes place when the continuum A contains an event or events that have a participant/s who participate in an event or events in the continuum B regardless of the semantic role that the participant has in the two events. A participant may have the semantic role of agent in A and

patient in B. The extension happens also when a participant in A has a relationship in B.

4. Extension through contextual frame: events are categorized into different frames as if has been discussed before. So, the continuum A extends to the continuum B when two or more counterpart events in the continuums belong to the same contextual frame.
5. Extension through causality: the most important schematic component is causality. An event (or events) in the continuum A may be cause for undertaking an event (or events) in the continuum B or vice versa.

The last process within the framework of blending is the process of **sequencing**. Narration in many times is not chronological, so there are some event should be inserted before or between other events. So, function of this process is to arrange event. This process is based on the temporal and causality schematic structures. Events are distributed on the line of time which its arrow toward future. This distribution is based on the temporal dixies. The events can be arranged on the basis of cause and effect in which the causer event precedes the causee event. In addition to time and causality, there are **logical sequence** and **typical sequence**. The former refers to the logical arrangement of events in the real world; for example, death does not precede birth and waking up does not come before sleeping. The latter indicates the typical arrangement of events that is based on our daily experiences.

3.3. Idealization Cognitive System

One of the prominent features of natural languages, specially meaning, is the flexibility in which language users can structure it formally and

meaningfully in different ways. This is an aspect of linguistic creativity that human beings have. This feature leads to the mercurial nature that any linguist feels when he undertakes any type of linguistic analysis. In addition, there are many nonlinguistic aspects that cannot subject to the linguistic analysis. Variable nature of language forces scholars to look for a level of language in which fluid elements of language are not found in order to make the linguistic analysis possible. The idea of necessity of existence such level which has been started with Chomsky (1957) when he suggested existence of deep and surface levels of language. The main justification for such hypothesis is the systematic nature of human mind. Cognitive processes are systematic; therefore, they cannot deal with unpredictable behavior of language.

The current study suggests existence of a cognitive system that works between the surface and deep structures of language. Input of this system is any piece of language loaded with linguistic and nonlinguistic elements that cannot subject to the restricted operations of language processing. At the same time, many necessary linguistic elements are missed. Its output is the perceived piece of language with all the missing elements and without the unprocessable ones. This system works on all the levels of language and it is restricted by logic. This system divides into two parts: **Gap-filling Process and Compression Process**.

3.3.1. Gap-filling Process

The process of gap-filling has the function of adding what is missed in a piece of language to make it possible for processing. Our cognition adds the implicit elements that are not found in the surface form of language and

these elements are derived from context, logic and typicality. Gap-filling draws heavily on the context because most of the meanings are not expressed by words but by the context. This process relies on the context (textual, social and physical) to add the meanings that are not found in words, especially those which are missed from the five schematic components/structures. Typicality is built through our daily experiences and how actions happen in our real world, for example, what happens when people go to restaurants. Typical entities and actions can be formed in terms of image schemas that have been discussed in the previous chapter. Properties of these schemas have been summarized by Evans and Green (2006: 179-89) as follows:

1. Image schemas are prior to the conceptual structure in their existence. Mandler (2004, as cited in Evans and Green, 2006: 180) points out that they are derived from the everyday experiences of human senses precede and give rise to structuring concepts. This means, as it has been mentioned before, that image schemas contribute to building our concepts.
2. Image schemas are general constructive abstract features of concepts that can give rise to more specific concepts. In other words, an image schema underlies several concepts but also gives rise to a specific concept. For example, all the following specific lexicalized concepts *out, into, in, out and out of* relate to CONTAINER schema which is highly abstract image schema.
3. An Image schema appears when humans observe and interact with the world. The nature of this schema is based on the way we interact with the world. This can be illustrated by the FORCE schema. This image

schema derives from the way we act upon the other entities, or these entities act upon us.

4. Image schemas have inherent meaning because they derive from an inherently embodied experience. However, it is not meaningful according to our usual sense of meaning. It is meaningful in the sense that we can predict the consequences of the embodied experience. For instance, if a person moves a cup of coffee from side to side slowly, we predict that the coffee will move with the cup. This is because of the image schema of CONTAINMENT in which the entity (coffee in our example) is restricted by obvious boundaries. In terms of the FORCE schema, the cup controls the coffee because it has the force to exert. Humans acquire this obvious kind of knowledge as a result to our interaction with the physical world.
5. "Image schemas are analogue representations deriving from experience." This means that our knowledge is not represented in out cognition in terms of words and pictures. They simulate the embodied experience. This idea can be illustrated by the following analogy: driving cannot be learned by reading a driving manual or listening to an instructor's explanation. Instructions represent only the general clues for mastering driving. Instead, we have to learn through experiencing driving. This type of complex learning process involves mastering "an array of interrelated sensorimotor routines." Image schemas simulate the driving experience in the human mind as a holistic sensory experience (Mandler, 2004 as cited in Evans and Green, 2006: 184).
6. "Image schemas can be internally complex." They typically consist of complex aspects that can be separately analyzed. For instance, the

complex image schema of CONTAINER consists of boundary, exterior and interior elements.

7. "Image schemas are not the same as mental images". A person can close his eyes to imagine his friend's face. The detailed image of his friend's face in his mind is called mental image. This kind of image is rich of details and it can be retrieved from the memory consciously. Image schemas, in contrast, are highly abstract and a person cannot close his eye to think about them as he does with mental images.
8. "Image schemas are multi-modal." The main reason behind our disability to think up image schemas is that they do not derive from the embodied experience through a specific sense. Image schemas are not accessible to the conscious introspection because they highly abstract patterns hidden in the cognitive system.
9. "Image schemas are subject to transformations." The embodied experiences that image schemas derive from are not static, they are ongoing. Therefore, human mind transform from one schema to another.
10. "Image schemas can occur in clusters." They are not found separately, they form interrelated networks. For example, the FORCE image schema consists of a network related schemas. One of these image schemas is the COMPULSION schema. This image simulates the experience in which an external force is exerted over an entity. For example, a person exerts force to move a table. Another related one is the BLOCKAGE schema. This schema derives from an experience in which an entity resists force. For example, a person stops a ball.

3.3.2. Compression Process

One of the main scientific principles in language processing is the principle of economy. A narrative may include a huge and diverse amount of details that cover the main story of that narrative. All of these details are processed within the short term memory, but only the basic concepts or scenes pass to the long term memory. The principle of economy and the huge and diverse amount of details that our memory does not keep represent the necessity of the existence of the compression processes. While the process of gap-filling involves adding elements, the process of compression involves deleting some elements. This process consists of three sub-processes that work at different levels of compression. There are three levels of compression that correspond to the levels of event structuring levels: Scene compression, simple event compression and event continuum compression. This necessary process is missed in Talmy's (2000: 417).

The researcher posits that compression includes two processes: **extraction** and **conversion**. The process of extraction encompasses deleting some linguistic and nonlinguistic redundant elements. It is directed mainly to the interaction of acts within scenes. Every scene involves interaction between one or more acts which are selected through the process of extraction. The scene in (30) involves interaction between two acts: the act of *selling* and the act of *paying off*.

(30) The man sold his car to pay off his debt.

The second process, conversion, is directed for converting some fluid linguistic elements, for example metaphorical, into more stable elements, literal. Sometimes, a speaker uses many words or expressions to describe

something can be explained with one word (or little words) that represent the category to which the expressions belong. The process of conversion uses the category instead of the words which belong to it. In (31), the expression *turning the issue all over in his mind* can be converted to the general concept



Figure (12): The Conversion Process

to which this expression belongs, as it is illustrated in Figure (12). The bold circle represents the general category to which the expression in question belongs. This category or the converted meaning is called the intended action.

(31) He was turning the issue all over in his mind.

The question here is to what extent the two processes can be applied to compress scenes or expressions. The main criterion in this context is the accuracy of message. An expression subjects to the three processes to the extent that the expression meaning is not affected. Language mainly designed to convey messages, so the three processes do not affect the conveyed meaning in any way. In other words, the message will be conveyed as it is.

Compression of simple events and event continuums includes the process of **selection** and the process of **abstraction**. Selection can be explained in terms of relevancy (almost in the same use of this term proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1995) and prominence that our cognition is based on. The human beings have the ability to attend to some prominent aspects of their experience that are relevant to the context and ignore all the other aspects. Selection is one of the construal operations that have been explained in the third chapter. In any event there are many scenes but these scenes are not at the same level of **prominence**; some scenes are more prominent than the others. So, compression of events and continuums involve selecting the most prominent scene/s or event/s that represents the event as whole. The selected scene/s or event/s should satisfy the following criteria:

1. The schematic structure of the scene/s or event/s is represented in most of the other scenes; or at least, it has relation with all the other scene/s or event/s. For example, one or more of the interacted acts appear as part of the interaction in the other scenes or have direct relations with the other scene/s or event/s.
2. The selected scene/s or event/s includes the core idea of the event or the continuum as whole.
3. The selected scene/s or event/s has to contribute to forming and understanding the main plot or story of the narrative.

The process of abstraction, after the process of selection, applies to the selected scene/s or event/s. the process of abstraction involves selecting the most general aspects of an entity, scene or event. This process is based on Langacker's Abstraction and Talmy's Schematization. They use these terms

to indicate to whether something is construed in details or in general. Talmy (1983:238) uses the visual example of to illustrate this subcategory:

(32)

a. She ran across the field.

b. She ran through the field

The two sentences encode the same scene, but there is a kind of different detailed aspects profiled by using the different words "across" and "through". The sentence (a) illustrates a two dimensional scene while the sentence (b) guides the attention of the listener to the vegetation thickness in the field by using the preposition "through" that encodes a three-dimensional view. They are about how many details the attention is focused on.

The current study starts from the above idea of the construal operation of schematization/abstraction to formulate the process of abstraction. This process applies to the five schematic structures. For instance, instead of representing the select scene in terms of the interacted acts content, the scene can be represented in terms of the contextual frame to which the acts belong. For example, the sentence in (33a) belongs to the contextual frame of oddness; so this scene can be abstracted through referring to the act by the contextual frame. The scene in (33b) has been abstracted by substituting the act of *reading* by unidentified act of *doing an odd thing*.

(33) a. The horse was reading the novel.

b. The horse was doing an odd thing.

The spatial structure can be abstracted in indicating the macro aspects of the location that are found in all basic scenes.

3.4. Concept Formation Processes

Language has different forms and styles that are processed in different ways. Through our experiences in the real world, our cognition has designed different mechanism to deal with these different forms of language. These mechanisms will be motivated through the genre determining process. This process is employed to identify the genre to which the input (a piece of language) belongs in order to motivate the processing mechanism of that genre. Identifying genres takes place through the linguistic clues. Relying on the conceptual part of language, there are two genres: **realistic** and **fantastical**. By means of the linguistic clues, our cognition can identify whether the processed concepts subject to the real world laws (realistic) or violate these laws (fantastical). The fantastical genre involves forming new concepts that do not subject to the real world norms. The new concepts are formed by the concept formation processes. These processes do not create completely new concepts; the new concepts are modified forms of the real concepts. So, these processes can be classified as modification processes. These processes can be formulated in terms of mental spaces in Fauconnier and Turner's (2002) (see section 2.5). Some concepts are formed by one process and others are formed by more than one process. The researcher exploits Fauconnier and Turner's (2002) and Structural schematization (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 63) to formulate the following processes through deriving the structural schematic components of the concepts in terms of mental spaces and the process of blending. The suggested processes are:

1. Importation: this process involves deriving one feature or a group of features from the real concept and adding it to the fantastical concept. This process consists of two mental spaces, source space and target space, and two sub-processes: derivation and addition. The real concept occupies the source space and the fantastical concept occupies the target space. The process of derivation is employed to select one feature or a group of features from the source space; and the process of addition is directed to add the derived features to the target space. The researcher illustrates this process in Figure (13). The general elements of this process (mental spaces and blending) are based on Fauconnier and Turner's (2002), but they are employed in a completely different way.



Figure (13): The Process of Importation

2. Personification: this process is a special form of the process of importation; it involves also deriving one feature from the source space and adding it to the target space. The difference in this process is in identity of the spaces in which the source space is occupied by the human and the target is occupied by an animal or a thing; or the source space is occupied by an animal and the target is occupied by a thing. In (35), the feature of reading is derived from the source space of human and added to the target space of dogs. There is another form of this process which is

(35) The dogs were singing in a wonderful voice.

the **reverse personification**. This process involves derivation one feature or a group of features from an animal or a thing and adding them to human as in (36).

(36) The man was flying around the house when his wings broke.

3. Coining: this process involves modification of already found concepts by coining new features and adding to them. It consists of two mental spaces: the first one contains the coined features which are added to the second space which contains the target concept; Figure (14) shows how this process works.



Figure (14): The Process of Coining

4. Metaphoricity: metaphor is one of the most prominent figures of speech that received great interest from linguists because of its special features. Some linguists look at metaphor as a linguistic device and others, like cognitive linguists, view it a one of the cognitive mechanisms that has different applications in human mind. Croft and Cruse (2004: 53) consider metaphor (see 3.2 in the former chapter) as a construal operation. This process works within the process of importation which has been explained above. It mediates derivation and addition of the importation process. This process consists of three mental spaces: the first mental space represents the one concept (A); the second space is determined for another concept (B); and the third one includes the formed concept. The process encompasses

mapping between the two concepts, A and B, in which features of the concept A is represented in terms of features of the counterpart concept. This representation appears in the third space. The process is illustrated in Figure (15).



Figure (15): The Process of Metaphoricity

5. Clipping: this process includes cutting part/s or a group of features from a concept and leaving the rest. It consists of two mental spaces: the first one (source) involves the complete concept and the second (target) encompasses the clipped part. Mostly, this process works within the scope of the merging process, as the researcher represents in Figure (16).

6. Merging: the current process encompasses forming one concept through integrating two or more concepts, or parts from different concepts. There are three forms of merging:

a) Merging part of one concept with another complete concept. This merging is preceded by the process of clipping in which part of the concept A is clipped, then, the part merges with the concept B.



Figure (16): The Process of Merging

b) Merging two complete concepts to form one fantastical concept; and this form of merging is rear.

c) Merging parts from two different concepts. This form involves clipping part from the concept A and part from the concept B, then, merging them to form one concept.

7. Unplexity and Multiplexity: these two concepts have been used by Talmy (2000: 48) instead of the grammatical terms of singular and plural to encode the category of number in all situations and aspects of language. The terms are employed here as two related concept formation processes. Unplexity encompasses reduction of size and/or number of a concept or part of concept. Multiplexity reverses unplexity in which it increases size and/or number of a concept or part of concept. The fantastical concept of snick in (37a) is formed by the process of multiplexity which increases number of

heads in the snick concept. The process of unplexity decreases the size of man in (37b). Multiplexity and unplexity of size include all the dimensions. The two processes are shown in Figure (17).

(37) a. The hero cut the five heads of the snick.

b. The dwarf man was flying on the back of a butterfly in the field.



Figure (17): The Processes of Unplexity and Multiplexity

4. The Model in Brief

Narrative Structuring System, as in Figure (18), consists of three parts: pattern structuring system, idialization cognitive system and concept formation processes; these parts work simultaneously. The system starts by figuring out the first unit in the narrative, the initiative scene through the five schematic components: spatial, temporal, causal, participation and contextual frame components. Then the configured scenes connect by the process of extension by means of the schematic components to form an event; this event is framed by the process of framing at the closing scene. During the pattern structuring work, the idealization system achieves some issues like extracting the interacted acts (perceived, logical, inferred, typical

acts) from the perceived scenes; converting some metaphorical and indirect pieces of language into literal and direct ones; and compensating the missing linguistic pieces.

After framing the event by the pattern structuring system, the event is compressed by the idealization system. It selects the most prominent scene/s that represents the event as whole; and then, it abstracts the selected scene/s by taking the most general aspects of that scene. The compressed events connect by the processes of extension and sequencing, in the pattern structuring system, to form an event continuum. The first event in the continuum is called the initiative event and the last one is the closing one. During the work of the system above, there are some fantastical concepts appear; they are formed through a number of concept formation processes: importation, personification, coining, metaphoricity, clipping, merging, multiplexity and uniplexity.

Chapter Four

Data Analysis

4.1. Introduction

The current chapter is devoted to applying the model which has been developed in the previous chapter. It involves analyzing the data (events and fantastical concepts) which is selected from the first part in Rowling's Harry Potter. The data includes events continuums that are selected from different chapters of the novel. Some of these continuums are analyzed in the body of this chapter and the others are analyzed in the appendix. The analysis starts with the initiating event (and its scenes) in the continuum; then, the developing events and, at the end, the closing event. Every scene in these events is analyzed into its schematic components. The sum of the schematic components of the scenes represents the schematic structure of the event as a whole. This structure consists of the five schematic structures: temporal structure, spatial structure, participation structure, causal structure and contextual frame structure.

These five structures are compressed to establish the event which consists of the general and prominent aspects of the event. The other events within the event continuum come across the same process, then, these compressed events will be involved in the process of sequencing. The event continuum, like events, is subjected to the process of compression by selecting the compressed events that have contribution to the main plot in the novel as a whole. The compressed continuums connect to form the novel as a whole. The analyzed data involves not only events, but also concepts. All the fantastical concepts in the novel are analyzed according to concept

formation processes that have been established and discussed in the third chapter. So the chapter is divided into two main parts relying on the type of the analyzed date, events and concepts.

4.2. Event-Continuum-A

The Event-Continuum-A is the first continuum in the novel and it consists of five events that have different lengths. The starting point of this continuum is ascribed by establishing a new situation by the two prominent participants, *Mr. Dursley* and the cat. *Mr. Dursley* is the most prominent participation domain because it continues in participating through the five events of the continuums. The initiating and closing events are represented in the following sections. Boundaries of the current continuum are ascribed by the contextual frame (when peculiarity changes) and participation domains (when *Mr. Dursley* disappears). The five events are analyzed in the following sections; the analysis involves structuring the scenes within the events, compressing and connecting the events.

4.2.1. Schematic Structure of the Initiating Event (Event-A)

This event (Event-A) is classified as an initiating event because it is not based on a previous event and it initiates a new situation. It involves ten connected scenes that are ascribed by different actions performed by the participants. According to the criteria have been established (see 3.2.3.1), the ten scenes should share five structures: spatial, temporal, contextual frame, causal and participation. On the basis of the **framing process**, the current event is **bounded** principally by the causal structure and participation structure. The other three structures continue to the next event. The causal chain has been broken at the end of the last scene (*Dursley gave himself a little shake and put the cat out of his mind*). Participation structure of this

event is based on the dialectical participation between the two **prominent participants (domains)**, *Mr. Dursley* (A-Dom) and *the cat* (B-Dom). This dialectical participation ascribes the event when the B-Dom (*the cat*) disappeared from the last scene and the A-Dom starts a participation process with another participant (*the strangely dressed people*).

The ten scenes are as follow:

S1. "*It was on the corner of the street that he noticed the first sign of something peculiar– a cat reading a map* (Rowling, 2004: 8)."

A-Dom: Mr. Dursly [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Mr. Dursly – Pr: noticing) (P: a cat – Pr: is noticed)]

B-Dom: a cat [Motivator: PerAct [(A: a cat – Pr: read) (P: a map – Pr: is read)]] [Lo: the street corner]]

Res: [B-Dom's PerAct motivates A-Dom's PerAct to undertake]

The **extracting process** detects an interaction between two perceived acts; one of them is related to the domain of *Mr. Dursley* (A-Dom) and the second one is related to the domain of *the cat* (B-Dom). As in Figure (19) diagram, the first act consists of the process of noticing and its two arguments, *Mr. Dursley* as an agent and *the cat* as a patient. This act is motivated by a previous act which involves a process (reading) and two arguments, the cat as an agent and the map as a patient. The peculiar act of reading motivates the act of noticing to start. Figure (19) shows the spatial relationship between the two participant domains where the A-Dom (the above bold circle) directed his attention toward the B-Dom (the below bold circle) where the street corner represents a surface for it. Time is not represented in the scene, but it has been added through **gap-filling** process depending on the previous context. In terms of theme, this scene can be categorized within

the most abstract contextual frame of "peculiarity" because the cat's act of reading is something is rejected by the human mind. The following formula represents how the perceived acts interact.



Figure (19): Diagrammatical analysis of S1 of event-A

S2. *"Mr. Dursley didn't realize what he had seen* (ibid)*."*

A-Dom: Mr. Dursly [Inhibitor: LogAct [(A: cats – Pr: cannot read)] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – Pr: realize) (P: the cat's act – Pr: is realized]]

Res: [Inhibitor's LogAct stops Inhibited PerAct]

According to the **extracting process**, this scene consists of an interaction between two acts within one participation domain. As a reaction to the cat's PerAct of reading in the previous scene, the A-Dom (Mr. Dursley) undertakes a logical act (*cats cannot read*). This logical act interacts with the perceived act of realization. According to the diagramatical analysis in Figure (18), the LogAct (*cats cannot read*) works as an inhibitor for the PerAct of realization. The LogAct consists of the negated process of *reading* with *cats* as an agent. The PerAct includes the process of *realization* with two arguments, Mr. Dursley as an agent and the cat as a patient. Location

and time of this event are not found explicitly in the scene, but they have been derived from the context by the **gap-filling** process. Concerning theme, this scene is also related to the contextual frame of peculiarity because the acts relate to the cat's PerAct of reading. This scene connects with the previous one through the process of **blending** on the bases of different aspects. Part of the blending is based on the similarity between the two scenes in time, place, theme and participants. There is also a causal relation between the two scenes where the LogAct in this scene is motivated by the cat's PerAct in the previous scene.



Figure (20): Diagrammatical analysis of S2 of event-A

S3. "*then he jerked his head around to look again* (ibid)."

A-Dom1: Mr. Dursly [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – Pr: realize) (P: the cat's act – Pr: is realized]] [Motivated: PerAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – Pr: jerk) – (P: his head – Pr: is jerked)]]

Res: [Motivator's PerAct makes Motivated's PerAct undertake jerking]

A-Dom2: Mr. Dursly [Facilitator: PerAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – Pr: jerk) – (P: his head – Pr: is jerked)]] [Facilitated: PerAct: [(A: Mr.Dursley – Pr: look) (P: the cat – Pr: is looked)]]

Res: [A-Dom's Facilitator PerAct enables A-Dom's Facilitated PerAct]

The **extracting** process determines three interacted perceived acts, as in Figure (21), two of them are found in the scene and the third is derived from the previous scene. The PerAct of *realization* represents the motivator that leads to the PerAct of *jerking* (the motivated act). The motivator (act) consists of the process of *realization* with two arguments, *Mr. Dursley* as an agent and the *cat* as a patient. The motivated act involves a process with two arguments, *Mr. Dursley* as an agent and his *head* as a patient. The act of *jerking* turns to be a facilitator that enables the PerAct of *looking* to undertake as a facilitated act.



Figure (21): Diagrammatical analysis of S3of event-A

The three acts occur within one participation domain (A-Dom). The spatial relationship between the two participants where *Mr. Dursley* is reprsented by the above bold circle and the *cat* is represented by the below one and the curved arrow ascribes *Mr. Durley's* reoriention of attention toward the *cat* which stands on the street corner. Time is added by the process of **gap-filling** depending on the context. The blending process makes mapping between this scene and the former one relying on the similarity between time, space, theme, and participents in the two scenes. The causal chain is extended by means of the PerAct of realization which is inhibited act in the preceeding scene and motivator in the current scene.

S4. "*There was a tabby cat standing on the corner of Privet Drive, but there wasn't a map in sight* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Mr. Dursly [Facilitator: PerAct [(A: Mr.Dursley – Pr: look) (P: the cat – Pr: is looked)]]

B-Dom2: a cat [Facilitatee: PerAct [(A: cat – Pr: exist) – (A: map – pr: not exist]]

Res: [A-Dom's PerAct facilitates the second PerAct]

The process of **extracting** identifies two interacted acts within two participatipn domains, *Mr. Dursley* (A-Dom) and *the cat* (B-Dom). The interaction between the acts starts with the act of *looking* which is derived from the preceeding scene. This act is involved within the A-Dom. This PerAct works as a facilitator that enables the PerAct of *existing* to be perceived. The process of *existing* is not found explicitly in the scene, but it

represents the **intended act** of the scene that is derived through the process of **conversion**. This PerAct consists of the process *exsisting* which is repeated with two agents, *the cat* and *the map*. The spatial relations between the participant and the time are added by the process of **gap-filling** as they are represented in the diagram. This scene is also placed within the contextual frame of peculiarity because some elements of the previous scenes have disappeared suddenly. Regarding the relationship between this scene and the previous one, the blending process is based on the extention of the schematic elements of the last scene: causal chain, time, space, participation and theme.



Figure (22): Diagrammatical analysis of S4 of event-A

S5. *"What could he have been thinking of? It must have been a trick of the light* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: trick of light – Pr: exist)]]

B-Dom: a cat [Motivator: PerAct [(A: cat – Pr: reads/exists) (P: map – pr: is read/not exist)]]

Res: [B-Dom's PerAct makes A-Dom's PerAct undertakes]

The process of **extracting** in this scene takes out three interacted acts within the two domains, A-Dom (Mr. Dursley) and B-Dom (the cat). The interaction starts with the two PerActs that are derived from the former scenes. The two PerActs of *reading* and *existing* are included within the B-Dom and they, together, represents the motivator. They motivate the PerAct of *existing* within the A-Dom. This act consists of the process of *existing* with one argument (*trick of light* as an agent). This act of *existing* is established through the process of conversion. It represents the **intended act** that the scene as whole tends to convey. As in the previous scenes, time and space are added by the **gap-filling** process. They can be indicated by the contextual clues. This scene is highly cohesive because the motivator involves derived acts from all the previous scenes. In addition, all the other schematic elements extend from the former scenes into this scene.



Figure (23): Diagrammatical analysis of S5 of event-A

S6. *"Mr. Dursley blinked and stared at the cat* (ibid)*."*

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: PerAct [(A: trick of light – Pr: exist)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – blink/stare]]

Res: [Motivator's PerAct makes Motivatee PerAct undertake]

In this scene, there are three **extracted** acts within the domain of *Mr. Dursley* (A-Dom). The first act is the PerAct of existing (as shown in the formula) that is derived from the preceding scene. It works as a motivator for the second extracted two acts. These motivated PerActs consists of the processes *staring* and *blinking* with only one argument, Mr. Dursley as an agent. The spatial relation between the participants and time are inferred from the context and added by the **gap-filling** process. Mr. Dursley is located in front of his house and directs his sight into the second participant. These two elements extend from the previous scenes. The process of **extension** also relates this scene to the above scenes by extending the contextual frame of peculiarity because the A-Dom is still under the effect of the first scene in which a cat reads a map. The causal chain is extended by the interaction between the current and prior acts.



Figure (24): Diagrammatical analysis of S6 of event-A

S7. *"It stared back* (ibid)."

B-Dom: a cat [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: the cat – Pr: stare)]]]

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – blink/stare)]]

Res: [B-Dom's Act makes A-Dom's PerAct undertake]

The current scene is based on an interaction between three **extracted** acts within the two participation domains, A-Dom and B-Dom. The motivator consists of the *staring* and *blinking* PerActs that are derived from the scene above. These acts motivate *the cat* to perform a reactive PerAct of *staring*. In this situation, there is a kind of substitution between the prominent participants, especially in the perspective which has been converted. The act of *staring* starts from the cat (B-Dom) toward Mr. Dursley (A-Dom); the positions of the two participants have not been changed. The act of *staring* that the cat performs makes the scene relate to the contextual frame of peculiarity. Time is inserted by the **gap-filling** process which works by using the contextual clues. The relationship between the current scene and the previous one is represented by the process of **extension** in which the schematic components of the scene above are found in this event. The



Figure (25): Diagrammatical analysis of S7 of event-A

component of causality is extended through the motivator which is derived from the former scene. The spatial relation between the two participants is same in the two scenes with little change. The places of the participants have not changed, but the viewpoint has been converted. The arrow, as in the diagram, starts from the B-Dom toward the A-Dom. Participation, time, and theme have not changed.

S8. *"As Mr. Dursley drove around the corner and up the road, he watched the cat in his mirror* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Facilitator: PerAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – Pr: driving) (P: car – Pr: is driven)]] [Lo: around the corner and up the road] [Facilitatee: PerAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – Pr: watching) (P: the cat – Pr: is watched)]]

Res2: [Facilitator enables Facilitatee PerAct to undertakes]

The current scene contains two acts can be **extracted** from the sentence above. None of the acts is derived from the scene above; they are explicitly represented in the scene. The two acts are within the same participation domain, Mr. Dursley. The first PerAct consists of the process of *driving* and two arguments, *Mr. Dursley* as an agent and *the car* (added by the **gap-filling** process) as a patient. This act functions as a facilitator to the second PerAct which involves the process of watching with two arguments, Mr. Dursley as an agent and the cat as a patient. Concerning the spatial relation between the two prominent interacted participants, A-Dom is moving around the corner on which *the cat* is standing. Meanwhile his moving, he directs his sight toward *the cat* as it shown in the diagram. As in the scenes above, time is added by the gap-filling process. The A-Dom still focuses on the

peculiar act that the cat does, so this act can be classified within the contextual frame of peculiarity.

The process of **extension** relates this scene to the prior ones by extending the schematic components from the previous act into the current act. The component of causality of the causal chain is not broken even though none of the previous acts are derived. The act of *watching the cat* is related to all the scenes above. The spatial relation between the two prominent acts differs in some aspects, but they are similar in many other aspects. The B-Dom stands on the same position in the two scenes, but the A-Dom has changed his position. The viewpoint also has been changed as it is illustrated in the diagram. The other components extend to the current scene without any change.



Figure (26): Diagrammatical analysis of S8 of event-A

S9. "*It was now reading the sign that said Privet Drive _no, looking at the sign; cats couldn't read maps or signs* (ibid)."

A-Dom1: Mr. Dursley [Inhibitor: LogAct [(A: cats – Pr: cannot read)]]

B-Dom1: the cat [Inhibitee: PerAct [A: the cat – Pr: read) (P: the sign – Pr: is read)]]

Res1: [B-Dom's LogAct inhibits A-Dom's PerAct]

A-Dom2: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: LogAct [(A: cats – Pr: can look)]]

B-Dom2: the cat [Motivatee: PerAct [A: the cat – Pr: look) (P: the sign – Pr: is looked)]]

Res2: [B-Dom's LogAct motivates A-Dom's PerAct]

This scene traces back to the first peculiar act of reading that is performed by the cat. The process of **extracting** can identify four interacted acts within the two participation domains, Mr. Dursley and the cat. The scene starts with an interaction between two acts. The first one is the LogAct in which *cats cannot read*. This act inhibits the PerAct of reading that is derived from the first scene in the current event. The former act is within the A-Dom and the latter is within B-Dom. This process of inhibiting leads to finding a substituted conversion to the peculiar scene which Mr. Dursley sees. Therefore, another interaction starts between two acts also within the two participants. The first is the LogAct of *looking* within the A-Dom. It consists of the process of *looking* with only one argument, *cats* as an agent. This LogAct motivates the PerAct of looking within the B-Dom as an acceptable conversion for what is going on. This motivated PerAct involves the process of *looking* with two arguments: *the cat* as an agent and *the sign* as a patient.

Time and space are added by the process of gap-filling as in the previous scenes. The scene is still connected with the contextual frame of peculiarity because it involves the peculiar acts that have been represented in the prior

scenes. The scene relates to the previous ones by the schematic components through the process of **extension**. Starting with the component of causality, the first two cats of reading, the logical and the perceived, are derived from the first scene and they appear in most of the previous scenes. This makes the chain of causality so strong. The rest of components also extend to this scene without any change.



Figure (27): Diagrammatical analysis of S9 in event-A

S10. *"Mr. Dursley gave himself a little shake and put the cat out of his mind* (ibid).*"*

A-Dom1: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: InfAct [(A: cats – Pr: read/look) (P: the sign – Pr: is read/looked)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – Pr: shaking) (P: himself – Pr: is shacked]]

Res1: [Motivator's InfAct makes Motivatee PerAct undertakes]

A-Dom2: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – Pr: shaking) (P: himself – Pr: is shacked]] [Motivatee**:** InfAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – Pr: forgetting) (P: the cat – Pr: is forgotten)]]

Res2: [Motivator's InfAct makes Motivatee PerAct undertakes]

This scene is the last scene within the current event and it represents the border between this event and the next event. The border is ascribed by two components: causality and participation. This scene represents the last ring within the causal chain. Concerning the participation component, one of the prominent participants, *the cat*, disappears from the next scene. The **extracting** process determines four interacted acts. The motivator consists of



Figure (28): diagrammatical analysis of S10 in event-A

the two competent acts of *reading* and *looking* that are derived from the scene above. These PerActs motivates *Mr. Dursley* as an agent to undertake the PerAct of *shaking himself* as a patient. This act turns to function as a motivator for an inferred act that includes the process of *forgetting* with the two arguments: *Mr. Dursley* as an agent and *the cat* as a patient. The scene still goes around the first peculiar act of *reading* that is performed by *the cat*. Therefore this scene is related to the contextual frame of peculiarity. The spatial relation between the two participants has been broken when A-Dom goes far from B-Dom. The process of extension relates the current scene to the previous ones by extending the components of time, space, participation, theme and causality from the former scene into this scene.

4.2.2. Compression of the Initiating Event (Event-A)

As it has been discussed before, the event schematic structure is the sum of the five structures: spatial, temporal, causal, contextual frame, and participation. Each of these structures is built on the bases of the schematic components of the scenes. So the compression of the event is based on compressing these structures. In the following points the five structures will be compressed by selecting the prominent aspects and abstracting the scenes into their general features that can be found implicitly in the scenes.

The first step in the process of compression is **selecting** the most **prominent** interacted acts. According to the criteria established in the previous chapter (see 3.3.2), the first scene is the most prominent one. In this scene, *the cat's* PerAct of *reading* represent the motivator which leads to Mr. *Dursley's* PerAct of *noticing*. This scene fulfills all the requirements of the prominent

scene because it indicates the main idea of the event and it has relations with all the other scenes as follows:

- S2's agent does not realize S1
- S3's agent relooks at S1
- S4 represents S1 without the act of reading
- S5's agent interprets S1 as a trick of light
- S6's agent tries to make sure of S1
- S7's agent reacts to S6 which is based on S1
- S8's agent tries to make sure of S1
- S9's agent tries to find a logical conversion for S1
- S10's agent tries to forget S1

On the basis of the represented relations between S1 and the others scenes, S1 is selected as the prominent scene.

Concerning the contextual frame structure, the acts above can be classified into two types: first, the supporting acts in this event are like the act of jerking in S3, the act of driving in S8, and the act of shaking in S10. The



Figure (29): The contextual frame structure of the initiating Event

contextual frame is triggered by the word *peculiar* in S1 and the *cat's* PerAct of *reading* also in S1. The other basic scenes are also related to the contextual frame of **peculiarity,** as it is shown in Figure (29), because they are connected with S1. What makes these acts belong to the contextual frame of peculiarity is the clash between these acts and Mr. Dursley's logic.

The selected scene above (the cat's PerAct of Reading and Mr. Dursley's PerAct of noticing) can be subjected to the process of **abstracting** by referring to the selected act by means of the contextual frame to which it belongs. It is as follows: Mr. Dursley directed his attention to the cat which does something peculiar.

The spatial structure can be compressed on the bases of all the two processes: selection and abstracting. In terms of **selection**, the space of the prominent scene can be selected as a representative for the spatial structure for the event as whole. The process of abstracting can compress the spatial components in the scenes as whole by selecting the general parts of space in the scenes. The compressed space can be represented as follows: two participants, Mr. Dursley (A-Dom) and the cat (B-Dom) are located on different points on the street. The two participants direct their attention to each other, as it is shown at the bottom of the Figure (30).



Figure (30): The spatial structure of the initiating Event

Concerning the participation structure, it is easy to select the most prominent and the only domains of participants, A-Dom (Mr. Dursley), which is the agent in most of the scenes and B-Dom (the cat), which is the patient in most of the scenes. The temporal structure is passive in this event because all the scenes happen in the past and the same time, in the early morning. The **sequencing** process arranged the scenes as they have been represented relying on the causal relations between them. The final compressed form of the event will be shown in the next formula and Figure (31):

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – Pr: directing) (P: his attention – Pr: is directed)]]

B-Dom: the cat [Motivator: PerAct [(A: the cat – Pr: does) (P: something peculiar – is done)]]

Res: [B-Dom's PerAct motivates A-Dom's PerAct to undertake]



Figure (31): Diagrammatical analysis of the compressed form of event-A

4.2.3. Schematic Structure of Event-B

The current event involves nine scenes that deal with different and connected scenes. According to the **framing** process, the event is **bounded** by the five schematic structures that represent the sum of the schematic components. The beginning of this event is ascribed by disappearance of the cat, one of the most prominent participants. End of this event is ascribed by causality and participation components. The causal chain has been broken at the end of the scene number nine. Participation ascribes the end of the event when the most important participants (*people in cloaks*) disappear. The previous event extends to the current event through three schematic components. Time and contextual frame have full **extension** into the present event. Participation has partial extension through the A-Dom (*Mr. Dursley*). The nine scenes of the current event are analyzed as follows:

S1. *"As he drove towards town he thought of nothing except a large order of drills he was hoping to get that day* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: PerAct [(A: drills – Pr: exist)]] [Motivatee: PerAct: (A: he – Pr: think)]

Extraction: this scene involves two interacted acts which interact over the concept of motivation in which the first act (the act of *exist* with *drills* as an agent) functions as a motivator for the second act (the act of *think* with *he* as an agent). The act of *exist* is found implicitly in the scene above; it is derived by the process of **conversion**. In other words, it is part of the conceptual meaning of the expression as whole. In this act, the noun drills has been extracted from the scene as an agent because all other words (like *a large order* and *he was hoping to get that day*) describe this noun. The second act

is represented explicitly in the scene above. *Mr. Dursley* represents the only participation domain to which the two acts in question belong.

Time in Figure (32) is restricted by a doted frame because it is not found explicitly in the scene, but it is added by the process of **gab-filling** process relying on the contextual clues. This scene belongs to the contextual frame of work because *Mr. Dursley* thinks in his work. The spatial component of this scene is illustrated in Figure (34). The below bold line refers to the street and at its ends the city and the agent are located. The bold circle indicates A-Dom. The square refers to the city and the doted arrow points out to the entity mode in which the car is moving toward the city.

Extension: this is the first scene in the event; therefore, there is no previous scene which has extension through the all components. There are only two schematic components which extend from the previous event into this event through the current scene; they are temporal component and participation domain (*Mr. Dursley*).



Figure (32): Diagrammatical analysis of S1 in event-B

S2. *"But on the edge of town, drills were driven out of his mind by something else* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [InfAct: Inhibitor [(A: something – Pr: do) (P: something – Pr: is done)]] [PerAct: Inhibited (A: drills – Pr: exist)]

Extraction: according to the formula above, the interaction is between two extracted acts, the first one is inferred and the second is perceived. Existence of the inferred act is necessary because the second act does not set out without a preceded cause. It consists of the general process of *do* with the two arguments that are not actualized; therefore the noun *something* occupies the position of the agent and the patient. This scene has to be actualized in the next scenes. This act works as an inhibitor that prevents the second act to be preceded. The second act is formed by the process of **conversion** which converts the present process of the scene above into the process of *exist* which is part of the act conceptual meaning. The process has only *drills* as an agent. Time, participant domain and contextual frame derive from the previous scene. The spatial component derives from the prior scene with a difference only in the viewing distance. The distance between the entities in the previous scene is wide, while the entities are close in this scene.

Extension: all the five schematic components extend from the prior scene into the current scene. Causality extends through the act of exist which is found in the present scene and the scene above; but it functions as a motivator in the former scene and as an inhibitee in the current scene. Time, participation domain and contextual frame extend fully without any change.

The spatial component extends partially; the whole entities extend with no change except the viewing distance as it has been mentioned before.



Figure (33): Diagrammatical analysis of S2 in event-B

S3. *"As he sat in the usual morning traffic jam, he couldn't help noticing that there seemed to be a lot of strangely dressed people about. People in cloaks* (ibid)*."*

A-Dom1: Mr. Dursley [Inhibitor: PerAct [(A: he –Pr: sit (in traffic jam)]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: he – Pr: help noticing)]]

A-Dom2: Mr. Dursley [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: he – Pr: notice)]

B-Dom: People [Motivator: PerAct [(A: People – Pr: dress) (A: cloaks – Pr: are dressed)]]

Extraction: the formula above indicates that the scene involves two places of interaction. The first interaction is between two PerActs: the first one consists of the process *sit* with *Mr. Dursley* as an agent. It functions as an inhibitor to the second act which includes the process *help noticing* with *Mr. dursley* as an agent. The two interacted acts belong to the A-Dom. The second place of interaction takes place over the concept of motivation. The

first interacted act belongs to A-Dom (*Mr. Dursley*) and it consists of the process *notice* and *Mr. Dursley* as an agent. This act is motivated by the second act which belongs to B-Dom (People). The process of this act (*dress*) encompasses *people* as an agent and *cloaks* as a patient. This act actualizes the inferred act (**actualized act**) in the former scene. The previous scene does not refer to a prominent contextual frame, because it involves an inferred action that needs to be actualized. It belongs to the same contextual frame to which the current scene, because it is actualized in this scene. The two scenes belong to the contextual frame of peculiarity because people dress strange clothes. Time, as in the prior scenes, is added by the gap-filling process; this addition is marked by the doted frame in Figure (34). The spatial component consists of two participants: A-Dom (*Mr. Dursley*) and B-Dom (*people*). The former is marked by the large bold circle (in Figure (34))



Figure (34): Diagrammatical analysis of S3 in event-B

which surrounded by the squire which refers to traffic jam. The latter are marked by the three small bold circles within the oval frame. The arrow represents A-Dom's sight direction.

Extension: the current scene connects with the prior scenes through the extension of the five schematic components fully and partially. Causality extends into the current scene through the inferred act in the previous event which has been actualized in the present scene. Time, participant domain and contextual frame extend fully into this scene. Extension of the spatial component is represented by entity mode which moves from one point to another sequentially.

S4. *"Mr Dursley couldn't bear people who dressed in funny clothes* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Inhibitor: TypAct [(A: People – Pr: do not dress) (P: Funny clothes – Pr: are not dressed)]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: bear) (P: (A: People – Pr: dress) (P: funny clothes – Pr: is dressed) – Pr: are bore)]]

Extraction: the present scene, as formulated above, encompasses two interacted acts that interact over the concept of inhibition. The first act is not found explicitly in the scene; it is derived from the typical behaviors of people. It consists of the negated process of dress and the two arguments: people as an agent and funny clothes as a patient. This act inhibits the second act which is a perceived act. It involves the process of *bear* with *Mr. Dursley* as an agent and the clause (*people who dressed in funny clothes*) as a patient. The two acts belong to the same participation domain (*Mr. Dursley*). The spatial and temporal components are surrounded by the doted frame in Figure (35) because they are derived from the previous scene and

added by the gap-filling process. The scene also belongs to the contextual frame of peculiarity.

Extension: the five schematic components in the prior scene extend into the present scene. Causality extends through the PerAct in *which people dress funny clothes* which is represented in the two scenes. The other four schematic components extend fully into the current scene without any change.



Figure (35): Diagrammatical analysis of S4 in event-B

S5. *"He supposed this was some stupid new fashion* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: TypAct [(A: People – Pr: do not dress) (P: Funny clothes – Pr: are not dressed)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: suppose) (P: (A: stupid new fashion – exist) – Pr: is supposed)]]

Extraction: the current scene involves interaction between two acts; they interact over the concept of motivation as represented in the above formula. The first one (TypAct) is derived from the previous scene and it consists of the *negated dress* process with the two arguments, *adult people* as an agent

and *funny clothes* as a patient. This act motivates the second act to proceed; the latter consists of the process of *suppose* with two arguments. The first argument is *Mr. Dursley* who functions as the agent, and the patient is represented by the clause *stupid fashion exists* that has a **converted** process. The two acts belong to the same participation domain (A-Dom) and to the contextual frame of peculiarity. The spatial and temporal components are surrounded by the doted frames because they are derived and added to the current scene by the **gap-filling** process.

Extension: the schematic components extend fully and partially from the prior scene into the current scene. The extension through causality is represented by the TypAct which participates in the interaction of the present scene and the former scene. All the other schematic components extend fully without any change.



Figure (36): Diagrammatical analysis of S5 in event-B

S6. "*They were whispering excitedly together* (ibid)."

B-Dom: People [Motivator: InfAct [(A: something – Pr: happen)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: people – Pr: whisper)]]

Extraction: one can extract two acts that interact over the concept of motivation in which the first act motivates the second act. The first act is inferred from the context and needs to be **actualized** in a later scene. It consists of the general process of *happen*, which can be substituted by any other particular process, and the general noun *something* that can be substituted any particular noun. The second act consists of the process of *whisper* and *people* as an agent. The two acts belong to the same participation domain (B-Dom) and to the contextual frame of peculiarity. As in the prior scenes, spatial and temporal components are derived from the former scene and added to the current one by the process of **gap-filling**.

Extension: the five schematic components extend from the scene above into the present scene through the five components. The extension through causality or interaction is partial because they connect by the act in which *people whisper*; this act completes the description of the situation of people which is represented by the act in the prior scene in which people dress cloaks. All the other schematic components extend to the current scene fully.



Figure (37): Diagrammatical analysis of S6 in event-B

S7. *"Mr. Dursley was enraged to see that a couple of them weren't young at all; why, that man had to be older than he was, and wearing an emerald-green cloak!* (ibid) *"*

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: see) (P: (A: a couple of them – Pr: being not young) – Pr: is seen)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – Pr: being enraged)]]

A-Dom: [Motivator: TypAct [(A: Old people – Pr: should not wear) (P: emerald cloak – Pr: should not be wore)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – Pr: being enraged)]]

Extraction: the current scene involves two places of interaction over the concept of motivation. The first interaction is between two PerActs; the first one consists of the process *see* with *Mr. Dursley* as an agent and the clause *a couple of them weren't young* as a patient. This act functions as a motivator to the second act which *Mr. Dursley* as an agent and the *being enraged* as a process. This act is motivated also by a TypAct, as in the above formula; the TypAct consists of *old people* as an agent, *emerald cloak* as a patient and the negated form of the process *wear* as a process. All the interacted acts belong to A-Dom (*Mr. Dursley*) and to the contextual frame of peculiarity. Spatial and temporal components are not found explicitly in the scene above; they are derived from the prior and added to the current scene by the **gap-filling** process, as shown in Figure (38).

Extension: as in the previous scenes, all the schematic components extend into this scene. Extension through causality takes place by the TypAct old people should not wear emerald cloaks which participates in the interaction

in this scene and the prior ones. While causality extends partially, the other four extend fully into this scene.



Figure (38): Diagrammatical analysis of S7 in event-B

S8. *"But then it struck Mr. Dursley that this was probably some silly stunt – these people were obviously collecting for something ... yes, that would be it* (ibid)*."*

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: TypAct [(A: People – Pr: do not dress) (P: Funny clothes – Pr: are not dressed)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: (A: silly stunt – Pr: exist) – Pr: struck) (P: he – Pr: is struck)]]

Extraction: there are two extracted acts in this scene; they interact over the concept of motivation. The first act (TypAct) is derived from the former

scenes and it consists of the negated form of the process *dress* with *people* as an agent and *funny clothes* as a patient. The second act is not derived from a prior scene; it involves the process struck with two arguments. The agent place is occupied by the clause *silly stunt exists* which has the **converted** process of *exist*. It is part of the conceptual meaning of the clause. Patient of this act is *Mr. Dursley*. This scene belongs to the contextual frame of peculiarity because of the unusual appearance of those people. The two interacted acts relate to A-Dom (*Mr. Dursley*). Temporal and spatial components are surrounded by doted frames because they are derived from the context and added to the scene by the process of **gap-filling**.

Extension: the current scene relates to the prior ones through the process of extension in which all the five schematic components extend from the former scene into this scene. Extension of causality component is based on the TypAct above, because it is found in the current scene and in the former scenes. All the other components extend fully into the current scene.



Figure (39): Diagrammatical analysis of S8 in event-B

S9. "*The traffic moved on, and a few minutes later, Mr Dursley arrived in the Grunnings car park, his mind back on drills* (ibid)."

A-Dom1: Mr. Dursley [Facilitator: PerAct [(A: the traffic – Pr: move)]] [Facilitatee: PerAct [(Mr. Dursley – Pr: arrive)]]

A-Dom2: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: InfAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – Pr: leave) (P: People in cloaks – Pr: are left)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: he – Pr: think) (P: drills – Pr: are thought)]]

Extraction: there are two places of interaction in this scene; the first interaction is between two PerActs. The first includes the process of *move* and the agent *the traffic*. It functions as a facilitator to the second act which encompasses *arrive* as a process and *Mr. Dursley* as an agent. The second interaction is between the inferred act which is extracted relying on the contextual clues and the perceived act which is represented explicitly. The InfAct involves two states in which the agent *Mr. Dursley leave* and the patient *people in cloaks are left*. It motivates the second act which encompasses the state in which the agent (*Mr. Dursley*) *thinks* and the state of the patient (*drills*) in which the agent is thinking. The scene belongs to the contextual frame of peculiarity because of the strange people. The interacted acts relate to *Mr. Dursley* (A-Dom). Time is derived from context and added to the present scene by the process of **gap-filling**. The spatial component is derived from the context in most of its aspects; the only difference between the spatial component in the scene and the previous one is in the entity mode. The most prominent participant moves away from the group of people. His movement is marked by the doted arrow and his last position is marked by the doted circle.

Extension: the schematic components extend into the current scene partially and fully. Causality extends into the current scene through the relation between the patient *people in cloaks* and the previous scenes. Time, participation and contextual frame components extends to the current scene fully; while the spatial component extends partially. As it has been mentioned above, the only difference is in the entity mode. This scene closes the current event because the participation domain (B-Dom) disappears.



Figure (40): Diagrammatical analysis of S9 in event-B

4.2.4. Compression of Event-B

The schematic compression of this event is represented by compressing the nine scenes analyzed above. The first step in compression is the **selection** on the bases of the three criteria postulated in the previous chapter. The most prominent two acts in the scenes above interact in terms of motivation. The first act (motivator) consists of two states: the agent state (*people in cloaks*) with the action of *dressing*. The patient state (*cloaks*) inaZvolves the passive

form of the *dressing* action. The second act (motivatee) involves the state of agent (*Mr. Dursley*) with the action of *noticing* and the state of patient with the passive form of *notice*. The two interacted acts satisfy the conditions of the selection as follow:

- S1 and S2 are affected by the selected acts in which they inhibit the act of *drills existence*.
- S3 consists of the selected acts.
- S4 relates directly into the selected acts because Mr. Dursley tries to achieve the selected act of *noticing the people in cloaks*.
- S5 represents the clash between the selected act and the first selected act and the typical act in which people should not dress cloaks.
- S6 gives some details about *the people in cloaks* in which they whisper about something.
- S7 involves the act of Mr. Dursley's enrage because of the selected acts.
- S8 includes a justification given by Mr. Dursley to the selected acts; this justification is motivated by the typical act.
- S9 shows *Mr. Dursley's* leaving to the people in cloaks.



Figure (41): Contextual Frame of Event-B

The current event encompasses **basic** and **supporting** scenes as follow: the first scene and the sixth scene can be classified as supporting scene because they do not contribute directly to the event understanding. It is clear that all the basic scenes belong to the contextual frame of peculiarity. The network of the conceptual frame is represented in Figure (41). The selected acts can be subjected to the process of abstraction by referring to the theme of these acts in terms of peculiarity.

The spatial structure of this event consists of the spatial components of the scenes. According to the **selection** process, the selected spatial component should be related to the selected acts. So, among the components that are represented in Figure (42), only one component is selected. This component represents the **micro** space of the event as whole. It represents most of the basic scenes fully or partially. The final stage in Figure (42), at the bottom, represents the **abstracted** aspects of the scene which reflects the macro space of the event.



Figure (42): Compression of the spatial structure

In light of the discussion above, the compressed form of Event-B can be represented in the next formula and the diagrammatical analysis in Figure (43).

A-Dom2: Mr. Dursley [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: he – Pr: notice)]

B-Dom: People [Motivator: PerAct [(A: People – Pr: dress) (A: cloaks – Pr: are dressed)]]



Figure (43): The Compressed Form of Event-B

4.2.5. Schematic Structure of Event-C

The current event consists of five scenes that represent different parts of the event. According to the **framing** process, boundaries of this event beginning are ascribed by causality, participation and spatial components. Causal chain has broken at the end of the previous event when the A-Dom leaves the situation that he is connected with. The spatial component ascribes the beginning of this event when the A-Dom leaves his place to another place. Disappearance of the B-Dom (*people in cloaks*) from the scene represents one of the event boundaries. However, the participation component of the

former event has a **partial extension** into the current event through the A-Dom (Mr. Dursley) who continues his participation in this event. Time and contextual frame have **full extension** from the previous scene into the present scene. Boundaries of the event end are ascribed by the temporal, causal and participation components.

S1. *"Mr. Dursley always sat with his back to the window in his office on the ninth floor* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: InfAct [(A. something – Pr: do) (P: something – Pr: is done)] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: sit (with his back to the window)]]

Extraction: this process extracts two interacted acts; the first is inferred from the context. This act is unidentified and needs to be actualized later. It consists of the general process *do* (which can be substituted by any other particular process) and the general noun *something* as an agent in one place and as a patient in another place. This act motivates the second act (PerAct) which includes the process *sit* with *Mr. Dursley* as an agent. This act cannot be classified into a contextual frame because of the inferred act which is not actualized. The acts belong to the same participation domain, Mr. Dursley (A-Dom). Time is surrounded by the doted frame in Figure (44) because it is added to this scene by the **gap-filling** process. The spatial component consists of A-Dom who is marked by bold circle. The frame around the circle refers to the office which functions as a container. The bold line indicates the window and the arrow which marks the participant's sight direction.

Extension: the present scene is the first one in the continuum; therefore, there is no previous scene to extend into this scene. However, some of the

schematic components of the previous event extend into the current through this scene. Time and participation components have full extension from the previous event into the present event.



Figure (44): Diagrammatical analysis of S1 in event-C

S2. *"If he hadn't, he might have found it harder to concentrate on drills that morning* (ibid: 9)*."*

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Facilitator: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: sit (with his back to the window)]] [Facilitatee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: concentrate on) (P: Drills – Pr: are concentrated)]]

Extraction: the process involves extracting two interacted acts that interact over the concept of facilitation. The first act is a PerAct and it is derived from the previous scene and it functions as a facilitator for the second act. The latter represents the **actualization** of the general act in the scene above. It contains *concentrate* as a process, *Mr. Dursley* as an agent and *drills* as a patient. The two acts cannot be classified into a specific contextual frame because they interact over the concept of facilitation. The acts that interact over this concept are not basic acts and they do not direct the scene toward a specific contextual frame. The acts relate to A-Dom (*Mr. Dursley*).

Temporal and spatial components are derived and added to this scene by the **gap-filling** process.

Extension: in the current situation the five schematic components extend fully from the scene above into the current scene. The two acts in this scene are extended from the scene above with a little difference in which the general act in the previous scene is actualized in this scene. The rest components extend to the current scene without any change.



Figure (45): Diagrammatical analysis of S2 in event-C

S3. *"He didn't see the owls swooping past in broad daylight* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Inhibitor: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: sit (with his back to the window)]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: see) (P: (A: the owls – Pr: swoop) – Pr: is seen)]]

Extraction: the current scene can be reduced into two interacted acts that interact over the concept of inhibition in which the first act inhibits the second. The first act is derived from the former two scenes. The second act consists of the process *see* with *Mr. Dursley* as an agent and the clause *the owls swoop* as a patient. This scene can be classified within the contextual

frame of peculiarity because of the unusual situation *the owls swooping in daylight*. The acts belong to A-Dom (*Mr. Dursley*). Time is added to the current scene by the **gap-filling** process relying on the contextual clues. The spatial component consists of the A-Dom location in his office as it is illustrated previously, in addition to the owls that are marked by the three small black circles within oval and their movement which is represented by the doted arrow.

Extension: this scene relates to the prior ones through the five components. The partial extension of the causality component takes place through the inhibitor act in this scene which is motivatee in the first scene and facilitator in the second scene. The temporal and participation domains extend fully into the present scene without any change. Spatial component extend partially into this event as it is shown above.



Figure (46): diagrammatical analysis of S3

S4. "*though people down in the street did;* (ibid)*"*

B-Dom: people [Facilitator: PerAct [(A: people – Pr: exist (in street)]] [Facilitatee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: see) (P: (A: the owls – Pr: swoop) – Pr: is seen)]]

Extraction: the present scene encompasses interaction over the concept of facilitation between two acts. The first act includes *people* which is the agent of **the converted** process of *exist*. This **intended action** of *exist* is part of the conceptual meaning of the clause. The second act is derived from the previous scene to be incorporated in this scene. The current scene relates to the contextual frame of peculiarity because of the clause *the owls swoop* which is derived from the scene above. The acts relate to the B-Dom (people). Temporal component, as usual, is derived and added by **the gap-filling** process which is marked by the doted frame in Figure (47). The spatial component consists of two groups: *people* and *owls*. People are represented by the below three black circles within the *oval* and the *owls* that are marked by the upper ones. The doted arrow represents movement of the owls and the vertical arrow indicates the sight direction of people. The long bold line below represents the street which functions as a ground for the participants.



Figure (47): Diagrammatical analysis of S4 in event-C

Extension: the five components extend into the present act as follow: causality extends through the facilitatee act in this scene. This act is found in the previous scene as an inhibitee in this context. Time, participation and contextual frame extend into the current scene without any change. The spatial component extends through the **macro** level of space in which the current scene and the previous ones take place within the same macro space.

S5. *"they pointed and gazed open-mouthed as owl after owl sped overhead* (ibid)."

B-Dom: People [Motivator: TypAct [(A: owls – Pr: don't appear (at daytime)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: people – Pr: point/gaze)]]

Extraction: this process extracts two acts the first one is typical which is derived from our daily experiences; and the second is a perceived act. The TypAct involves the typical behavior of owls in which they do not appear through daytime. This act motivates people (agent) to point and gaze because of the strange behavior of the owls. Time and space components are surrounded by doted frames because they are added by the **gap-filling**



Figure (48): Diagrammatical analysis of S5 in event-C

process. The scene can be viewed as part of the contextual frame of peculiarity because of the strange behavior of the *owls*. The acts belong to the B-Dom (people).

Extension: the five components extend as follows: causality extends through the relationship between the agent in the TypAct of the current scene and the agent of the facilitatee in the previous scene. All the other components extend fully without any change.

4.2.6. Compression of Event-C

The most prominent acts that should be **selected** to represent the event as whole are: the first act (PerAct) includes the process *sit* with *Mr. Dursley* as an agent. It inhibits the second act which consists of the process *see* with *Mr. Dursley* as an agent and the clause *the owls swoop* as a patient. Selection of these acts is based on the following relations between the selected acts and the other acts within the event.

- S1 involves the act of Dursley's sitting as part of it.
- S2 includes the act of Dursley's sitting as a facilitator.
- S3 consists of the two selected acts above.
- S4 encompasses the act of *owls' swooping* as a facilitatee.
- S5 involves the typical act in which *owls do not fly in daytime* as a reaction to the second selected act.



Figure (49): Contextual Frame of Event-B

The current event encompasses **basic** and **supporting** scenes as follows: the first and second scenes can be classified as supporting scene because they do not contribute directly to the event understanding. It is clear that all the basic scenes belong to the contextual frame of peculiarity. The network of the conceptual frame is represented in Figure (49). The selected acts can be subjected to the process of abstraction by referring to the theme of these acts in terms of peculiarity.

The spatial structure of this event consists of the spatial components of the scenes. According to the **selection** process, the selected spatial component should be related to the selected acts. So, among the components that are represented in Figure (50); only one component is selected. This component



Figure (50): Compression of the spatial structure of event-B

represents the **micro** space of the event as whole. It represents most of the basic scenes fully or partially. The final stage in Figure (50), at the bottom, represents the **abstracted** aspects of the scene which reflects the **macro**

space of the event. It includes only the main aspects of space that can convey the basic meaning.

In light of the discussion above, the compressed form of Event-B can be represented in the next formula and the diagrammatical analysis in Figure (51).

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Inhibitor: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: sit (with his back to the window)]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: see) (P: (A: the owls – Pr: swoop) – Pr: is seen)]]



Figure (51): diagrammatical analysis of S3

4.2.7. Schematic Structure of Event-D

The present event consists of seven scenes that reflect the different aspects of the events. The **framing** process ascribes the boundaries of the event on the bases of the five schematic components. Boundaries of the event beginning are ascribed by two structures: time and causality. This event starts with the lunch time and with a new situation. However, participation and contextual frame extend fully into the current event. *Mr. Dursley*

extends his participation to the present event with the peculiar scenes. Spatial structure has partial extension into this event through the **macro** space.

S1. *"He was in a very good mood until lunch-time, when he thought he'd stretch his legs and walk across the road to buy himself a bun from the baker's opposite* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: think) (P: (A: He – Pr: stretch/walk) (P: his legs – Pr: are stretched)) – Pr: is thought)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: bay) (P: a bun – Pr: is bought)]]

Extraction: according to the formula of the scene above, the scene involves interaction between two PerActs. The first act works as a motivator and it consists of the state of the agent (*Mr. Dursley*) who *think*s the state of the patient (the clause *he'd stretch his legs and walk*). The second act functions as motivatee and it encompasses the state of the doer (*Mr. Dursley*) who *bay* and the state of the patient (*a bun*) which *is bought*. Time is determined in this scene; it is the *lunch time*. The acts belong to the *Mr. Dursley*'s domain (A-Dom). This scene is not basic because it refers to usual behavior. The spatial component consists of the prominent participant (*Mr. Dursley*) who is marked by the black circle in Figure (52). The squire indicates *the baker* and the doted arrow refers to *Dursley*'s mode in which he moves toward *the baker*.

Extension: the previous event extends to the current event through this scene. The extension is represented by the macro level of space in which the two events take place within one macro location. Participation domain (A-Dom) extends to the current scene.



Figure (52): Diagrammatical analysis of S1 in event-D

S2. *"He'd forgotten all about the people in cloaks until he passed a group of them next to the baker's* (ibid)."

A-Dom1: Mr. Dursley [Facilitator: InfAct [(A: He – Pr: walk)]] [Facilitatee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr; pass) (P: a group of the people in cloaks – Pr: is passed)]]

A-Dom2: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: PerAct [(A: He – Pr; pass) (P: a group of the people in cloaks – Pr: is passed)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: remember) (P: people in cloak – are remembered)]]

Extraction: the scene involves an interaction between two extracted acts in two places. The first interaction involves two extracted acts. The first act is inferred from the context relying on the previous scene when the agent (Mr. Dursley) thinks that he should walk. This scene consists of only one state in which the agent (*Mr. Dursley*) performs the action of *walk*. This act functions as a facilitator to the second which includes, as in the formula

above, the state of the agent (*Mr. Dursley*) with the process *pass* and the state of the patient (*a group of the people in cloaks*) who *are passed*. This act returns to be a motivator in the second place of interaction with anther act. The motivatee PerAct involves *Mr. Dursley* as an agent who performs the process *remember* and the patient (*people in cloaks*) with the passive process *are remembered*. Because of the strange people in cloaks, this scene can be classified within the contextual category of peculiarity. The acts also relate to the A-Dom (*Mr. Dursly*) who returns to interact with B-Dom (*the people in cloaks*). Time is derived from the previous scene and added to the present scene by the **gap-filling** process. The spatial component in the diagrammatical analysis in Figure (53) includes the larger black circle which refers to *Mr. Dursley* and the three smaller circles within oval indicate *the group of people*. The doted arrow marks the A-Dom movement.



Figure (53): Diagrammatical analysis of S2 in event-D

Extension: the previous scene extends to the current scene through the five schematic components. Causality is extended through the relation between the inferred act and the clause *he walk*s in the former scene. Temporal and participation components extend fully to the current scene, while the spatial component extends through the **macro** space only in which the two scenes occur in the same macro space.

S3. *"He eyed them angrily as he passed* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: Typ [(A: people – Pr: should not dress) (P: cloaks – should not be dressed)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: being anger)]

Extraction: this scene turns to derive the typical act in which *people should not dress cloaks*. This act function as a motivator for the second act consists of only one state in which the agent (*Mr. Dursley*) *being anger*. Temporal and spatial components are surrounded by the doted frames because they are derived from the context and added to the scene by the gap-filling process. The acts belong to the contextual frame of peculiarity because of the TypAct; and they also relate to the A-Dom (Mr. Dursley).

Extension: the prior scene extends into the current scene through the schematic components that most of them have the full extension. Causality extends to this scene because of the TypAct that is related to the act of the previous scene in which *people dress cloaks*. There is a causal relation between the two acts because of the clash between the perceived act and the typical act. The rest components have full extension into this scene.



Figure (54): Diagrammatical analysis of S3 in event-D

S4. *"This lot were whispering excitedly, too, he caught a few words of what they were saying.*

'The Potters, that's right, that's what I heard –'

'– yes, their son, Harry –' (ibid)*"*

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Facilitator: PerAct [(A: He – Pr; pass) (P: a group of the people in cloaks – Pr: is passed)]] [Facilitatee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: hear) (P: (A: People – Pr: say) (P: The Potters – is said)) – Pr: is heard]]

Extraction: the process extracts two acts that interact in terms of facilitation. The first act is derived from the previous scenes and it functions in this scene as a facilitator. The facilitated act consists of two states: the state of agent in which *Mr. Dursley hears* and the state of patient in which the clause *people say The Potter* is *heard*. The two acts involve the process of **conversion** in the expression *caught a few words* has been converted to the verb *hear*. There are some words and expressions that have not been integrated because their meaning is conveyed by the extracted acts. These

words and expressions are like *whispering*, *that's right*, and *that's what I heard*. Time and space are added by the **gap-filling** process. The acts relate to the A-Dom and to the contextual frame of peculiarity because the acts connected with the people in cloaks.

Extension: the previous scene extends fully through the spatial, temporal, participation and contextual frame components. In terms of causality, the scene extents through the first PerAct in this scene; it is derived from the prior scenes.



Figure (55): Diagrammatical analysis of S4 in event-D

S5. *"Mr Dursley stopped dead* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: hear) (P: (A: People – Pr: say) (P: The Potters – is said))]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: stop dead)]]

Extraction: this scene is a simple one because it is extracted in nature. It involves two PerActs; the first motivates the second. The first act is derived from the former scene where it functions as a facilitatee in the former scene. The second scene involves only one state in which the agent (*Mr. Dursley*)

and the process *stop*. The spatial and temporal components are surrounded by the doted frames in Figure (56) because they are added by the **gap-filling** process. The scene belongs to the contextual frame of peculiarity because the acts connect with the strange people and the strange connection between those people and The Potter. The acts relate to the A-Dom.

Extension: except causality, all the schematic components extend fully into the current scene. Causality extends into this scene through the first act which functions as a motivator in this scene and as a facilitatee in the previous scene.



Figure (56): Diagrammatical analysis of S5 in event-D

S6. *"He hurried up to his office, seized his telephone and had almost finished dialing his home number when he changed his mind* (ibid)*."*

A-Dom1: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: hear) (P: (A: People – Pr: say) (P: The Potters – is said))]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: phone)]]

A-Dom2: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: phone)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: go (to his office))]]

A-Dom3: Mr. Dursley [Inhibitor: PerAct [(A: an idea – Pr: appear)]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: phone)]]

Extraction: the scene involves three places of interaction as they are shown in the above formulas. The first interaction is between two PerActs: the first is derived from the former and it works as a motivator to the second act. The latter consists of only one state in which the agent (*Mr. Dursley*) performs the action of *phoning*. This act turns to be motivator in the second place. It motivates the PerAct in which the agent (*Mr. Dursley*) performs the action of *going*. The act of *phoning* turns to participate in the third interaction; it is inhibited by the PerAct in which the agent (*an idea*) *appears*. The acts belong to the contextual frame of peculiarity because they are performed as a reaction to the peculiar acts. They relate to the A-Dom. Time is derived from the context and added to the scene by the **gap-filling** process. The spatial component is illustrated in the diagrammatical analysis (Figure (57)) in which the black circle represents the prominent participant, *Mr. Dursley*, and the frame around the circle marks the office which functions as a container to the participant. The doted arrow is used to indicate Mr. Dursley's movement.

Extension: the former scene extends from the previous scene into this scene through schematic components. Causality extends into this scene through the action of *hearing* which is performed by *Mr. Dursley* which is part of the two scenes. Spatial component extends into this scene through the macro

space because this scene and the prior ones take place at the same macro space. The other components have a full extension into this scene.



Figure (57): Diagrammatical analysis of S6 in event-D

S7. *"He was sure there were lots of people called Potter who had a son called Harry* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Inhibitor: PerAct [(A: many people – Pr: have) (P: the name of Potter and son called Harry – Pr: is had]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: phone)]]

Extraction: the scene involves an interaction between two PerActs in terms of inhibition. The first act represents the idea that Mr. Dursley has in the previous scene. It consists of two states, the state of the agent (*many people*) with the process *have* and the state of the patient (*the name of Potter and son called Harry*) with the passive form of the verb have. The inhibitee is the act of *phoning* which is derived from the prior scenes. This scene relates indirectly to the contextual frame of peculiarity because it relates to what has been said by the strange people and their relationship with The Potter. The extracted acts belong to the A-Dom. Time and space are surrounded by the doted frames in Figure (58) because they are derived from the context and added to the present scene.

Extension: most of the schematic components have full extension from the last scene into this scene. The only component which has partial extension is causality which extends through the motivator in this scene because it represents the idea in the previous scene.



Figure (58): Diagrammatical analysis of S7 in event-D

4.2.8. Compression of Event-D

The schematic compression of this event is represented by compressing the seven scenes analyzed above. The first step in compression is the **selection** on the bases of the three criteria postulated in the previous chapter (3.3.2). The most prominent two acts in the scenes above interact in terms of motivation. The first act (motivator) consists of two states: the agent state (*Mr. Dursley*) with the action of *hearing*. The patient state involves the clause *people in cloaks say The Potter* with the passive form of the verb *hear*. The second act (motivatee) involves the state of agent (*Mr. Dursley*) with the action of *stopping dead*. The two interacted acts satisfy the conditions of the selection as follow:

- S1 facilitates S2 and S3
- S2 facilitates the selected acts
- S3 is not basic; it is supporting scene
- S4 contains the first selected act
- S5 includes the two selected acts
- S6 and S7 encompass the first selected act and the reactions toward the selected acts.

The current event encompasses **basic** and **supporting** scenes as follows: the first and the third scenes can be classified as supporting scenes because they do not contribute directly to the event understanding. It is clear that all the basic scenes belong to the contextual frame of peculiarity. The network of the conceptual frame is represented in Figure (59). The selected acts can subject to the process of **abstraction** by referring to the theme of these acts in terms of peculiarity.



Figure (59): Contextual Frame of Event-D

The spatial structure of this event consists of the spatial components of the scenes. According to the **selection** process, the selected spatial component should be related to the selected acts. So, among the components that are represented in Figure (60), only one component is selected. This component represents the **micro** space of the event as whole. It represents most of the basic scenes fully or partially. The final stage in Figure (60), at the bottom, represents the **abstracted** aspects of the scene which reflects the macro space of the event.



Figure (60): Compression of the spatial structure of event-D

In light of the discussion above, the compressed form of Event-B is represented in the next formula and the diagrammatical analysis in Figure (61).

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: hear) (P: (A: People – Pr: say) (P: The Potters – is said))]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: stop dead)]]



Figure (61): The Compressed Form Event-D

4.2.9. Schematic Structure of the Closing Event (Event-E)

This event is the **closing** event of the continuum which consists of five scenes. The **framing** process ascribes the starting and the ending points of the current event. The event starts when one of the prominent participants, Mrs. Dursley, disappares from the previous event. What makes this event part of the Event Continuum-A is the prominent participant, Mr. Dursley, who starts acting as a prominent participant from the intiating event, and across the developing events, into the current closing event. This prominent participant ascribes the closing event, through the process of framing, when

it disappear at the end of the event. The five scenes of the closing event can be discussrd as follows:

S1. "*Mr. Dursley lay awake, turning it all over in his mind* (ibid: 11)."

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Inhibitor: PerAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – Pr: think) (P: the potters – is thought about)]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: Me. Dursley – Pr: sleep]]

Res: [Inhibitor's PerAct stops Inhibited InfAct]

Through the process of **extracting**, two interacted acts can be identified through the participation domain of Mr. Dursley. The first PerAct of *laying awake* is converted to the **intended act** disability of *sleeping* by the process of **conversion**. The PerAct of *turning it all over in his mind* also is converted to the intended act of *thinking*. So the interaction is between the act of *sleeping* and the act of *thinking*. The process of *thinking* has two arguments: *Mr. Dursley* as an agent and *the Potters* as a patient. This PerAct functions as an inhibitor to the PerAct of *sleeping* which involves only *Mr. Dursley* as



Figure (62): Diagrammatical analysis of S1 in event-E

an agent. The spatial and temporal components are added by the **gap-filling** process relying on the previous context. This scene triggers the contextual frame of anxiety because it is the deep idea that can be gotten from the current scene.

S2: *"His last, comforting thought before he fell asleep was that even if the Potters were involved, there was no reason for them to come near him and Mrs. Dursley* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Inhibitor: PerAct [(A: reasons of coming – Pr: not exist)]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: the Potters – Pr: come)]]

Res: [Inhibitor's PerAct stops Inhibited PerAct]

There are two **extracted** acts interacted in this scene that happen within Mr. Dursley's domain of participation. The first PerAct is the PerAct of *being not existed* which has one argument, *reasons of coming* as an agent. This act inhibits the second PerAct of *coming* that the agent, the *Potters*, performs. The scene can be classified also within the contextual frame of anxiety because he tries to get rid the anxious idea of the Potters coming. The temporal component is manifested by the expression *before he fell asleep* which can be converted to the general term, *night*. This scene is related to the previous scene through the process of **extension**. The former PerAct of *thinking* extends to the PerAct of *being not existed* in which and the PerAct of coming because *Mr. Dursley thinks* in the *existence of the reasons* that make the *Potters come*. All the other components of the scene above extend as they are to this scene.



Figure (63): Diagrammatical analysis of S2 in event-E

S3: "*The Potters knew very well what he and Petunia thought about them and their kind* ... (ibid: 11-2)"

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Inhibitor: PerAct [(A: The Potters – Pr: knew) (P: what he and Petunia – Pr: is known)]] [Inhibitee: InfAct [(A: The Potters – Pr: com)]]

Res: [Inhibitor prevent Inhibited PerAct to undertake]

The current scene is based on two acts detected by the process of **extracting**. The two PerAct are within the domain of Mr. Dursley (A-Dom). The first PerAct is the act of knowing which involves two arguments: the *Potters* as an agent and *what he and Petunia thought* is a patient. The second act is the Potters InfAct of coming which is inferred and derived from the scene above. The former represents the inhibitor that prevents the latter InfAct to be undertaken. Concerning the contextual frame component, Mr. Dursley

still goes around the anxious idea of the Potters coming, so the current scene can be classified within the contextual frame of anxiety. The process of **gap-filling** adds the components of space and time which are found implicitly in the scene and guessed from the context. The connection between this scene and the preceding one is created by the process of **extension**. The first form of extension is represented by extending the InfAct from the scene above to this scene. The other schematic components extend to this scene without any change.



Figure (64): Diagrammatical analysis of S3 in event-E

S4: *"He couldn't see how he and Petunia could get mixed up in anything that might be going on* (ibid: 12)*."*

A-Dom: he (Mr. Dursley) [Inhibitor: InfAct [A: Mr. Dursley's thoughts – Pr: exists)]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: he – Pr: could see) (P: how he and Petunia could get mixed up – Pr: could be seen)]]

Res: [Inhibitor prevents Inhibited PerAct to undertake]

As they are illustrated in the formula and diagram below, the process of **extraction** indicates two interacted acts within Mr. Dursley's domain of participation. The first act is inferred from the context and it involves the general process of *existing* and the agent *Mr. Dursley's thoughts*. This event functions as an inhibitor for the second PerAct of *seeing* which has *Mr. Dursley* as an agent. This scene can be related to the frame of anxiety excluding the probability of taking place of the anxious act of the *Potters' coming*. As in the prior scenes, gap-filling process adds the components of space and time which are **extended** from the previous scene. The causality component also extends from the scene above to the current scenes. This extension is represented by the connection between the InfAct of Mr. Dursley thoughts' existing which relates to the act of thinking in S1 and the next scenes.



Figure (65): Diagrammatical analysis of S4 in event-E

S5: *"He yawned and turned over* (ibid)*."*

A-Dom1: He (Mr. Dursley) [Motivator: InfAct [(A: Dursley's thoughts – Pr: exist)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Dursley – Pr: sleep)]]

Res1: [Motivator InfAct leads to undertaking Motivated PerAct]

A-Dom2: He (Mr. Dursley) [Motivator: InfAct [(A: he – Pr: sleep)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: he – Pr: yawned/turned)]]

Res2: [Motivator InfAct leads to undertaking Motivated PerAct]

This scene is classified as the closing scene because it is the last scene in which the most prominent participant, *Mr. Dursley*, appears. The process of **extracting** identifies three interacted acts within the prominent domain of participation, *Mr. Dursley*. The first act is *Mr. Dursley's* InfAct of *existing* which is derived from the prior scene. This act motivates Mr. *Dursley's* act of *sleeping*. The latter motivated act turns to be a motivator to the PerAct of



Figure (66): Diagrammatical analysis of S5 in event-E

yawning and turning which have Mr. Dursley as an agent. Concerning the relation between this event and the previous events, there is a clear extension of the schematic components of the previous scenes into the current scene. Concerning the component of causality, the extension is represented by the two inferred acts that extend from the prior scenes to play a central role in this scene. All the other schematic components extend into this scene without any change through the process of gap-filling.

4.2.10. Compression of the Closing Event (Event-E)

Compression of the current event starts with **selecting** the most **prominent** scene. The prominence in the event is distributed between the act of *thinking* in S1 and the second scene (S2) because they represent the core idea of the event as whole. S2 is involved within the act of thinking in S2. They have relations with all basic scenes in the event as follows:

- S1's agent *thinks* in the *Potters' reasons of coming* in S2
- S3 represents the reasons of coming in S2 that S1's agent *thinks* about.
- S4 is inhibited by S2 that S1's agent *thinks* about.
- S5 is motivated by Dursley's thought which is manifested in S2 that S1's agent *thinks* about.

The selected acts can be formulated as follows:

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: PerAct [(A: the Potters – Pr: coming)]] [Motivated: PerAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – Pr: think) (P: reasons of the Potters' coming – is thought)]

Concerning the contextual frame structure, the deep idea or theme that can be derived from the context is the theme of anxiety which triggered by the

first scene in the event in which the agent, Mr. Dursley, cannot sleep because he is anxious and think in the probability of the Potters' coming near him. All the **basic acts** clearly relates to this frame in a way or another. For example, the comforting thought relates to the contextual frame of anxiety in which the agent attempts to find a thought can remove his anxiety. In the same context the act *no reason for them to come near him and Mrs. Dursley* comes to remove anxiety. The act *He couldn't see how he and Petunia could get mixed up…* indicates that the Dursleys should be anxious from what is going on. The next diagram illustrates the contextual frame of anxiety.



Figure (67): The contextual frame structure of the closing Event

The spatial and the temporal structures are not compressed because they have only one form represented in the scenes above. The process of abstracting can reformulate the selected scene in terms of the general aspects of the scene and the contextual frame of anxiety. The compressed abstracted form is illustrated in the following formula and diagram:

A-Dom: Mr. Dursley [Motivator: PerAct [(A: the Potters – Pr: coming)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Mr. Dursley – Pr: being anxious)]]



Figure (68): Compressed Structure of the closing Event

4.2.11. Sequencing Events of Continuum-A

All the events in the continuum are sequenced by the **sequencing process**. Time plays a vital role in sequencing most of the events in the continuum because most of the events take place at different times. The narrator uses many temporal dixies; however, in many cases, time is added to the scenes by the gap-filling process. There is no direct causal relation between the events above, so causality does not paly role in sequencing them. It is clear that typicality also contributes to sequencing some events. In terms of time, event-A is the first event because it takes place at the early morning. Events-B and C happen in morning, so, they come after the event A. Event-D comes after B and C because it occurs at the lunch time and it is followed by the closing event which takes place at night. The **typical sequence** of these events is that Mr. Dursley goes out of his house (where event-A happens), rides his car and moves to reach his work (event-B occurs), inters his workplace (event-C takes place, goes to have lunch (event-D happens), and returns to his house (event-E takes places).

4.3. Event-Continuum-B

The current event continuum consists of seven events that do not have the same length; some of them are short and the others are long. This continuum starts immediately after Event-Continuum-A when the most prominent participant, Mr. Dursley, who connected all the previous events in Event-Continuum-A, disappears from the scene. Event-Continuum-B starts with the participant, the cat, which shared the prominent participant, Mr. Dursley, in the first event of the previous continuum.

4.3.1. Schematic Structure of the Initiating Event (Event-F)

This event is the initiating event because it establishes a new situation in which the focus has transmitted from Mr. Dursley and his situation into the cat and what will goes around it. So, this new situation and the new prominent participant ascribe the initiating event. It consists of six scenes share the sameschematic structures: time, space, causality, paticipation and contextual frame. The process of **framing** ascribes the **boundries** of this event by the participation structure, causal structure and contextual frame. Time and space continue to the next events. Participation structure indicates the boundry of this event when the focus transmits from the prominent participant domain of this event, *the cat*, into another partcipant domain, *Dumbledore*. Causality ascribes the event boundry when the direct causal chain breaks. The focus transmits from the cat's situation into Dumbldore's description. The schematic structure of this event is represented in the following scenes:

S1. *"…the cat on the wall outside was showing no sign of sleepiness* (ibid).*"*

A-Dom: the cat [Inhibitor: InfAct [(A: the cat – Pr: wait) (A: something – Pr: is waited)]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: the cat – Pr: show) (P: sign of sleepiness – Pr: is shown]] [Lo: on wall]

Res: [A-Dom's InfAct inhibits A-Dom to undertake]

This scene is classified as an initiating scene which contains two acts that are derived by the process of **extracting**. The first act is an inferred act that is extracted by means of the contextual clues. This act consists of the process of waiting and the two arguments, the cat as an *agent* and *something* as a patient. This act will be actualized in the next scenes or events. It represents the inhibitor for the second act that involves the process of *showing*, *the cat* as an agent and the sign if sleep as a patient.



Figure (69): Diagrammatical analysis of S1 in event-F

In other words the InfAct of waiting prevents the PerAct of showing to undertake. The interaction between the two acts happens within the domain of *the cat*, A-Dom. The **macro-space** of the event is the street and the **micro-space** is the wall where A-Dom is placed. This event initiates a new contextual frame, the frame of waiting and focusing.

S2. *"It was sitting as still as a statue, its eyes fixed unblinkingly on the far corner of Privet Drive* (ibid)."

A-Dom1: the cat [Motivator: InfAct [(A: the cat – Pr: waits) (P: something – Pr: is waited)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: the cat – Pr: sitting)]]

Res1: [A-Dom's InfAct motivates A-Dom's PerAct]

A-Dom2: the cat [Motivator: InfAct [(A: the cat – Pr: waits) (P: something – Pr: is waited)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: the cat's eyes – Pr: fix)]]

Res2: [A-Dom's InfAct motivates A-Dom's PerAct]

The scene, which is reflected in the sentence above, involves three interacted acts that are identified by the process of **extracting**. These acts take place within one domain, *the cat*. The first one is the inferred act of *waiting* which is represented in the previous scene. This act interacts with the other two acts, the PerActs of *sitting* and *fixing*. These two acts have *the cat* as an agent. The InfAct of *waiting* is the basic act in this scene while the other two PerActs are supporting ones. So, this scene belongs to the contextual frame of waiting and focusing. The spatial relation in this scene is between the *street corner* and the *cat* which is located on a flat ground (*the wall*). It directs its sight toward the corner. The *cat*'s place is added, with temporal component, into the current scene by **gap-filling** process.

This scene is related to the former scene through the extension of all schematic components. The causal chain extends to this scene through the InfAct of *waiting* that is extracted relying on the contextual clues in the two scenes. Because of extending this act, the contextual frame of waiting and expecting also extends to the current scene. The spatial component of the

prior scene, which is represented by the *cat*'s place, extends to this scene. This scene is illustrated in Figure (70).



Figure (70): Diagrammatical analysis of S2 in event-F

S3. *"It didn't so much as quiver when a car door slammed in the next street, nor when two owls swooped overhead* (ibid)."

A-Dom1: someone [Resistee: PerAct [(A: someone – Pr: slim) (P: the door – Pr: is slimmed)]] [Lo: the next street]

B-Dom1: the cat [Resistor: PerAct [(A: the cat – Pr: not quiver)]] [Lo: street corner]

Res1: [B-Dom resists A-Dom]

A-Dom2: two owls [Resistee: PerAct [(A: two owls – Pr: swooped)]] [Lo: overhead]

B-Dom2: the cat [Resistor: PerAct [(A: the cat – Pr: not quiver)]] [Lo: street corner]

Res2: [B-Dom resists A-Dom]

The process of **extracting** indicates that the scene above involves interaction between three acts and the interaction is based on the concept of resistance. It also includes three domains of participation, they are: the *cat*, the *man* and the *two owls*. The first act is the PerAct of *not quiver* that includes the *cat* as an agent. This act resists the other two acts: the PerAct of *slimming* that the *man*, as an agent, performs and the PerActs of *swooping* which has the two *owls* as agents. The latter PerActs are classified as resistees. Concerning the spatial relation between the participants, the scene derives the *cat*'s place from the former scene through the process of **gap-filling**. The current scene refers to the place of the other participants and the relation between each of them and the *cat*. Time is inferred from the context because it is not explicitly manifested in the scene.

This scene connects with the prior scenes through all schematic components. The connection starts with causality, the interaction between the acts over resistance. The extension of causality from the previous scene is represented by the relationship between the act of *quivering* in the current scene and the inferred act of *waiting* in the prior scenes. The act of *waiting* motivates the cat to resist the act of *quivering*. This leads also to the extension of the contextual frame of waiting and focusing into this scene. The spatial component of the former scene also extends into this scene with some

addition shown above. As usually, time does not play a role in structuring the scenes because it is not changed.



Figure (71): Diagrammatical analysis of S3 in event-F

S4. *"In fact, it was nearly midnight before the cat moved at all* (ibid)*."*

A-Dom: the cat [Inhibitor: InfAct [(A: the cat – Pr: wait) (P: something – Pr: is waited)]] [Lo: the far corner of Privet Drive] [Inhibitee [(A: the cat – Pr: moving)]

Res: [A-Dom's InfAct inhibits A-Dom's PerAct]

This scene like the previous ones is based on the inferred act of *waiting* which is **extracted** and interacts with the PerAct of *moving*. The two acts interact within one domain of participation, the cat (A-Dom). The former act inhibits the latter. In other words, the act of waiting something important

which the cat performs makes it stand and focus without any move. This makes the scene relates to the contextual frame of waiting and focusing. Time in this scene is explicitly manifested and this is a sign that what the cat waits will happen. The spatial component of this scene is inferred and added by the process of **gap-filling**. It consists of the place of A-Dom and the orientation of its sight. Like the other scenes within the current event, this



Figure (72): Diagrammatical analysis of S4 in event-F

scene represents an extension for the previous scene. This extension starts with the InfAct of *waiting* which extends from the scenes before and interacts with PerAct of *moving* in this scene. Time, space and contextual frame extend from the scene above with some changes in time which is accurately determined in the scene. The structure of this scene is represented in following diagrammatical analysis in Figure (72).

S5. *"A man appeared on the corner the cat had been watching, appeared so suddenly and silently you'd have thought he'd just popped out of the ground* (ibid)."

B-Dom: A man [Motivator: InfAct [(A: a man – Pr: do) (P: something – Pr: is done]]

[Motivatee: PerAct [(A: the man – Pr: appearing)]] [Lo: the corner that the cat watches]

Res: [B-Dom's InfAct motivates B-Dom's PerAct]

The sentence above is long and complex but what is extracted are only two acts interacts within a new domain of participation, *the man* (B-Dom). The part of the sentence *so suddenly and silently you'd have thought he'd just popped out of the ground* comes to describe the act of appearing, so it will not be selected by the process of extraction. The clause The first act is the inferred act which consists of the process of doing and the two arguments (the man as an agent and something as a patient).The act represents the mystery in the novel because the general schematic verb *do* and noun *something* can substitute any other verb and noun. The second involves the agent (*the man*) and the process of appearing. The first act works as a motivator for the second one. In other words, the man appears on *the street corner* to do something. In this scene the InfAct of *waiting* does not appear but this does not mean that it vanishes. The patient, *something*, in the act of waiting is **actualized** by the PerAct of *appearing* because what the cat waits is the man's coming. This means that the man's act of *appearing* is part of the InfAct of *waiting*. So the scene belongs to the contextual frame of waiting and focusing.

Part of the spatial component of this scene, the cat place, is added by the **gap-filling** process and the second part is represented by the clause *the corner the cat had been watching*. The wall represents the flat ground on

which the cat sits and it directs toward the street corner which is the flat ground on which the man moves. Time is derived from the previous scene and added to the current scene. The diagrammatical analysis of this scene is illustrated in Figure (73).



Figure (73): Diagrammatical analysis of S5 in event-F

S6. *"The cat's tail twitched and its eyes narrowed* (ibid)*."*

A-Dom1: the cat [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: the cat– Pr: twitched) [(P: tail – Pr: is twitched)]]

B-Dom1: a man [Motivator: PerAct [(A: the man – Pr: appearing)]] [Lo: the corner that the cat watches]

Res1: [B-Dom's PerAct motivates A-Dom PerAct]

A-Dom2: the cat [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: the cat– Pr: narrowing) [(P: eyes – Pr: is narrowed)]]

B-Dom2: a man [Motivator: perceived act [(A: the man – Pr: appearing)]] [Lo: the corner that the cat watches]

Res2: [B-Dom's PerAct motivates A-Dom PerAct]

The current scene is represented in a simple sentence in which the man's act of appearing in the previous scene is derived to interact with the cat's PerActs. The first interaction, over the concept of motivation, is between the derived act of appearing and the PerAct of twitching which involves the process of appearing, an agent (*the cat*) and a patient (*the tail*). The same interaction takes place between the man's act of appearing and the PerAct which consists of the process of narrowing, the cat as an agent and its eyes as a patient. The interaction is between the two domains of participation, the cat (A-Dom) and the man (B-Dom). The man's act works as a motivator which leads to what the cat does. As it has been mentioned above, the man's PerAct of *appearing* actualizes the patient, *something*, of the cat's InfAct of *waiting*. This makes this scene relates to the contextual frame of waiting and



Figure (74): diagrammatical analysis of S6

focusing. The spatial and temporal components are derived from the previous scene and added to this scene through the process of gap-filling. This is part of the extension of the scene above into the current scene. The extension of causality and contextual frame of waiting and focusing is represented by the man's derived act of *appearing*. The current scene is analyzed diagrammatically in Figure (74).

4.3.2. Compression of the Initiating Event (Event-F)

The current event involves many scenes that tackle different aspects of the event. Some of these scenes are supporting ones in which they do not represent the main theme of the event; their function is to connect the basic scenes. So, this event can be represented by one schematic scene which contains the main idea of the event. This scene is structured through the processes of **selection** and **abstraction**. The process of selection involves selecting the most prominent and basic interacted acts within one scene or different scenes. The process of selection involves also selecting the most prominent schematic components, spatial, temporal, and participation. For example, the spatial structure across the scenes will be compressed by selecting only one component. After selection, the process of abstraction will precede in forming the selected components according to their general aspects.

In the current event, the most prominent interacted acts are the cat's InfAct of *waiting* in S1 and the man's InfAct of *doing* in S5. These acts are selected interacted acts as the most prominent acts because they represent the core idea of the event and they have relations with all basic scenes as follows:

- S1's InfAct of *waiting* inhibits the PerAct of *showing*.

- S1's InfAct of *waiting* motivates S2's PerActs of *sitting* and *fixing*.
- S1's InfAct of *waiting* makes S3's A-Dom resists the PerAct of *slimming* and *swooping*.
- S1's InfAct of *waiting* inhibits S4's PerAct of *moving*.
- S1's InfAct of *waiting* is actualized in S5 and motivated by S5's InfAct of *doing*.
- S5's PerAct of *appearing* (actualized InfAct of waiting) motivates the PerActs of *twitching* and *narrowing*.

In the represented relations above, it is clear that the InfAct of *waiting* (its patient is actualized in S5) appears nearly in all senses and it has the force in most of the scenes, sometimes as motivator and other times as inhibitor. In S5 it loses its force in front of the InfAct of *doing* which functions as a motivator for it. The PerAct of doing is what the InfAct of waiting's agent waits for. So, these two inferred acts will be selected as the most prominent ones. These two acts are performed by the two participation domains, the cat and the man; there is no another domain in this event. So, these participation domains are selected to be involved in the compressed event. Time is same in all scenes, so it will be included in the compressed event as it is represented in all scenes.

The spatial structure of the current event involves different micro spatial states. The first step in the process of compression of the current spatial structure is the selection of the prominent spatial component. The prominent spatial component of this event reflects the spatial relation related to the selected interacted acts. So, the spatial component of S5 is the selected one. It consists of the micro parts of the spatial relation between the two participation domains which is represented in the participants' places and the

orientation of the sight from the A-Dom into the B-Dom. This component, then, is abstracted relying on the general parts of the spatial component. These parts are the two participants located on the macro space, the street, and the orientation of sight from A-Dom into B-Dom.



Figure (75): Compression of the spatial structure of event-F

Concerning the contextual frame of this event, it is clear that all scenes go around the theme or idea which is represented by the selected interacted acts. It is the theme of waiting and focusing. This contextual frame is triggered by the cat's PerAct of showing. The relation between the scene and the contextual frame of waiting and focusing is shown through the discussion of the scenes above. The contextual frame of waiting and focusing is illustrated in Figure (76).



Figure (76): The contextual frame of waiting and Mystery

According to the discussion above, the compressed event (SE-1) is structured as follow:

A-Dom: the cat [Motivatee: InfAct [(A: the cat – Pr: waiting) (P: (A: the man – Pr: appear) – Pr: is waited)]]

B-Dom: the man [Motivator: InfAct [(A: the man – Pr: do) (P: something – is doen)]]

Res: [A-Dom's InfAct motivates B-Dom's InfAct]



Figure (77): the compressed structure of the initiating event (event-F)

4.3.3. Schematic Structure of Event-G

The present event is the smallest among the events in the novel; it consists of three scenes only. In light of the **framing** process, boundaries of the event beginning and ending are ascribed by the causality structure only. This means that the current event shares the previous and next ones in many aspects. In terms of **extension**, the previous event extends into this event through four schematic structures. Participation structure extends into this event through the two prominent participants, *Mr. Dursley* and *the cat*. Time and contextual frame have full extension into this event. The spatial structure has partial extension into this event because the two events have the same **macro** space. Thy scenes are listed in the following sections:

S1. *"He flicked a silver cigarette lighter open, held it up in the air and clicked it* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Dumbledore [Motivator: InfAct [(A: something – Pr: do) (P: something – Pr: is done)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: open/held up/click) (P: it – Pr: is opened/hold up/clicked)]]

Extraction: the formula above indicates that the scene has two extracted acts. The first one is inferred from the context and it functions as a motivator. It consists of a general agent (*something*), and unidentified action and patient. This act needs to be identified in a later act. This act interacts with three related PerActs that are integrated in one act for short. The three actions *open*, *held up* and *click* are performed by *Dumbledore* (agent) on the agent (Put-Outer). Time and space are derived from context and added to the scene by the **gap-filling** process. The contextual frame of this scene is not

identified because of the general inferred act that needs to be identified. The two acts relate to the A-Dom (*Dumbledore*).

Extension: there are three schematic components that have full extension from the previous event into this event. These components are spatial, temporal and participation.



Figure (78): Diagrammatical analysis of S1 in event-G

S2. *"Twelve times he clicked the Put-Outer, until the only lights left in the whole street were two tiny pinpricks in the distance, which were the eyes of the cat watching him* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Dumbledore [Maker: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: click) (P: the Put-Outer – is clicked)]] [Makee: PerAct [(A: All lights – Pr: are went out)]]

B-Dom: the cat [Maker: PerAct [(A: darkness – Pr: exist)]] [Makee: PerAct (A: the cat's eyes – Pr: flash)]]

Extraction: the scenes involve two places of interaction in terms of making. The first place of interaction includes two PerActs; the first is derived from the former scene and is used as a maker. The second act consists of the agent (*all lights*) which performs the action of *going out*. The second place of

interaction involves two extracted PerActs. The first act (maker) includes the agent (*darkness*) with the process of *exist* which is extracted because it is part of the conceptual meaning of the act. The second act includes the agent (the cat's eyes) which performs the action of *flashing*. The spatial component is represented explicitly and illustrated in Figure (79). The cat (the left black circle) is located on the wall (the upper bold line). It directs its sight (the arrow) toward the man (the right black circle) who is located on the street (the below bold line). Time is surrounded by the doted frame because it is derived from the context and added to the scene by the **gap-filling** process. The contextual frame of these acts is not identified because they are not basic in this context; especially they interact in terms on making. The first interacted acts belong to the A-Dom (*Dumbledore*) while the second interacted acts relate to the B-Dom (*the cat*).



Figure (79): Diagrammatical analysis of S2 in event-G

Extension: the five schematic components of the former scene extend to this scene fully and partially. Concerning causality, the act of *clicking* in the current scene is derived from the previous scene. The other schematic components extend fully into the current scene.

S3: *"If anyone looked out of their window now, they wouldn't be able to see anything that was happening down on the pavement* (ibid)."
A-Dom: Dumbledore [Inhibitor: PerAct [(A: darkness – Pr: exist)]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: people – Pr: see) (P: what happens – Pr: is seen)]]

Extraction: the scene encompasses two extracted acts that interact in terms of inhibition. The first act is derived from the previous scene in which *darkness exists*. It functions as an inhibitor to another act which consists of the action *see* with two arguments, *people* as an agent and *what happen* as a patient. The scene can open the contextual frame of mystery because something mysterious is waited. The acts belong to the A-Dom. Temporal and spatial components are derived from the context and added to the scene.



Figure (80): Diagrammatical analysis of S3 in event-G

Extension: causality has a full extension to this scene; the first act is derived from the preceding scene and the second act represents actualization of the

inferred act in the first scene within the present event. All the other components extend fully into this component.

4.3.4. Compression of Event-G

The schematic compression of this event is represented by compressing the three scenes analyzed above. The first step in compression is the **selection** on the bases of the three criteria postulated in the previous chapter. The most prominent two acts in the scenes above interact in terms of inhibition. The first act is derived from the previous scene in which *darkness exists*. It functions as an inhibitor to another act which consists of the action *see* with two arguments, *people* as an agent and *what happen* as a patient. The two interacted acts satisfy the conditions of the selection as follow:

- S1 facilitates S2 and S3
- S2 facilitates the selected acts
- S3 contains the selected acts

The current event encompasses **basic** and **supporting** scenes as follow: the first and the second scenes can be classified as supporting scene because they do not contribute directly to the event understanding. It is clear that the only one basic scene belongs to the contextual frame of mystery. The network of the conceptual frame is represented in Figure (81). The selected acts can subject to the process of **abstraction** by referring to the theme of these acts in terms of mystery and waiting.



Figure (81): Contextual Frame of Event-G

The spatial structure of this event consists of the spatial components of the scenes. According to the **selection** process, the selected spatial component should be related to the selected acts. So, among the components that are represented in Figure (82), only one component is selected. This component represents the **micro** space of the event as whole. It represents most of the basic scenes fully or partially. The final stage in Figure (82), at the bottom, represents the **abstracted** aspects of the scene which reflects the macro space of the event. It encompasses the two prominent participants and B-Dom's sight direction toward the A-Dom.



Figure (82): Compression of the spatial structure

In light of the discussion above, the compressed form of Event-B can be represented in the next formula and the diagrammatical analysis in Figure (83).

A-Dom: Dumbledore [Inhibitor: PerAct [(A: darkness – Pr: exist)]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: people – Pr: see) (P: what happens – Pr: is seen)]]



Figure (83): The compressed form of event-GG

4.3.5. Schematic Structure of Event-H

The current event is similar to the former one in which they are the smallest among the events in the novel; it consists of three scenes only. In light of the **framing** process, boundaries of the event beginning end are ascribed by the causality structure only. This means that the current event shares the previous and next ones in many aspects. In terms of **extension**, the previous event extends into this event through four schematic structures. Participation structure extends into this event through the two prominent participants, *Mr. Dursley* and *the cat*. Time and contextual frame have full extension into this event. The spatial structure has partial extension into this event because the two events have the same **macro** space. The scenes are listed in the following sections

S1: *"He sat down on the wall next to the cat* (ibid: 13)*."*

A-Dom: Dumbledore [Motivator: InfAct [(A: He – Pr: do) (P: something – Pr: is done)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: sit down)]]

Extraction: the scene initiates a new situation in which A-Dom (Dumbledore) and B-Dom (the cat) starts a new communication. The scene

involves interaction between two acts in terms of motivation. The first act is inferred from the context and it needs to be actualized. The agent of this act is determined (*Dumbledore*), but the process and patient are not. This act works as a motivator for the second act which consists of the action of *sitting down* which is performed by *Dumbledore* (the agent). The spatial component, as in Figure (84), encompasses the two participants (*Dumbledore* and *the cat*) that are marked by the two black circles. The *wall* is represented by the upper bold line and it functions as a surface on which the participants are located; the lower bold line represents *the street*. The act cannot be classified into a particular contextual frame because of the inferred act which is not identified. The acts relate to the A-Dom (*Dumbledore*). Time is circled by a doted frame because it is derived from the context and added to the scene by the **gap-filling** process.

Extension: there are three schematic components extend from the previous event into the current event through this scene. Temporal and participation components have full extension into this scene. The spatial component extends through the **macro** space because this scene and the prior ones are located within one macro space.



Figure (84): Diagrammatical analysis of S1 in event-H

S2. *"Fancy seeing you here, Professor McGonagall* (ibid)*."*

A-Dom: Dumbledore [Motivator: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: say) (P: (A: seeing Professor McGonagall – Pr: being fancy) – Pr: is said)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: He – Pr: sit down)]]

Extraction: the formula above shows the interacted PerActs in terms of motivation. The first extracted act includes two states: the state of the agent in which *Dumbledore* says and the state of patient in which the clause seeing *Professor McConagal* being fancy is said. This act motivates the second act to undertake and it is derived from the former scene. Time and space are derived from the context and added to the scene by the process of **gap-filling**. The scene can be classified within the contextual frame of mystery because of the A-Dom behavior toward the cat. The acts relate to A-Dom (*Dumbledore*).

Extension: except the schematic component of causality, all the other schematic components have full extension toward the current scene. Causality has a partial extension through the act of *sitting down* which is derived from the former scene.



Figure (85): Diagrammatical analysis of S2 in event-H

S3. *"He turned to smile at the tabby, but it had gone. Instead he was smiling at a rather severe-looking woman* (ibid)*."*

A-Dom1: Dumbledore [Facilitator: PerAct [(A: he – Pr: turn)]] [Facilitatee: PerAct [(A: he – smile to) (P: the cat – Pr: is given a smile)]]

A-Dom2: Dumbledore [Motivator: InfAct [(A: He – Pr: discover) (P: McGonagall – Pr: is discovered)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: he – smile to) (P: the cat – Pr: is given a smile)]]

A-Dom3: McGonagall [Motivator: InfAct [(A: He – Pr: discover) (P: McGonagall – Pr: is discovered)]]

B-Dom3: [Motivatee: InfAct [(A: the cat– pr: turn into) (P: McGonagall: Pr: is turned)]]

Extraction: the formulas above refer to three places of interaction in terms of facilitation and motivation. The first place of interaction involves two extracted acts that belong to the A-Dom (*Dumbledore*). This PerAct includes the action of *turning* which is performed by *Dumbledore* (the agent). This act functions as a facilitator to the second act consists of two states: agent state has the action of smiling to which is performed by *Dumbledore* (agent). The patient state has the passive form of *smile* (*is given a smile*) and *the cat* as a patient. The second place of interaction involves the inferred act which includes the state of agent (*Dumbledore*) with the action of *discovering* and the state of patient (*McGonagall*) with the passive form of the verb *discover*. This act is equal to the motivator in the previous scene in which the current act represents the **intended action** of the motivator in the previous act. The current act is a motivator to the second act which is derived from the previous scene. The act of *discovering* turns to perform the role of motivator

in the third place of articulation. The motivatee in the last place of interaction involves two states: the agent state (*the cat*) which *turns* and the state of the patient (*McGonagall*) who *is turned*. This scene relates to the contextual frame of mystery. Time and space are surrounded by doted frames because they are pulled out from the context and added to the scene.

Extension: the preceding scene extends into the current scene fully through four components and partially through the component of causality. Causality extends into the scene through the relationship between the motivator in the previous scene and its intended action in the current scene.



Figure (86): Diagrammatical analysis of S3 in event-H

4.3.6. Compression of Event-H

The schematic compression of this event is represented by compressing the three scenes analyzed above. The first step in compression is the **selection** on the bases of the three criteria postulated in the previous chapter. The most prominent two acts in the scenes above interact in terms of motivation. The first act includes the state of agent (*Dumbledore*) with the action of *discovering* and the state of patient (*McGonagall*) with the passive form of the verb *discover*. The motivatee involves two states: the agent state (*the cat*) which *turns* and the state of the patient (*McGonagall*) who *is turned*. The two interacted acts satisfy the conditions of the selection as follow:

- S1 and S2 are actualized by the selected acts
- S3 contains the selected acts

The present event encompasses **basic** and **supporting** scenes as follow: the first scene can be classified as supporting scene because it does not contribute directly to the event understanding. It is clear that the two basic scenes belong to the contextual frame of mystery. The network of the conceptual frame is represented in Figure (87). The selected acts can subject to the process of **abstraction** by referring to the theme of these acts in terms of mystery and waiting.



Figure (87): Contextual Frame of Event-G

The spatial structure of this event consists of the spatial components of the scenes. According to the **selection** process, the selected spatial component should be related to the selected acts. So, among the components that are represented in Figure (88), only one component is selected. This component represents the **micro** space of the event as whole. It represents most of the basic scenes fully or partially. The final stage in Figure (88), at the bottom, represents the **abstracted** aspects of the scene which reflects the macro space of the event. It includes the two participants and the A-Dom's sight direction.



Figure (88): Compression of the spatial structure

In light of the discussion above, the compressed form of Event-B can be represented in the next formula and the diagrammatical analysis in Figure (89).

A-Dom: McGonagall [Motivator: InfAct [(A: He – Pr: discover) (P: McGonagall – Pr: is discovered)]]

B-Dom: [Motivatee: InfAct [(A: the cat– pr: turn into) (P: McGonagall: Pr: is turned)]]



Figure (89): The compressed form of event-H

4.3.7. Schematic Structure of Event-I

It seems that the current event is similar to the prior ones in which they are the smallest among the events in the novel; it consists of three scenes only. In light of the **framing** process, boundaries of the event beginning end are ascribed by the causality structure only. This means that the current event shares the previous and next ones in many aspects. In terms of **extension**, the previous event extends into this event through four schematic structures. Participation structure extends into this event through the two prominent participants, *Mr. Dursley* and *the cat*. Time and contextual frame have full extension into this event. The spatial structure has partial extension into this event because the two events have the same **macro** space. The scenes are listed in the following sections

S1. *"'Yes,' said Professor McGonagall. 'And I don't suppose you're going to tell me why you're here, of all places*? (ibid: 15)"

C-Dom: McGonagall [Motivator: InfAct [(A: he – Pr: have) (P: secret mission – is had)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: I – Pr: suppose) (P: (A: He – Pr: not tell) (P: his mission – Pr: is not told) – Pr: is supposed))]]

Extraction: the current scene involves extracting two interacted acts that belong to *McGonagall* (C-Dom). The first act is inferred relying on the context. It consists of two states: the state of agent (*Dumbledore*) with the process *have* and the state of patient with passive form of *have*. The second act involves also two states: the agent state (*McGonagall*) with *suppose*. The second state has the clause *he will not tell about his mission* as a patient with the passive form of suppose. The spatial and temporal components, as usual, are added by the **gap-filling** process. The spatial component involves the two participants in addition to their sight directions which are marked by the reverse arrows. The scene belongs to the contextual frame of mystery because of his mysterious duty.

Extension: there are four schematic components that extend from the previous event into the current event. These components are the temporal, participation and contextual frame. The spatial component extends partially into this scene through the **macro** space in which the current and the prior events occur in. Causality does not extend into the present scene and event.



Figure (90): Diagrammatical analysis of S1 in event-I

S2. *"'I've come to bring Harry to his aunt and uncle* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Dumbledore [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Dumbledore – Pr: bring) (P: Harry – Pr: is brought)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Dumbledore – Pr: come)]]

Extraction: the question that has been raised by *McGonagall* leads to the current scene. It involves an interaction between two PerActs that belong to A-Dom (*Dumbledore*). The first act has two states: the state of agent (*Dumbledore*) has the action of *bringing*, and the state of the patient (*Harry*) has the passive form of the action in question. This act motivates the act of *coming* which is performed by *Dumbledore.* Temporal and spatial components are found in Figure (91) with the doted frames because they are added by the **gap-filling** process. The scene removes the previous mystery and adds a new mystery because he says that he is bringing Harry, but not why? So the scene relates to the contextual frame of mystery.

Extension: causality in the former scene extends into this scene partially because of the relation between the two scenes in which the current acts are motivated by the previous scene acts. All the other components extend fully.



Figure (91): Diagrammatical analysis of S2 in event-I

S3. *"'You can't mean the people who live here?' cried Professor McGonagall* (ibid)."

B-Dom: McGonagall [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Dumbledore – Pr: mean) (P: The Dursley (the people who live here) – P: are meant)]] [Motivatee InfAct [(A: McGonagall – Pr: cry)]]

Extraction: in the present scene *McGonagall* expresses her sorrow and anger from the derived act in which *Dumbledore brings Harry*. This situation motivates the second extracted act which includes *McGonagall* as an agent with the action of *crying*. Spatial and temporal components are derived from the context and added to the scene. The two interacted acts relate to *McGonagall* (B-Dom). The scene can belong to the contextual frame of mystery because of the mysterious reason of *McGonagall's crying.*

Extension: the preceding scene extends into the current scene fully through four components and partially through the component of causality. Causality extends into the scene through the relationship between the motivator in the previous scene and its intended action in the current scene.



Figure (92): Diagrammatical analysis of S3 in event-I

4.3.8. Compression of Event-I

The schematic compression of this event is represented by compressing the three scenes analyzed above. The first step in compression is the **selection** on the bases of the three criteria postulated in the previous chapter. The most prominent two acts in the scenes above interact in terms of motivation. The first act has two states: the state of agent (*Dumbledore*) has the action of *bringing*, and the state of the patient (*Harry*) has the passive form of the action in question. This act motivates the act of *coming* which is performed by *Dumbledore*. The two interacted acts satisfy the conditions of the selection as follow:

- S1 represents the wondering situation about the selected acts
- S2 includes the selected acts
- S3 represents a reaction toward the selected acts

The present event encompasses **basic** scenes only. It is clear that the three basic scenes belong to the contextual frame of mystery. The network of the conceptual frame is represented in Figure (93). The selected acts can subject to the process of **abstraction** by referring to the theme of these acts in terms of mystery and waiting.



Figure (93): Contextual Frame of Event-I

The spatial structure of this event consists of the spatial components of the scenes. According to the **selection** process, the selected spatial component should be related to the selected acts. So, among the components that are represented in Figure (94), only one component is selected. This component represents the **micro** space of the event as whole. All the scenes have the same spatial component. It represents most of the basic scenes fully or partially. The final stage in Figure (94), at the bottom, represents the **abstracted** aspects of the scene which reflects the macro space of the event. It includes the two participants their sight direction toward each other.



Figure (94): Compression of the spatial structure

In light of the discussion above, the compressed form of Event-B can be represented in the next formula and the diagrammatical analysis in Figure (95).

A-Dom: Dumbledore [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Dumbledore – Pr: bring) (P: Harry – Pr: is brought)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Dumbledore – Pr: come)]]



Figure (95): diagrammatical analysis of S3

4.3.9. Schematic Structure of the Closing Event (Event-J)

This event is the closing one of the Event-Continuum-B which contains only four scenes. Concerning the process of framing, the boundaries that indicate the end of SE-6 and beginning of SE-7 are ascribed by the breaking of the causal chain and disappearance of the two prominent participation domains, Professor McGonagall and Hagrid. The end of this event, and the continuum as whole, is ascribed also by the causal chain break and disappearance of the most prominent participation domains, Dumbledore and the cat. Dumbledore and the cat start their participation from the initiating event, and through the next events, into the closing event. The four scenes of this continuum are structured as follow:

S1: *"Dumbledore turned and walked back down the street* (ibid: 17)*."*

A-Dom: Dumbledore [Motivator: InfAct [(A: Dumbledore – Pr: leave) (P: Harry Potter – Pr: is left)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Dumbledore – Pr: turned and walked)]] [Lo: down street]

Res: [A-Dom's InfAct of leaving motivate A-Dom's PerActs of turning and walking]

The formulation analysis of the sentence above represents that the current scene involves an interaction, over the concept of motivation, between two **extracted** acts within one domain of participation, *Dumbledore* (A-Dom). The first is the inferred act that consists the process of *leaving*, *Dumbledore* as an agent and *Harry Potter* as a patient. This act is not explicitly found in the sentence above, but it is derived from the contextual clues. The second is the PerAct which consists of two sequenced processes, *turning* and *walking*, with only one argument, Dumbledore as an agent. The first act functions as a motivator for the second act. In other words, *Dumbledore turns and walks* because he wants to leave the place where he puts the infant Harry Potter. This scene initiates a new situation and triggers forming a new contextual frame. It is the frame of departure where the beginning of this scene is ascribed by departing two participants, *Professor McGonagall* and *Hagrid*, and now *Dumbledore* is leaving. Time extends from the prior event into this



Figure (96): Diagrammatical analysis of S1 in event-J

event; the process of gap-filling adds the temporal component, *midnight*. The spatial **macro**, the street, spatial structure of the former events extends into this event with some **micro** details. This scene encodes Dumbledore's movement and orientation. He starts by turning orientation of his body and walking toward the street end. This movement is illustrated in Figure (96).

S2: *"On the corner he stopped and took out the silver Put-Outer* (ibid: 18)*."*

A-Dom1: he (Dumbledore) [Motivator: InfAct [(A: Dumbledore – Pr: do) (P: something – Pr: is done)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: he – Pr: stopped)] [Lo: on the corner]

Res: [A-Dom's InfAct motivates A-Dom's PerAct]

A-Dom2: he (Dumbledore) [Motivator: InfAct [(A: Dumbledore – Pr: do) (P: something – Pr: is done)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: he – Pr: took out) (P: the silver Put-Outer – Pr: is taken out)] [Lo: on the corner]

Res: [A-Dom's InfAct motivates A-Dom's PerAct]

The second scene in the closing event involves an interaction between three **extracted** acts within only one participation domain, Dumbledore. The first act is the general inferred act of doing which needs to be actualized in the next scene. This general inferred act consists of the process of doing, an agent (*Dumbledore*) and a patient (*something*). The verb do and the noun something are general words have to be actualized in order to be understood. This act interacts with the act of *stopping* which has *Dumbledore* as an agent. The act of stopping can convert to the act of walking when the interaction between the two acts is based on the concept of inhibition in which the former InfAct inhibits the latter PerAct. In other words, what is

stopped in the sentence above is the process of walking and the process of stopping is equal the causality form of inhibiting, so the act that is effected by the process of doing is the process of walking. The InfAct of doing turn to interact with the act of *taking* which has two arguments: *Dumbledore* as an agent and *the silver PutOuter* as a patient. The interaction between these two acts is over the concept of motivation in which the former motivates the latter.



Figure (97): Diagrammatical analysis of S2 in event-J

The acts, in this scene, are supporting ones because they do not have a specific theme, the functions as connectors between the basic acts, so they are not classified within a specific contextual frame. The spatial component of this scene is manifested in the prepositional phrase on the corner in which

the corner functions as a flat ground for *Dumbledore*. The temporal component, as usual, is added by the process of **gap-filling**. Concerning the relation between this scene and the previous one, Dumbledore's PerAct of walking extends from the former scene into the current scene, but in the previous scene as a motivatee and here as an inhibitee. Time extends into this scene without any change and the spatial component of this scene represents the end point of the spatial component of the former scene. Structuring this scene is illustrated in the formulation analysis above and the diagrammatical analysis in Figure (97).

S3: "*He clicked it once and twelve balls of light sped back to their street lamps so that Privet Drive glowed suddenly orange and he could make out a tabby cat slinking around the corner at the other end of the street* (ibid)."

A-Dom1: He (Dumbledore) [Maker: PerAct [(A: he – Pr: clicked) (P: it (the silver Put-Outer) – Pr: is clicked)]] [Makee: PerAct [(A: the silver Put-Outer – Pr: lighten) (P: street lamps – lightened)]] [Lo: the street]

Res1: [A-Dom's PerAct of clicking makes A-Dom's PerAct of lightening]

A-Dom2: He (Dumbledore) [Maker: PerAct [(A: the silver Put-Outer – Pr: lighten) (P: street lamps – lightened)]] [Makee: PerAct [(A: the street – Pr: glow)]]

Res2: [A-Dom's PerAct of lightening makes A-Dom's PerAct of glowing]

A-Dom3: He (Dumbledore) [Facilitator: PerAct [(A: the street – Pr: glowing)]] [Facilitatee: PerAct [(A: he – Pr: making out) (P: (A: a tabby cat – slink)) – Pr: is maked out]

Res3: [A-Dom's PerAct of glowing facilitates A-Dom PerAct of making out]

The long sentence above that is reformed in terms of the above formulation analysis, and through the process of extraction, into four interacted acts within one domain of participation, *Dumbledore*. The first act is the act of *clicking* that comes in a typical sequence with the act of *taking* in the scene above. This PerAct consists of the process of clicking with the two arguments, agent (*Dumbledore*) and patient (*the PutOuter*). This act functions as a maker for the act of *lightening* because this process is automatic. The act of *lightening* is extracted in terms of the intended action. The clause *twelve balls of light sped back to their street lamps* can be compressed into the process of lightening because it is the final result process. The act of lightening has two arguments, the *PutOuter* as an agent and the *street lamps* as a patient. This act turns to be maker for the act of *glowing* which has only one argument, the street as an agent. This act of *glowing* is the intended action for the clause *that Privet Drive glowed suddenly orange* which include some details that are related to the process of glowing.

The PerAct of glowing turns to be a motivator to the act of *making out* in which has the cat's act of *slinking*. *Dumbledore* in this scene returns everything to its previous situation because he is leaving this place. So, the current scene belongs to the contextual frame of waiting and focusing. The spatial components in this scene consists of two participants, *Dumbledore* and *the cat* where one of the street corners functions as a flat ground for *Dumbledore* which is derived from the prior events. The second corner functions as a flat ground for the cat's movement where it moves around it. *Dumbledore*'s sight is directed toward the cat and its movement. Time is not explicitly manifested in the current scene; it is derived from the context and

added to this scene by the process of **gap-filling**. This represents the **extension** of the temporal component from the previous scene into this scene. Part of the spatial component, *Dumbledore*'s place, is derived from the scene above and added to the current scene. The contextual frame of departure, as it is mentioned above, extends from all prior scenes into this scene. Regarding the causal chain, the act of *taking out* in the previous scene can be seen as a motivator for the PerAct of *Dumbledore*'s clicking. So, this scene as whole is an extension of the scenes above.



Figure (98): Diagrammatical analysis of S3 in event-J

S4: "*He could just see the bundle of blankets on the step of number four* (ibid)."

A-Dom: Dumbledore [Facilitator: PerAct [(A: the street – Pr: glow)]]

[Facilitatee: PerAct [(A: he – Pr: see) (P: (A: the bundle of blankets – Pr: lay) – Pr: is seen]]

Res: [A-Dom's PerAct of glowing facilitates A-Dom's PerAct of seeing]

According to the formulation analysis of the sentence above, the current scene involves interaction between two acts over the concept of facilitation. The first act is the PerAct of glowing which is derived from the previous scene and the second scene consists of the process of seeing, *Dumbledore* as an agent and Harry's act of laying as a patient. The interaction takes place within *Dumbledore*'s participation domain (A-Dom) where the first act functions as a facilitator for the second one. In this scene, *Dumbledore* leaves Harry on the house step, so the scene has its place in the contextual frame of departure. *Dumbledore*'s place, as a part of the spatial component of this scene, is derived from the former scene. Harry's flat ground and *Dumbledore*'s sight orientation are expressed in the sentence above, *the bundle of blankets on the step of number four*. The *bundle of blankets* indicates metonymically to Harry because it covers him. As usual, time extends from the previous scenes into this scene. The causal chain extends into the current event through the act of *glowing* of the previous scene. So, this scene is an extension for the prior scenes. Figure (99) illustrates the diagrammatical analysis of the above scene structure.



Figure (99): Diagrammatical analysis of S4 in event-J

4.3.10. Compression of the Closing Event (Event-J)

The current event involves just four scenes tackle different aspects of the event and, as the other events, these scenes are not equal. Some of them contain and determine the main idea of the event as whole and others technical functions. Starting with the process of selection, the most prominent interacted acts are those which determine the basic idea of the event and have relations with all basic acts. So, it is obvious that the *Dumbledore*'s InfAct of *leaving* in S1 represents the most prominent act in the event. This act interacts directly only with the act of *walking* in S1, so the first scene can be selected as the prominent acts to be involved in the compressed event. Most of the acts in these events are not basic; they are supporting ones, for example, *Dumbledore*'s PerActs of *taking out*, *clicking* and *glowing*. The relationship between the interacted acts and the other acts is represented as follow:

- S1's InfAct of *leaving* motivates with S1's PerAct of *walking*.
- S2's InfAct of *doing* S1's inhibits PerAct of *walking*.
- S1's InfAct of *leaving* motivates all S3's PerActs.
- S1's patient of *leaving* InfAct represents as a patient in the S4's PerAct of *seeing*.

The temporal component is same in all the scenes above, so it will be included in the compressed event without any change. This event includes also one participation domain, *Dumbledore*, so it takes its position in the compressed event. The most prominent component in the spatial structure is that which relates to the interacted acts. It consists of *Dumbledore*'s movement which represented by the dotted arrows and the three connected black circles. The second part is Harry's position on a flat ground (the house step) which is represented by the black circle on the horizontal line. These micro parts are located within the macro space, *the street*. This selected spatial component is abstracted by taking only the most general aspects of the spatial relation between the two participants, *Dumbledore* and *Harry*.



Figure (100): Compression of spatial structure in event-J

This abstracted spatial component includes Harry's position represented by the right black circle and Dumbledor's movement, going away from Harry; which is illustrated by the two black circles that are connected by the dotted arrow. The two participants have *the street* as a macro spatial part in which they are located. The abstracted spatial component is included in the compressed event. The diagrammatical analysis in Figure (100) illustrates the spatial structure of the event and how it is compressed.

The contextual frame of the current event is the frame of departure which is triggered by the PerActs of turning and walking in the first scene. The discussion of the scenes above has shown how the interacted acts belong to the contextual frame in question. The different ideas and processes in the scene can be indicated by the contextual frame that they belong to. Figure (101) shows the diagrammatical analysis of the contextual frame of departure.



Figure (101): the contextual frame of departure

According to the discussion above, the compressed event can be represented as follow:

A-Dom: Dumbledore [Motivator: InfAct [(A: Dumbledore – Pr: leave) (P: Harry Potter – Pr: is left)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Dumbledore – Pr: walk)]]

Res: [A-Dom's InfAct of leaving motivates A-Dom's PerActs of walking]



Figure (102): the compressed structure of the closing event

4.3.11. Sequencing Event of Continuum-B

In terms of **sequencing process**, arrangement of the events in this continuum is based mainly on the **logical sequence**. Time does not paly role in this continuum because all its events take place at the same time. There is no direct and clear causal relation between the events, so, causality does not have role in the sequencing. The evens are not typical; therefore, the typical sequence does not work. In terms of logical sequence, event-F is the first one in the continuum because it involves the first appearance of Dumbledore who participates in all the other events. Event-J is the last event in the continuum because it includes Dumbledore's departure. Event-G must be the second event in the continuum because it involves the cat as a participant; it

turns out into McGonagall in event-H which must be the third. Event-I must be the fourth event in the continuum.

4.4. Formation of the Fantastical Concepts

1. *"…a cat reading a map* (ibid: 8)."

In our real life it is not accepted to say such expression in which a cat reads because it rejected by our logic. However, this expression can be accepted easily in unreal contexts as in cartoon movie, or in a fantastical novel. This expression leads to forming a **fantastical concept** that is mostly temporal because it is not derived from our daily repeated real experiences. This concept is created through the process of personification that consists of **deriving** a specific feature from HUMAN (the source mental space) and **adding** it to an OBJECT or an ANIMAL (the target mental space), then the fantastical concept will be represented in the result mental space. Such concepts are not created from scratch; they are already found concepts that are subjected to the **modification** process. The current concept is formed by deriving the feature of *reading* and adding it to the CAT as in Figure (103).



Figure (103): The fantastical concept of the cat's reading

2. *"'Where do you come from, anyway?' Harry asked… Boa Constrictor, Brazil* (ibid: 25-6)."

The current concept is formed in the same way of forming the previous concept. The already existed concept of SNAKE is modified through the

process of **personification** by deriving the feature of *speaking* from HUMAN and adding it to SNAKE as in Figure (104).



Figure (104): The fantastical concept of the cat's speaking

3. "*… there was an owl rapping its claw on the window, a newspaper held in its beak … Harry counted out five little bronze coins and the owl held out its leg …..* (ibid: 49)."

The scene above leads to structuring a fantastical concept like the previous ones by means of modifying a prior concept, OWL, through the process of **personification**. In the current concept is formed by deriving two features from the source mental space (HUMAN), the feature of working as a delivery man and the feature of dealing with money, then adding them to the target mental space (OWL). The Figure (105) shows how the concept is formed.



Figure (105): The fantastical concept of OWL

4. a.*"… portrait of the Fat Lady on the seventh floor.*

'Where on earth have you all been?' she asked … (ibid: 120)."

b.*"…. This was exactly like Muggle chess except that the figures were alive, which made it a lot like directing troops in battle* (ibid: 149)."

c. *"…the book was screaming!* (ibid: 151)"

d. *"Quirrell snapped his fingers. Ropes sprang out of thin air and wrapped themselves tightly around Harry* (ibid: 209)."

The four scenes above modify four real concepts, PORTRAT, CHESS, BOOK and ROPS, in order to establish fantastical concepts. The four concepts are formed in the same way through the process of personification. The four concepts differ from the previous ones in which the target mental space is inanimate. Regarding the first two fantastical concepts of PORTRAT and CHESS, there is only one fundamental feature derived from the source mental space of ANIMATE into each of the two concepts; this feature is *life*.

The fantastical concept of BOOK is formed in the same way of forming the prior concepts. So, the process of personification in this context involves deriving the feature of screaming from the source mental space of HUMAN and adding it to the target mental space of BOOK. The last fantastical concept of ROPES is established by deriving two features: first, the feature of movability (ropes can move) and this feature can be transfer not only from human but also from animals, so the source mental space is ANIMATE. The second feature is *the execution of orders* in which *ropes* have cognition and can receive and execute orders. The source mental space of this feature is HUMAN. The four concepts formation is represented in the Figure (106).



Figure (106): Structuring the fantastical concept of PORTRAT, CHESS, BOOK and ROPS

5. "*Then the hat twitched. A rip near the brim opened wide like a mouth – and the hat began to sing* (ibid: 88)."

The current scene leads to modifying the well-known concept of HAT which receives new features. The modified fantastical concept is formed by the process of **personification** and the process of **metaphoricity**. The two processes interact to create the fantastical concept of HAT in which there are some features derived from the source mental space (HUMAN) to the target mental space (HAT). These features are the existence of a mouth, speaking

and singing. Adding the feature of mouth to HAT has been formed through the process of metaphoricity in which there are three mental spaces, the source mental space (HUMAN MOUTH), the target mental space (HAT's RIP) and the result mental space in which the RIP is a MOUTH. The interaction between the two processes, personification and metaphoricity, is illustrated in Figure (107).



Figure (107): Structuring the fantastical concept of HAT

6. *"So what is Quidditch?*

… everyone follows Quidditch – played up in the air on broomsticks and there's four balls … (P. 61)."

"... inside the stadium...

... it can go on for ages (P.123)."

"… move up into second place in the House Championship (P. 133)."

"... was refereeing (P. 136)."

"... the commentary for the match… (P. 137)."

"... a red card? (P. 138)"

The above long scene leads to structuring a complex fantastical concept of QUIDDITCH. This concept is subjected to multiple processes of concept formation; they are importation, coining, personification, and Mulitiplexity. Starting with the process of importation, there are three real concepts represent the source mental spaces; these concepts are FOOTBALL, BASKETBALL and GAME (this concept is a **schematic concept** which consists of the general features of games like football and basketball. The target mental space is the fantastical concept of QUIDDITCH. There is only one feature imported from the source mental space of FOOTBALL; this feature is *being public* (*everyone follows*).

The mental space of BASKETBALL contributes two features: first, *poles with hoops on the end*. Second, scoring is by *putting balls through the hoops*. The mental space of GAME supports QUIDDITCH with a group of features such as: *playing in a stadium*, *giving players different roles*, *championship, refereeing*, *commenting on the match, chasing and beating palls*, *goal keeper* and *expelling players by the red card*. All the features above are derived from real concepts found in our daily life, but there are some concepts that are not imported from other concepts. These features

have been added to the fantastical concept of QUIDDITCH through the process of coining. They are invented by the imagination of the writer.

The coined features in this concept are: *playing in the air*, *riding broomsticks*, *seven players*, *two identical black balls*, *one so small golden ball*, *seeking the golden ball by one player (the seeker)*, *the team which find the golden ball wins the match* and *the match can go on for ages*. There are two features added to the fantastical concept of QUIDDITCH through the process of multiplexity. These features are: *four balls instead of one* and *three poles with hoops on the end*. There are two features, *having wings* and *flight*, added to the concept by means of the process of personification. They are derived from the source mental space of BIRDS. The feature of flight is add to the two goal mental spaces of BALL and BROOMSTICK and the feature of having wings is added to BALL only.

The sequencing of the processes can be as follows: the concept formation starts with the process importation; the imported features represent the basis for the concept. Then, some of the imported features, *ball* and *poles with hoops on the end*, are modified by the process of multiplexity. The process of coining, then, adds the created features to the basic ones. Two of these features, *ball* and *broomstick*, are modified through the process of personification. The interaction between the four concept formation processes is illustrated in Figure (108).



Figure (108): Structuring the fantastical concept QUIDDITCH

7. "*… a dog which filled the whole space between ceiling and floor. It had three head* (ibid: 119)."

The current scene leads to modification of the real concept of DOG to establish its fantastical version. This modification is achieved through the process of multiplexity. Particularly, there are two features have been modified by this process, *heads number* and *body size*. The following Figure (109) illustrates the modification process.



Figure (113): Structuring the fantastical concept DOG

8. *"To the waist, a man, with red hair and beard, but below that was a horse's gleaming chestnut body with a long, reddish tail* (ibid: 184)."

This scene leads our cognition to construct a fantastical concept by **clipping** two parts from different concepts, and then **merging** them to form a single concept. In merging there are three mental spaces The current concept is formed by clipping a part from the real concept of HUMAN (the upper part of human body) and another part from the real concept of HORSE (the lower part of hours body). The process of forming this fantastical concept, through the process of clipping and merging, is illustrated in Figure (110).



Figure (110): Structuring the fantastical concept of CENTAUR

12. *"Only there's a unicorn bin injured* … (ibid: 187)."

"The blood of a unicorn will keep you alive, even if you are an inch from death… (ibid: 188)."

This scene motivates our cognition to structure the fantastical concept of UNICORN through the processes of merging and clipping. Formation of this concept starts with clipping the horn from the concept of RHENO and merging with the concept of HORSE to form the fantastical concept of UNICORN in the result mental space. The formed fantastical concept is subjected to the process of coining by inventing the feature of unicorn's blood as a source of keeping people alive. This concept formation is shown in Figure (111).



Figure (111): Structuring the fantastical concept of UNIHORN

13. "*Where there should have been a back to Quirrell's head, there was a face, the most terrible face Harry had ever seen* (ibid: 212)."

The current scene is formed in the same way of forming the previous fantastical concepts. In this situation the two input spaces relate to one real concept, HUMAN. The formation starts with **clipping** human face from one of the mental spaces and **merging** it with the HUMAN, specifically head back, in the second mental space. The result mental space will contain the formed fantastical concept of TWO-FACES-HUMAN. The processes are illustrated in Figure (112).



Figure (112): Structuring the fantastical concept of UNIHORN

14. *"Twelve feet tall, its skin was a dull, granite grey, its great lumpy body like a boulder with its small bald head perched on top like a coconut. It had short legs thick as tree trunks with flat, horny feet* (ibid: 129)."

The scene above motivates our cognition to form a new fantastical concept of TROLL through the four processes of **importation**, **multiplexity** and **unplexity**. This concept formation starts with the importation process in which some general features derived from the source mental space of HUMAN to be added to the target mental space of TROLL. These imported features represent the basis for establishing the target fantastical concept of TROLL. They are: *vertical body*, *skin*, *legs*, *feet*, *ears* and *head*. These features, then, are subjected to modification through the processes of multiplexity, unplexity and metaphoricity. The *vertical body*' tall, *ears'* size and *legs'* thickness are increased by the **multiplexity** process. *Legs*' tall and *head*'s size are decreased by the process of **unplexity**. There is another kind

of modification through the process of metaphoricity on the features of skin and body. Formation of this concept is illustrated in Figure (113).



Figure (113): Structuring the fantastical concept TROLL

15. a. *"'It's an Invisibility Cloak,' said Ron…* (ibid: 148)."

b. *"… the mirror… 'It shows us nothing more or less than the deepest, most desperate desire of our hearts* (ibid: 157)."

The two scenes above lead to structuring the fantastical version of the two real concepts of CLOAK and MIRROR through the process of coining. These real concepts are modified by adding the feature of *invisibility* to CLOAK and the feature of *showing the deepest, most desperate desire of our hearts* to MIRROR. Figure (114) illustrate formation of these two fantastical concepts.



Figure (114): The fantastical concepts of CLOAK and MIRROR

18. *"... the plant had started to twist snake-like tendrils around her ankles. ... it cringed away from the light and warmth* (ibid: 201-2)."

The fantastical concept of PLANT that is derived from the scene above is structured through the two processes of **importation** and **coining**. These processes take place parallel because the target concept already exists. There are two features, *movability* and *aggression*, derived from the source mental space of ANIMATE and added to the target mental space of PLANT. The process of coining creates the feature of *cringing away from the light and warmth* and adds it to PLANT, as in Figure (115).



Figure (115): The fantastical concept of PLANT

19. "…'they're keys! Winged keys … (ibid: 203)."

Personification is the process through which the fantastical concept of KEY in the scene above is structured. The real concept of KEY is modified by deriving the two features of *having wings* and *flight* from the source mental space of BIRDS and, then, adding them to the target mental space of the fantastical concept of KEY, as this process is illustrated in Figure (116).



Figure (116): The fantastical concept of KEY

20. "*They were standing on the edge of a huge chessboard… 'It's obvious, isn't it?' said Ron. 'We've got to play our way across the room.'*

… 'I think,' said Ron, 'we're going to have to be chessmen.'

He walked up to a black knight and put his hand out to touch the knight's horse. At once, the stone sprang to life (ibid: 204)."



Figure (117): The fantastical concept of CHESS

The current scene leads to forming the fantastical version of the real concept of CHESS through three processes: coining, multipexity and personification. The process of coining establishes the feature of *involving players as chess pieces* during playing. The process of multipexity increases the size of the real CHESS. The process of personification derives the feature of *life* from the source mental space of ANIMATE and adds it to the target mental space of CHESS pieces. These three processes are diagramed in Figure (117).

4.5. Descriptive Statistical Analysis and Hypotheses Verification

The current study is principally qualitative, but there are some issues in the qualitative analysis need to be discussed in terms of descriptive statistics. Some of the hypotheses have been verified through the qualitative analysis and the others are discussed in the following points:

1. Types of Interacted Acts

The scenes above involve many different interacted acts that are distributed into four types: PerActs, InfActs, TypActs and LogActs. As it has mentioned in chapter three, PerActs refer to the acts that are expressed clearly by language. Therefore, number of these acts has to be greater than the other acts. So, percentage of these acts is greater than the others as in Table (3). Unlike the acts in question, InfActs are implicit; they are not expressed by the speaker/writer. These acts are derived from the context of the narrative, logical processes and expectation. These acts, especially those which are actualized later, indicate a kind of mystery in the narrative, because some actions need to be explained. Nearly, quarter of the analyzed acts is inferred, as illustrated in Table (3). So, this supports the raised hypothesis in which Harry Potter novel is mysterious.

TypActs refer to acts that are derived from our daily experiences of how things happen in the real world. LogActs point out to the acts which represent our logic. Finding such acts interacting with PerActs or InfActs indicate that there are some peculiar things that contradict with our typical behaviors or our logic. Although Harry Potter is classified as a fantasy novel, number of TypActs and LogActs is little. This indicates that the novel is fantastical in some scenes, while it is real in most of the scenes. This result is demonstrated in point number 5 which is devoted to the fantastical concepts. The standard deviation in Table (3) is so little, this mean that the acts are normally distributed on the types of the acts.

Table (3): Interacted Acts Types

N	Valid	276
	Missing	0
Mean		1.2717
Std. Deviation		.59274

		Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	PerAct	216	78.3	78.3
	InfAct	51	18.5	96.7
	LogAct	3	1.1	97.8
	TypAct	6	2.2	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	

2. Causal Interaction Forms

The analysis above involves different forms of causality within the framework of causality component. There are five forms of causality in the current study; they have different values. The most prominent and frequent form is motivation; most of the acts interact in terms of motivation as in Table (4). This means that this form of interaction represent the normal situation in which an action leads to taking place another action. The second form of interaction, inhibition, occupies a lower stage as in Table (4). It comes in a lower position because it is opposite to the normal situation. While motivation leads to undertaking actions, inhibition form leads for preventing or stopping actions to proceed. Facilitation and making are lower than motivation and inhibition as in Table (4). Their little number is justified by their function in which they come in some position to enable the act to interact in terms of motivation or inhibition. The lowest form of interaction is the resistance; it's little percentage because it represents a clash between two or more acts. So, the points of clash between acts in the analyzed novel

are little. The standard deviation of the interaction forms of causality is little; it means that the data is normally distributed.

Table (4): Statistics of Causal Interaction Forms

N	Valid	276
	Missing	0
Mean		1.8188
Std. Deviation		1.10691
Variance		1.225

		Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Motivation	156	56.5	56.5
	Inhibition	50	18.1	74.6
	Facilitation	40	14.5	89.1
	Making	24	8.7	97.8
	Resistance	6	2.2	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	

3. The Schematic Components Role in Ascribing Boundaries and Connecting Events

In addition to their main function in representing the scene and event structure, the schematic components have two basic functions. First, they ascribe event boundaries; and, second, they connect scenes and events by the process of extension. Concerning boundaries ascription, it is clear that causality is the most prominent component in ascribing events boundaries, as in Table (5). Causality has a basic role more than the other components in identifying boundaries of the events as whole. Participation comes in a second position after causality; it also plays a significant role in ascribing events boundaries. The other three schematic components, temporal, spatial and contextual frame components, are nearly at the same level. Their role is

lower than causality and participation. The ascription points have normal distribution over the schematic components as the little number of the standard deviation refers.

Table (5): Statistics of the Schematic Components Role in Event Boundaries Ascription

N	Valid	88
	Missing	0
Mean		3.4091
Median		4.0000
Std. Deviation		1.30988

		Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Temporal Component	12	13.6	13.6
	Spatial Component	12	13.6	27.3
	Contextual Frame	8	9.1	36.4
	Causality	40	45.5	81.8
	Participation	16	18.2	100.0
	Total	88	100.0	

Causality has the prominent role in ascribing events boundaries; it also plays a fundamental role in connecting scenes within events. One can rely on this component in identifying boundaries of the events as whole. However, it has no role in connecting events. This means that it differs from all the other schematic components. Unlike causality, participation has a vital role in ascribing and connecting events at the same time. It can carry out the two functions, like spatial component, because it is not only one chunk like causality. In other words, an event may have two participants, one disappear at the end of the event (ascribes the event end) and the second continues (relates the event into the next event). The descriptive statistics in Table (6) indicate that the four schematic components have close statuses in

connecting events. The little number of the standard deviation refers to the normal distribution of the participation in connecting events among the four components. The small number of the standard deviation is due to the close numbers of the components in Table (6). This discussion demonstrates the hypotheses in which the schematic components identify events boundaries and connect events and scenes. At the same time, it refutes the hypothesis in which time and space are the most prominent schematic components.

Table (6): Statistics of Schematic Components Role in Connecting Events

N	Valid	112
	Missing	0
Mean		2.8929
Std. Deviation		1.50289

		Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Temporal Component	24	21.4	21.4
	Spatial Component	28	25.0	46.4
	Contextual Frame	28	25.0	71.4
	Participation	32	28.6	100.0
	Total	112	100.0	

4. Fantastical Concepts Formation Processes

The first issue has to be discussed in this context is the number of the fantastical concepts in Harry Potter compared with the real ones. Frankly, there are only twenty fantastical concepts in the novel compared with the great number of the real concepts. However, some of these concepts appear in many places and occasions in the novel. All the twenty concepts are not completely new or fantastical. They are modified real concepts. This refutes the hypothesis in which there are completely new fantastical concepts. These

concepts are formed by means of different processes. Table (8) contains statistics of the processes in which the status of each process in forming the fantastical concepts. It is clear that the most prominent process used in forming the concept is the personification process. All the other processes have close positions. There are many concepts formed by means of more than one process (multiprocesses). The process of personification forms most of the concepts that are formed by one process. The process of coinage does not work alone because there is no completely coined concept; it coins features rather than a concepts. The little number of the standard deviation indicates that the concepts and processes are located within the area of the normal distribution.

Table (7): Statistics of Fantastical Concepts Formation Processes

N	Valid	41
	Missing	24
Mean		5.0488
Median		3.0000
Std. Deviation		3.43476

		Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Importation	2	4.9	4.9
	Personification	14	34.1	39.0
	Coinage	6	14.6	53.7
	Clipping	2	4.9	58.5
	Metaphoricity	1	2.4	61.0
	Plexity	1	2.4	63.4
	Multiplexity	4	9.8	73.2
	Merging	3	7.3	80.5
	Multiprocesses	8	19.5	100.0
	Total	41	100.0	

Chapter Five

Conclusions, Recommendations and Suggested Studies

5.1. Conclusions

In light of what has been discussed in the previous chapter and on the bases of the questions and hypotheses in chapter one, the study has come up with the following conclusions:

1. Narrative structuring system consists of three subsystems that tackle different aspects of narrative. The first one is responsible for constructing events at different levels. The second prepares the perceived language pieces to be processed through filtering them from the redundant parts and compensating the missing parts. The third system (concept structuring system) works partially in this study; it includes formation processes that are devoted for forming the fantastical concepts in the current study. The three systems above work simultaneously.
2. There are four levels in structuring Harry Potter; the process starts with scenes (the smallest units in narrative). These scenes connect to form the simple events which, in turn, construct event continuums. The continuums together represent the novel as a whole.
3. There are five schematic components/structures that reflect the schematic structure of all events in Harry Potter. These components are: temporality, spatiality, participation, causality and contextual frame. Temporality represents the time in which an event takes place. Spatiality indicates the event place, the relationship between the place

and the event entities and the relation between the entities. Participation refers to the participants of the event and the acts that relate to them. Causality points out to the cause-effect relation between acts. Contextual frame represents the connection between the scenes on the basis of their shared theme.

The five schematic components fulfill three roles: first, they represent the skeleton on which events details are built. Second, they ascribe events boundaries at their different levels. Third, they relate scenes and events through the process of extension. In terms of prominence, causality is the most prominent in boundaries ascription. Most of the events are ascribed when the causal chain breaks at the end of an event. Participation is the most prominent component in connecting events through the continuum.

4. Events of narrative have identified boundaries that are ascribed by the process of framing on the bases of the schematic components. Simple event consists of the same five schematic components in all of its scenes; therefore, any change in one of the component draws a boundary around that event. Boundaries of an event continuum are ascribed by changing all the five schematic components.
5. The core process in relating scenes and events is the extension process. Every scene extends to the next one through the schematic components. Some of the scenes have full extension to the next one and others have partial extension. Sum of the connected scenes represents the event structure. In other words, scenes connect with each other through extension to form simple events. In the same way, these events relate to form event continuums that in turn construct the novel as a whole. Sequencing these events is based mainly on logical

sequence, typical sequence and time; while causality has no role in sequencing the analyzed events. The most prominent one among the four above is the logical sequence.

6. There are many events and details found in narrative; some of them are important and others are not. Our cognition summarizes the novel through compressing these events. The compression proceeds through the processes of selection and abstraction. Every event consists of number of scenes that involve interaction between different acts. Some of these acts are prominent more than the others and they represent the core idea of the event, so, they are selected. The selected acts are subjected to the abstraction process in which the acts keep only their general features.
7. Language meaning is not conveyed by words only; there are many aspect of meaning that are not said with words, but derived from the context. The missing parts of meaning are added by the process of gap-filling which is part of idealization system.
8. The fantastical concepts are formed by a number of formation processes. There are many fantastical concepts in Harry Potter novel and all of them are formed by modifying the related real concepts. This leads to the conclusion in which there are not complete fantastical concepts, but there are fantastical features. These features are added to the real concepts to form fantastical concepts.

   Although the novel is classified as fantastical, but there is no comparison between the small number of fantastical concepts and the great number of real ones. This indicates that human cognition can perceive fantasy novels only within the framework of the real

concepts. In other words, our cognition can understand fantastical concepts when they are inserted between the real ones.

9. Harry Potter can be classified as a fantastical because of the existence of the fantastical concepts and the clash between the logical and typical acts and the perceived acts. The existence of the interaction between the inferred acts (especially those which are undetermined) and the perceived acts indicate the novel mystery.

5.2. Recommendations

1. The study can be included in the curriculum of literature in the post graduate studies.
2. It can be used by literary scholars as a framework to analyze literary works.
3. The study can be included in the curriculums of cognitive science and cognitive linguistics to show how cognitive systems interact.

5.3. Suggested Studies

1. Narrative Structuring System of a Short Story.
2. Exploitation of the Construal Operations in Studying Narrative Context.
3. A Cognitive Grammatical Study of Narrative Structuring System.

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Appendix: The Additional Analyzed Events

Event-Continuum-C

Event-K

S1. *As the owls flooded into the Great Hall as usual, everyone's attention was caught at once by a long thin package carried by six large screech owls.*

A-Dom: owls [Motivator: PerAct [(A: owls – Pr: deliver) (P: a long thin package – Pr: is delivered)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: owls – Pr: inter)]]

B-Dom: attendants [Motivator: PerAct [(A: six large screech owls – Pr: carry) (P: a long thin package – Pr: is curred)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: attendants – Pr: direct) (P: their attention – Pr: is directed)]]

S2. *Harry was amazed when the owls soared down and dropped it right in front of him, knocking his bacon to the floor.*

C-Dom: Harry [Motivator: PerAct [(A: the owls – drop) (P: a long thin package – Pr: is dropped)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Harry – amaze)]]

S3. *They had hardly fluttered out of the way when another owl dropped a letter on top of the parcel.*

C-Dom: Harry [Motivator: InfAct [(A: a letter – Pr: tell) (P: Harry – Pr: is told)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: another owl – Pr: drop) (P: a letter – Pr: is dropped)]]

S4. *Harry ripped open the letter first,*

C-Dom: Harry [Facilitator: LogAct [(A: Harry – Pr: open) (P: the letter – Pr: is opened)]] [Facilitatee: InfAct [(A: Harry – Pr: read) (P: the letter – Pr: is read)]]

S5. *it said: DO NOT OPEN THE PARCEL AT THE TABLE.*

C-Dom: Harry [Inhibitor: InfAct [(A: something – Pr: exist)]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: open) (P: the parcel – Pr: is opened)]]

S6. *It contains your new Nimbus Two Thousand, but I don't want everybody knowing you've got a broomstick or they'll all want one.*

C-Dom: Harry [Inhibitor: PerAct [(A: everybody – Pr: know) (P: (A: the parcel – Pr: contain) (A: Nimbus Two Thousand – Pr: is contained]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: open) (P: the parcel – Pr: is opened)]]

C-Dom: Harry [Motivator: InfAct [(A: everybody – Pr: know) (P: (A: the parcel – Pr: contain) (A: Nimbus Two Thousand – Pr: is contained) – Pr: is known)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: everyone – Pr: want) (P: Nimbus Two Thousand – Pr: is wanted)]]

Event-L

S1. *As seven o'clock drew nearer, Harry left the castle and set off towards the Quidditch pitch in the dusk.*

A-Dom: Harry [Motivator: InfAct [(A: Wood – Pr: train) (P: Harry – Pr: is trained)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: leave) (P: castle – Pr: is left)]]

S2: *Too eager to fly again to wait for Wood;*

A-Dom: Harry [Inhipitor: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: being eager to fly)]] [Inhibitee: perAct [(A: Harry – Pr: wait) (P: Wood – Pr: is waited)]]

S3. *Harry mounted his broomstick and kicked off from the ground.*

A-Dom: Harry [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: being eager to fly)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: fly)]]

S4. The Nimbus Two Thousand turned wherever he wanted at his lightest touch.

A-Dom: Harry [Motivator: InfAct [(A: Harry – Pr: being skillful)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: control) (P: The Nimbus Two Thousand – is controlled)]]

S5. *'Hey, Potter, come down!' Oliver Wood had arrived. Harry landed next to him.*

A-Dom: Harry [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Wood – Pr: say) (P: Harry come down – Pr: is said]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: land)]]

S6. *He was carrying a large wooden crate under his arm.*

A-Dom: Harry [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Wood – Pr: do) (P: something – Pr: is done)]] [Motivatee: InfAct [(A: Wood – Pr: carry) (P: crate – Pr: is carried]]

S7. *'Very nice,' said Wood.*

B-Dom: Wood [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: control) (P: The Nimbus Two Thousand – is controlled)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Wood – Pr: say) (P: very nice – Pr: is said)]]

Event-Continuum-D

Event-M

S1. *Dumbledore had convinced Harry not to go looking for the Mirror of Erised again; and*

A-Dom: Harry [Motivator: InfAct [(A: (A: Harry – Pr: look) (P: mirror – Pr: is looked) – Pr: being dangerous)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: not look) (P: mirror – Pr: is looked)]]

S2. *for the rest of the Christmas holidays the Invisibility Cloak stayed folded at the bottom of his trunk.*

A-Dom: Harry [Inhibitor: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: not look) (P: mirror – Pr: is looked)]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: the Invisibility Cloak – Pr: stay folded]]

S3. *Harry wished he could forget what he'd seen in the Mirror as easily, but he couldn't.*

A-Dom: Harry [Inhibitor: InfAct [(A: Harry – Pr: see) (P: his parent – are seen)]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: forget) (P: the mirror – Pr: is forgotten)]]

S4. *He started having nightmares.*

A-Dom: Harry [Motivator: InfAct [(A: Harry – Pr: see) (P: his parent – are seen)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: have) (P: nightmares – Pr: are had)]]

S5. *Over and over again he dreamed about his parents disappearing in a flash of green light while a high voice cackled with laughter.*

A-Dom: Harry [Motivator: InfAct [(A: Harry – Pr: see) (P: his parent – are seen)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: dream) (P: (A: Harry's parent – Pr: disappear) – Pr: is dreamed)]]

S6. *'You see, mirror could drive you mad,' said Ron, when Harry told him about these dreams.*

A-Dom: Harry [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: tell) (P1: Ron, P2: dreams – Pr: are told)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Ron – Pr: say) (P: (A: mirror – Pr: derive) (P: mad – Pr: is derived) – Pr: is said]]

Event-N

S1. *Hermione, who came back the day before term started.*

A-Dom: Hermione [Motivator: PerAct [(A: term – Pr: start)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Hermione – Pr: come back)]]

S2. *She was torn between horror at the idea of Harry being out of bed, roaming the school three nights in a row ('If Filch had caught you!') and disappointment that he hadn't at least found out who Nicolas Flamel was.*

A-Dom: Hermione [Motivator-1: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: roam)]] [Motivator-2: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: don't find out) (P: Nicolas Flamel – Pr: is not found out)]] [Motivatee: PerAct (A: Hermione – Pr: fear)]]

S3. *They had almost given up hope of ever finding Flamel in a library book;*

B-Dom: they [Motivator: InfAct [(A: they – Pr: not find out) (P: Nicolas Flamel – Pr: is not found out)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: they – Pr: give up) (P: hope of finding Nicolas Flamel – Pr: is given up)]]

S4. *even though Harry was still sure he'd read the name somewhere.*

C-Dom: Harry [Resistor: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: read) (P: Nicolas Flamel's name – Pr: is read)]] [Resistee: PerAct [(A: they – Pr: give up) (P: hope of finding Nicolas Flamel – Pr: is given up)]]

S5. *Once term had started, they were back to skimming through books for ten minutes during their breaks.*

B-Dom: they [Facilitator: PerAct [(A: breaks – Pr: exist)]] [Facilitatee: PerAct [(A: they – Pr: search) (P: books – Pr: are searched)]]

Event-O

S1. *Harry had even less time than the other two, because Quidditch practice had started again.*

A-Dom: Harry [Inhibitor: PerAct [(A: Quidditch practice – Pr: start)]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: have) (P: more time – Pr: is had)]]

S2. Wood was working the team harder than ever.

B-Dom: Wood [Inhibitor: PerAct [(A: Wood – Pr: work) (P: team – Pr: is worked)]]

A-Dom: Harry [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: have) (P: more time – Pr: is had)]]

S3. Even the endless rain that had replaced the snow couldn't dampen his spirits.

B-Dom: Wood [Resistor: PerAct [(A: Wood – Pr: train)]] [Resistee: PerAct [(A: endless rain – Pr: exist)]]

S4. The Weasleys complained that Wood was becoming a fanatic, but Harry was on Wood's side.

B-Dom: Wood [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Wood – Pr: become fanatic)]]

C-Dom: Weasleys [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Weasleys – Pr: complain)]]

Event-P

S1. *As the match drew nearer, however, Harry became more and more nervous.*

A-Dom: Harry [Motivator: PerAct [(A: match – Pr: drew nearer)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: become nervous)]]

S2. The rest of the team weren't too calm, either.

B-Dom: the team [Motivator: PerAct [(A: match – Pr: drew nearer)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: the team – Pr: being not calm)]]

S3. The idea of overtaking Slytherin in the House Championship was wonderful, no one had done it for nearly seven years.

B-Dom: the team [Motivator: InfAct [(A: no one – Pr: defeat) (P: Slytherin – Pr: isn't defeated)]]

Event-Continuum-E

Event-Q

S1. *Harry was glad school was over;*

A-Dom: Harry [Motivator: PerAct [(A: school – Pr: being over)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: being glad)]]

S2. *but there was no escaping Dudley's gang, who visited the house every single day.*

A-Dom: Harry [Inhibitor: PerAct [(A: Dudley's gang – Pr: visit) (P: the house – Pr: is visited]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: cannot escape)]]

S3. *Piers, Dennis, Malcolm and Gordon were all big and stupid, but as Dudley was the biggest and stupidest of the lot, he was the leader.*

B-Dom: Dudley [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Dudley – Pr: being the biggest and stupidest)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Dudley – Pr: being the leader)]]

S4. *The rest of them were all quite happy to join in Dudley's favourite sport: Harry-hunting.*

C-Dom: Dudley's friends [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Dudley's friends – Pr: hunt) (P: Harry – Pr: is hunted]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Dudley's friends – Pr: being happy)]]

S5. *This was why Harry spent as much time as possible out of the house;*

C-Dom1: Dudley's friends [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Dudley's friends – Pr: hunt) (P: Harry – Pr: is hunted]]

A-Dom1: Harry [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: spent) (P: time – Pr: is spend)]]

S6. *wandering around and thinking about the end of the holidays,*

C-Dom: Dudley's friends [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Dudley's friends – Pr: hunt) (P: Harry – Pr: is hunted]]

A-Dom: Harry [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: wander/think) (P: end of the holidays – Pr: is wandered/thought)]]

S7. *where he could see a tiny ray of hope.*

A-Dom: Harry [Motivator: PerAct [(A: end of the holidays – Pr: come)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: see) (P: hope – Pr: is seen)]]

S8. *When September came he would be going off to secondary school and;*

A-Dom: Harry [Facilitator: PerAct [(A: September – Pr: come)]] [Facilitatee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: go off) (P: secondary school – Pr: is went off)]]

S9. *for the first time in his life, he wouldn't be with Dudley.*

A-Dom: Harry [Maker: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: go off) (P: secondary school – Pr: is went off)]] [Makee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: not meet) (A: Dudley – Pr: is not met)]]

Event-R

S1. *One day in July, Aunt Petunia took Dudley to London to buy his Smeltings uniform,*

A-Dom: Aunt Petunia [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Aunt Petunia – Pr: take) (P: Dudley – Pr: is taken)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [A: Aunt Petunia – Pr: bay) (P: his Smeltings uniform – Pr: is bought)]]

S2. leaving Harry at Mrs Figg's.

A-Dom: Aunt Petunia [Motivator: InfAct [(A: Harry – Pr: not being alone)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [A: Aunt Petunia – Pr: leave) (P: Harry – Pr: is left)]]

S3. Mrs Figg wasn't as bad as usual.

B-Dom: Mrs Figg [Motivator: InfAct [(A: something – Pr: change) (P: Mrs Figg – Pr: is changed)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [A: Mrs Figg – Pr: being not bad)]]

S4. It turned out she'd broken her leg tripping over one of her cats

B-Dom: Mrs Figg [Facilitator: PerAct [(A: Mrs Figg – Pr: break) (P: her leg – Pr: is broken)]] [Faciolitatee: PerAct [A: Mrs Figg – Pr: trip over) (P: one of her cats – Pr: is tripped]]

S5. she didn't seem quite as fond of them as before.

B-Dom: Mrs Figg [Motivator: InfAct [A: Mrs Figg – Pr: trip over) (P: one of her cats – Pr: is tripped]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: Mrs Figg – Pr: being not fond) (P: cats – Pr: being not fonder)]]

S6. She let Harry watch television and gave him a bit of.

B-Dom: Mrs Figg [Motivator: Inf [A: Mrs Figg – Pr: being not bad)]] [Motivator: PerAct [(A: Mrs Figg – Pr: allow) (P: (A: Harry – Pr: watch) (P: TV – Pr: is watched) – Pr: is allowed)]]

Event-Continuum-F

Event-S

S1. *The door was hit with such force that it swung clean off its hinges;*

A-Dom: a giant man [Maker: PerAct [(A: someone – Pr: hit) (P: door – Pr: is hit)]] [Makee: PerAct [(A: the door – Pr: swung)]]

S2. *and with a deafening crash landed flat on the floor.*

A-Dom: a giant man [Maker: PerAct [(A: someone – Pr: hit) (P: door – Pr: is hit)]] [Makee: PerAct [(A: a deafening crash – Pr: land flat) (P: the door – Pr: is landed flat]]

S3. *A giant of a man was standing in the doorway.*

A-Dom: a giant man [Motivator: PerAct [(A: a giant man – Pr: do) (P: something – Pr: is done)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: a giant man – Pr: come)]]

S4. *His face was almost completely hidden by a long, shaggy mane of hair and a wild, tangled beard;*

A-Dom: a giant man [Inhibitor: PerAct [(A: a long, shaggy mane of hair and a wild, tangled beard – Pr: hide) (P: his face – Pr: is hide]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: one – Pr: cannot see) (P: his face – Pr: cannot be seen]]

S5. *but you could make out his eyes, glinting like black beetles under all the hair.*

A-Dom: a giant man [Maker: PerAct [(A: you – Pr: can make out) (P: his eyes – Pr: can be made out]] [Makee: PerAct [(A: his eyes – Pr: glint)]]

S6. *The giant squeezed his way into the hut,*

A-Dom: a giant man [Motivator: InfAct [(A: the gaint – Pr: see) (P: Harry – Pr: is seen]] [Makee: PerAct [(A: the gaint – Pr: squeeze)]]

S7. *stooping so that his head just brushed the ceiling.*

A-Dom: a giant man [Maker: InfAct [(A: the giant's head – Pr: not tech) (P: ceiling – Pr: is not touch]] [Makee: PerAct [(A: the gaint – Pr: stoop)]]

S8. *He bent down, picked up the door,*

A-Dom: a giant man [Facilitator: PerAct [(A: the giant– Pr: bent down)]] [Facilitatee: PerAct [(A: the gaint – Pr: pick up) (P: the door – Pr: is picked up)]]

S9. and fitted it easily back into its frame.

A-Dom: a giant man [Motivator: InfAct [(A: the giant– Pr: close) (the door frame – Pr: is closed]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: the giant – Pr: fit back) (P: the door – Pr: is fitted back)]]

S10. *The noise of the storm outside dropped a little.*

A-Dom: a giant man [Maker: PerAct [(A: the giant – Pr: fit back) (P: the door – Pr: is fitted back)]] [Makee: PerAct [(A: the noise of the storm – Pr: drop little)]]

S11. *He turned to look at them all.*

A-Dom: a giant man [Facilitator: PerAct [(A: the giant – Pr: turn)]] [Facilitatee: PerAct [(A: the giant – Pr: see) (P: them – Pr: are seen)]]

Event-T

S1. *His eyes fell on the empty grate with the shrivelled crisp packets in it.*

A-Dom: a giant man [Motivator: PerAct [(A: the empty grate with the shrivelled crisp packets – Pr: attract) (P: he – Pr: is attracted)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: he – Pr: direct) (P: his sight – Pr: is directed)]]

S2. He bent down over the fireplace;

A-Dom: a giant man [Motivator: InfAct [(A: he – Pr: do) (P: something – Pr: is done)]] [Motivatee: PerAct [(A: he – Pr: bent)]]

S3. they couldn’t see what he was doing

A-Dom: a giant man [Inhibitor: InfAct [(A: his huge body – Pr: bent)]] [Inhibitee: PerAct [(A: they – Pr: see) (P: (A: he –do) – Pr: is seen)]]

S4. but when he drew back a second later, there was a roaring fire there.

A-Dom: a giant man [Faciliator: InfAct [(A: his huge body – Pr: draw back)]] [Facilitatee: PerAct [(A: they – Pr: see) (P: a roaring fire – Pr: is seen)]]

S5. It filled the whole damp hut with flickering light and

A-Dom: a giant man [Maker: InfAct [(A: fire – Pr: roar)]] [Makee: PerAct [(A: the whole damp hut – Pr: light)]]

S6. Harry felt the warmth wash over him as though he’d sunk into a hot bath.

B-Dom: Harry [Maker: InfAct [(A: fire – Pr: roar)]] [Makee: PerAct [(A: Harry – Pr: being warm)]]