

**Babylon University**

**Investigating the Difficulties Facing  
Iraqi EFL University Students in  
Interpreting Conversational  
Implicature**

**A Thesis**

**Submitted to the Council of the College of Basic Education,  
University of Babylon in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for  
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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ  
وَلَا تَقْفُ مَا لَيْسَ لَكَ بِهِ عِلْمٌ إِنَّ السَّمْعَ وَالْبَصَرَ  
وَالْفُؤَادَ كُلُّ أُولَئِكَ كَانَ عَنْهُ مَسْئُولًا  
صَدَقَ اللَّهُ الْعَظِيمِ

(سورة الإسراء/ اية 36 )

# **To My Parents**

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## Abstract

The ability to understand what is being said is one of the main requirements for interlocutors. Most of the times, the conversation is straightforward and direct so one can judge what is being said through the literal meaning, that is, the original meaning of the words. However there are cases that the conversation is not quite to the norm and indirect so one cannot make the right judgment if the utterance is only taken from its literal meaning (i.e. when the utterance is implied and expressed in a round-about way). Thus, the present study aims at explaining the phenomenon of conversational implicature and investigating empirically the extent of Iraqi EFL university students' ability in interpreting the required conversational implicatures at the production and recognition levels.

It is hypothesized that:

1. Most of Iraqi EFL university students face difficulties in interpreting conversational implicatures which are sensitive to cultural context and suprasegmental features.
2. Such learners face more difficulties in interpreting particularized conversational implicature than the generalized implicature.

On the basis of these hypotheses, a diagnostic test has been designed and applied to a sample of 50 Iraqi EFL university students at their fourth stage from the Department of English, College of Education, University of Babylon. The statistical and Linguistic analysis of the subjects' responses to the items of the test has yielded the following conclusions:

1. The Iraqi EFL university students at the fourth year face difficulties at both levels in interpreting conversational implicature which is sensitive to cultural differences and suprasegmental features since the rates of their correct responses are “poor question” (60.40%), “irony” (117.46.8%), “be relevant” (405.51%) and “understated criticism” (144.57.6%).

2. Iraqi EFL university students have faced more difficulties in interpreting particularized implicature than that of generalized implicature since the rate of their correct responses to particularized implicature (572,48 ) is lower than that of their correct responses to generalized implicature (546,68.25%).
3. The subjects' failure has been found to be attributed to the following factors:
  1. Sociopragmatic failure
  2. Pragmalinguistic failure

This study comprises five chapters, the first of which is devoted to the discussion of the problem, aims, hypotheses, procedures followed, limit, and value of the study.

Chapter two is a theoretical survey of the conversational implicature and its types.

Chapter three presents a description of the test administered to the fourth year EFL university students, Department of English, College of Education, University of Babylon. This description includes the objectives of the test, its design, material selection, validity and reliability, subjects, as well as the scoring scheme adopted.

Chapter four outlines the results of the test from both statistical and linguistic perspectives.

Finally, Chapter Five summarizes the conclusions arrived at in this study, on the bases of which some pedagogical implications are given and some topics for further research are suggested.

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## Abbreviations and Nomenclatures

Symbol	Description
CP	Cooperative Principle
EFL	English as a Foreign Language
H	Hearer
L1	First Language
L2	Second Language
P&Q	Any Propositions
Quantity1	The first Maxim of Quantity
S	Speaker
TL	Target language
+>	Con conversationally Implicate
~+>	Does not Conversationally Implicate
+>>	Conventionally implicate
~+>>	Does not Conventionally Implicate

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# Chapter One

## Introduction

### 1.1 The Problem

Successful communication can be achieved when interlocutors adhere to similar pragmatic rules that govern the manner language is used and interpreted. For second language speakers, this process is complicated by the fact that these speakers often rely on a different set of pragmatic rules based on the sociocultural conventions of their native language. The discrepancy in the expectations of language use created by the different pragmatic systems is often the source of miscommunication between native and non-native speakers of a language. Thus, language learners must not only acquire the correct forms and sounds of the TL, but also the knowledge of how language is pragmatically used in culture.

According to Grice (1975:45-6), interlocutors are expected to conform to certain conversational maxims. For example, they are expected to cooperate by recognizing a common purpose in communicating, which he defines as the '*Cooperative Principle*' (henceforth *CP*). Related to this general principle are four types of individual maxims that direct the particulars of discourse. *The Maxims of Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner* specify the rules of what should and should not be included in the conversation and how they should be said.

*The Maxim of Quantity* specifies that one should give as much information as is called for, but no more information than is required; *the Maxim of Quality* states that one should tell the truth, and not say anything that one lacks information for; *the Maxim of Relevance* claims that one should ask questions and provide information that is relevant to the course

of conversation ; and finally , *the Maxim of Manner* refers to the rules of being orderly , brief , and avoiding ambiguity and obscurity when speaking.

Grice (ibid: 49) further explained that the expectations for fulfilling these maxims can be violated by speakers in the following ways : (1) a speaker may quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim, which usually results in a misunderstanding; (2) a speaker may *opt out* from the operation of maxim or the CP indicating an unwillingness to cooperate ;(3) a speaker may find that two maxims *clash* and chooses one over the other ; or (4) a speaker may choose to *flout* a maxim by obviously failing to fulfill the demands of the rules. Speakers may follow or break these conversational maxims. For instance

(1).

- A: where's the fish?

- B: *The cat looks happy.*

In this dialogue, it appears that the location of the 'fish' in A's utterance and the feeling of the 'cat' in B's utterance are not related. B's utterance never becomes the direct answer to A's question, whereas B implies that the cat ate it. Therefore, the speaker breaks the maxim of relevance. (Mikio: 1995:4-5)

Most Iraqi EFL university students are believed to face difficulties in interpreting irrelevant replies because of the discrepancies in the expectations of the behaviours in the two cultures.

Furthermore, the Iraqi EFL learners find it difficult to distinguish sentence meaning (sense) from the utterance meaning (force) in which the latter is frequently signaled by suprasegmental features and as a result they

may fail to realize the implied meaning instead they focus on literal meaning. For example

(2).

- Kim: I told Hasan a secret, and he told it to everyone.

- Dave: *He's such a quiet guy!*

Dave's reply is an ironical statement which characteristically gives the opposite meaning i.e. he is saying it sarcastically. Syntactically, this sentence is an exclamative whereas semantically it is a statement.

To the best of the researcher's knowledge, no adequate empirical study of the subject of the conversational implicature has been carried out. Thus, the researcher hopes that this study fills this gap and be of great help for EFL teachers and material designers.

## **1.2 Aims of the study**

In connection with the preceding statements, the study aims basically at:

1. Identifying the Iraqi EFL university students' performance in interpreting the required conversational implicatures at the recognition and production levels.
2. Finding out the causes of the students' pragmatic failure so that some solutions can be posited to help them to overcome the problems they face.

## **1.3 Hypotheses**

It is hypothesized that:

1. Most of Iraqi EFL university students face difficulties in interpreting conversational implicatures that are sensitive to cultural context and suprasegmental features.

2. Iraqi EFL learners face more difficulties in interpreting particularized conversational implicatures than the generalized ones.

### **1.4 Procedures**

In the course of fulfilling the objectives of this study, the following steps are to be followed:

1. To provide a theoretical background, a linguistic view of conversational implicature will be established through presenting a semantic and pragmatic analysis of conversational implicature.
2. Selecting a sample of Iraqi EFL university students as subjects for administering a diagnostic test to point out the difficulties that they may encounter in interpreting conversational implicature.
3. The empirical part of this study will be a test conducted in the form of situations through which students of the University of Babylon imagine themselves and answer accordingly.
4. Analyzing the results of the test, on the bases of which conclusions and pedagogical recommendations will be introduced.

### **1.5 Scope**

The limits of the study are as follows:

1. The test is limited to the performance of 50 Iraqi fourth-year students, in the Department of English, College of Education, University of Babylon during the academic year 2007-2008.

2. This study will account only for one type of implicature, specifically the conversational implicature.
3. The test is confined to the following maxims:
  - a. The first Maxim of Quantity “*Make your contribution as informative as is required*” which is represented in the test by ‘*be sufficiently informative*’, ‘*understated criticism*’ and ‘*scalar*’.
  - b. The first and the second Maxims of Quality “*Do not say what you believe to be false*” and “*Do not say that for which you lack evidence*” which are represented by ‘*irony*’ and ‘*pope question*’
  - c. Maxim of Relation; “*be relevant*”
  - d. Manner: “*be orderly*”

## 1.6 Value of the Study

The findings of this study are hoped to be of benefit in two ways:

- 1- The theoretical aspect will provide updated information about conversational implicature which can be of help to other researchers as it can provide studies for future investigation.
- 2- The practical aspect has a pedagogical value to textbook writers, syllabus designers, teachers and EFL learners by presenting insights about the problems which Iraqi EFL university students encounter on pragmatics level.

## 1.7 The Model Adopted:

Grice's (1975) “*Logic and Conversation*” is considered a pioneering study in English implicature. Hence, it has been adopted as a basic model for

the present work. Moreover, other references have also been used to enhance the knowledge about conversational implicature.

## 1.8 Definitions of Some Related Terms

**1. Inference:** Commonly referred to as reading between the lines. It is essential for effective communication for two reasons. Firstly, the conventional meaning of lexis is not always a clear indicator of the intended message of speakers/ writers. Secondly, “discourse rarely provides us with a fully explicit description of a situation”; therefore, one usually has to fill in the missing information (Eysenck, 1990: 224)

**2. Sense:** According to Finch (2000:179), the meaning a word has within the language is limited to a word’s conceptual or propositional meaning. According to sense view, words are symbols entities deriving their meaning from the place they occupy in the linguistic system. Sense is usually discussed in relation to reference. For example, the word ‘*red*’ refers to red colour.

**3. Force:** According to Finch (2000:164), it is the contextual meaning of a linguistic item, which is frequently signaled by intonation. It is an aspect of utterance-meaning rather than sentence-meaning. Force is not so much linguistic, as extralinguistic, meaning i.e. those elements of meaning which are not explicit in the language itself and for which the dictionary reference would be a limited help.

**4. Presupposition:** is a term used to refer to the assumptions implicitly made by speakers and listeners which are necessary for the correct interpretation of utterances (ibid: 173).

**5. Exchanges:** It is the minimal interactive unit which involves the negotiation of a single piece of information (Stenstrom, 1994: 48).

**6. Context:** Utterances are not isolated phenomena in conversation but depend on the entire context for their interpretation. What the speaker means by saying something must be interpreted in relation to the wider context and not only in relation to what the previous speaker has just said, the immediate context (Ibid: 26).

**7. Shared Knowledge** is the knowledge that speakers have in common. Communication would hardly be possible without a certain amount of shared knowledge (ibid: 28).

**8. Transactions:** a transaction consists minimally of one exchange dealing with one topic, but usually of a sequence of exchanges dealing with the same topic (ibid: 55).

**9. Suprasegmental:** it is a term used in phonetics and phonology to refer to a vocal effect which extends over more than one sound segment in an utterance, such as a pitch, stress or juncture pattern (Crystal, 1997: 374).

# CHAPTER TWO

## CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

### 2.1 Notions of Meaning

The meaning of an utterance enables speakers to use language, to articulate their intentions such as a request, a statement of fact, an expression of praise, an apology and so on, and enables the hearer to interpret utterances as such. An utterance therefore takes on meaning, first, when the speaker uses it to express a thought; and second, in the receptive act when hearers interpret the utterance and assign meaning to it from their own knowledge and experience. Between the speaker and the hearer, therefore, there is the negotiation of the meaning of an utterance within a communication event.

The entry point of meaning is the word level. Words have meaning. However, words are not objects that have properties of their own in the same way that concrete objects do.

Words are relational entities. that is to say, that words are composed of parts that are not integrated by any form or structure intrinsic to the word itself.

The symbols (mark/ sounds) which taken together constitute a word, make the word real insofar as it exists outside the mind. All that air or paper can carry is the symbolic representation of the actual form which is understood within the mind and not the form itself

(<http://wings.buffalo.edu/philosophy/FARBER/Johnson.html>).

Martin (1987:20) states that "spoken words are the symbols of mental experiences". He adds: "words in their primary or immediate signification stand for nothing, but the ideals in the mind of him who uses them".

Meaningful communication occurs between participants, because there is, at least, some inter-subjective agreement as to what a particular word means, in a particular context:

If one adopts a broad notion of meaning, it follows that words or even sentences, considered as abstract entities do not have meaning. They are communicative acts that have meaning because meaning only becomes attached to words or sentences through the actions of a speaker or hearer.

(<http://wings.buffalo.edu/philosophy/FARBER/Johnson.html>).

### **2.1.1 Linguistic Meaning**

It is customary in linguistic philosophy to recognize three areas within language studies or semiotics. Montague (1968: 68) provides a useful articulation of these divisions as:

syntax, semantics and pragmatics may be characterized as follows. Syntax is concerned with the relations between linguistic expressions; semantics with relations between expressions and the objects to which they refer; and pragmatics with the relations among expressions, the objects to which they refer and the users or contexts of the use of the expressions.

A discussion of meaning, therefore, within a linguistic context, usually examines meaning as communicated by the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic values of an utterance.

#### **2.1.1.1 Syntactic Meaning**

The term syntax refers to the branch of language study dealing with the way in which words are arranged to show connections of meaning among the constituents of sentence. Syntactic analysis of language is usually

limited to its objective description of sentences, in relation to the rules. Such an analysis enables language users to determine the status of an utterance, syntactically.

(<http://spot.colorado.edu/~michaeli/MichaelisWordMeaning.pdf>)

The notion of communicative competence advocates that a purely syntactic analysis of language is wholly inadequate in describing what goes on with language usage. While syntax is an indication that the speaker is familiar with the internal arrangements of the elements of a sentence, there is no indication that such competence extends to the use or application of these arrangements. Rather an inclusive picture of language competence is obtained by the exploration of the semantic and pragmatic properties of the utterance (ibid: 13).

### **2.1.1.2 Semantic Meaning**

Semantics, the second category in the three-part division of language, is usually limited to the study of the meaning of linguistic expressions. Generally, semantics is the study of meaning as expressed by words, phrases and sentences in conjunction with their syntactic arrangement.

Kempson (1988:139) states that one of the main assumptions about the meaning of natural language is that a complete account of sentence meaning is given by recursively specifying the truth conditions of the sentences in the language. He adds, in this truth conditional view of semantics, the central property of natural languages is that human beings use language to communicate propositions i.e. information about the world.

Kempson (ibid) says:

It is uncontroversial that the meaning of a sentence is made up of the meaning of words which it contains and their syntactic arrangement in that sentence. Accordingly the semantic

component of a grammar is, on this view, assumed to be a formal algorithm which assigns propositional contents to a sentence on the basis of the meaning of expressions it contains and the syntactic configuration.

Truth-conditional semantics (also known as conventional or conceptual or literal meaning of utterances); therefore covers those basic, essential components of meaning which are conveyed by the literal use of a word or sentence without the benefit of context (ibid)

### **2.1.1.3 Pragmatic Meaning**

In pragmatics, most discussions on contextualized meaning include a differentiation between literal and intended meaning of natural language, whereby literal meaning is identical to the meaning of a sentence without context (semantics) while intended meaning is reserved to meaning achieved after the consideration of context, conversation principles and any implications that may exist (pragmatics). Or as Gadzar (1979:2) has put it, that semantics is limited to the statement of truth condition: “pragmatics has as its topic those aspects of meaning of utterances which cannot be accounted for by straightforward reference to the truth conditions of the sentence uttered”.

Leech (1989:5) defines pragmatics as “the study of meaning in relation to speech situation”. His definition is based on utterance meaning rather than sentence meaning. Whereas semantics (grammatical meaning) is defined purely as a property of expressions in a given language. He sees pragmatic meaning as ‘relative to a speaker or user of a language’. He concludes by showing the relation between pragmatics and grammar. Language consists of grammar and pragmatics. Grammar is an abstract formal system for producing and interpreting messages. General pragmatics

is a set of strategies and principles for achieving success in communication by the use of grammar. Grammar is functionally adapted to the extent that it possesses properties which facilitate the operation of pragmatic principles (ibid: 76).

Bach (1997: 24) explains pragmatic meaning also by differentiating it from its closest rival, semantics. His reason for invoking a semantic and pragmatic distinction in meaning is to shed the light on a number of other distinctions associated with pragmatic thinking. Some of these distinctions are:

type vs token; sentence vs utterance; meaning vs use; context-invariant vs context sensitive meaning; linguistic vs speaker meaning; literal vs nonliteral use; saying vs implying; content vs force.

Within these pairs, the first types fall in the domain of semantics while the second are areas in pragmatics. Bach believes that these diverse forms of linguistic meaning are the fundamental differences between semantics and pragmatics.

Pragmatic meaning, therefore, is characterized by the multiple senses that makes it rather difficult to grasp, especially for non-native speakers. Variations of sense yield variations of meaning-type. It may result in synonymy, hyponymy, metonymy, etc., types of utterance meanings.

To sum up the notion of pragmatics, Yule (1996:127) suggests that pragmatics is mainly concerned with the speaker's intended meaning, the invisible meaning and how one can recognize it although it is not actually said (or written).

The ability of interlocutors to create and manipulate these different meanings (syntactic, semantic and pragmatic) rests on their communicative competence.

## **2.2 Communicative competence**

Hymes (1972:281) first introduced the theoretical concept of communicative competence, arguing that for a language user to be competent, s/he needs to be able to do more than speaking the language using correct grammar, and his or her utterance needs to be appropriate to the context in which they occur.

Canale and Swain 1980 (cited in Richards and Rodgers, 2001:160) further developed Hymes's concept into a model of communicative competence. It consists of four main components:

1. Grammatical competence, that is, a learner's competence in the words and rules of the language;
2. Sociolinguistic competence, that is, a learner's ability to communicate appropriately in a particular social context, taking into account the participants and the rules for interaction;
3. Strategic competence, that is, the strategies used when either grammatical competences or sociolinguistic competence fail; and
4. Discourse competence, that is, the ability of the learner to produce utterances appropriate to the linguistic context.

Bachman (1990: 27) developed another model of communicative competence, in which he divided language competence into organizational competence and pragmatic competence. Organizational competence in Bachman's model comprises grammatical competence and textual competence. Pragmatic competence is divided into two groups, illocutionary competence and sociolinguistic competence. Illocutionary competence refers

to the performance of which acts through utterances, and sociolinguistic competence which refers to the appropriate use of language in context.

### **2.2.1 Pragmatic Competence**

A more recent definition of pragmatic competence is provided by Barron (2003:10):

Pragmatic competence... is understood as knowledge of the linguistic resources available in a given language for realizing particular illocutions, knowledge of the sequential aspects of speech acts and finally knowledge of the appropriate contextual use of the particular languages' linguistic recourses.

Thomas (1983: 92) sees pragmatic competence in terms of ability. He writes that pragmatic competence is a speakers' ability to use language effectively in order to achieve a specific purpose and to understand language in context. Thomas called the linguistic aspect, and the social or contextual aspect, 'pragmalinguistic' and 'sociopragmatic'. By pragmalinguistic, Thomas is referring to the linguistic aspect of pragmatic competence, and a learner's ability to assign the same pragmatic force to an utterance that a native speaker would; and to use speech act strategies appropriately without transferring inappropriate strategies from the learner's L1. Sociopragmatics is defined by Thomas to mean the social conditions placed on language in use (ibid: 99).

### 2.2.1.1 Pragmatic Failure

It is noteworthy that most of our misunderstandings of other people are not due to any inability to hear them or to parse their sentences or to understand their words. A far more important source of difficulty in communication is that we so often fall short to recognize a speaker's intention. For the inability to recognize what is meant by what is said, Thomas (ibid: 91) uses the term 'pragmatic failure'. It is the pragmatic failure that leads in one sense to the cross-cultural communication breakdown. Therefore; it is essential to explore the factors behind pragmatic failure and find ways to avoid the embarrassing situation by the unwise choice of linguistic forms, or, to avoid being unintentionally offensive.

Thomas divides pragmatic failure into pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic failure. The former has to do with the inappropriate use of linguistic forms. The latter refers to the social conditions placed on language use (ibid: 99).

Pragmalinguistic failure is principally a linguistic problem, caused by differences in the linguistic encoding of pragmatic force; sociopragmatic failure stems from cross-culturally different perceptions of what constitutes appropriate linguistic behaviour (ibid).

Davis (1999: 1) quotes Thomas's definition 1983 of the pragmatic failure as the inability to understand what is meant by what is said. He says that pragmalinguistic failure occurs when the pragmatic force mapped by the speaker in a given utterance is systematically different from the force that is intended by the native speakers of the target language.

Sociocultural factors such as difference between home culture and the TL can lead to negative cultural transfer strategies. Furthermore, a lack of knowledge of the target culture norms may contribute to sociolinguistic failure (ibid: 3).

Pragmalinguistic failures are easier to overcome for it is simply a question of highly conventionalized usage which can be taught quite straight forwardly as part of the grammar (ibid) . Sociopragmatic failures, on the other hand, usually arise when the interlocutors do not share the same set of beliefs. That is to say, they are, in part, culture-specific (Thomas, 1983:99)

Pragmatic failure makes a very important source of cross-cultural miscommunication. Unlike linguistic errors, pragmatic failures are rarely apparent in the surface structure of the utterances.

### **2.3 Theory of Implicature**

The theory of implicature is part of the theory of communication, the practice of social relationships where signs and codes are transmitted in a form of message between interlocutors (Fiske, 1982:2). It explains how interlocutors can communicate and understand each other, in spite of the implicit expressions and the implicated propositions used throughout a conversation. The content of any message is taken to cover everything a speaker or writer intends to express, i.e., implicitly as opposed to explicit form, to convey by his use of language (Doughty and Thornton, 1971:285). Garfinkel 1967 (cited in Coulthard,1977:30) proposes that it is never possible to say what one means in so many words, speakers require hearers to work a greater or lesser extent to derive their message from the words uttered.

Etymologically, 'to imply', Mey (1993:99) argues, means 'to fold something into something else' (from the Latin verb 'plicare' 'to fold'); hence, that which is implied, is 'folded in', and has to be 'unfolded' in order to be understood. Moreover, the word 'implicature' is derived from the verb 'to imply', as is its cognate 'implication'. He adds that a 'conversational

implicature' is, therefore, something which is implied in conversation, that is, something which is left implicit in actual language.

Price (1993:5) points out that the content of any message depends very much on four important factors which are the intention of the sender; the available language or symbolic forms, which will act to phrase the message; the context as the sender understands it within which the message is delivered and finally the communicative possibilities or discourse. A theory of implicature offers to present a number of explanations by distinguishing the idea of implicitness. Larson (1984:38- 40) states that some pieces of information, or meaning, are left implicit because of the structure of language, some other meanings are left implicit because they have been mentioned elsewhere in the text or because they are considered shared information in the communication situation. Bach (1994:140) states that;

an implicature is completely separated from what is said and is inferred from it (more precisely, from the saying of it). What is said is one proposition and what is communicated in addition to that is a conceptually independent proposition, a proposition with perhaps no constituent in common with what is said.

Horn (1994:1) states that implicature is a component of speaker meaning that constitutes an aspect of what is meant by a speaker's utterance without being part of what is said. He also mentions that what the speaker intends to communicate is characteristically far richer than what he directly expresses; linguistic meaning radically underdetermines the message conveyed and understood. Speaker tacitly uses pragmatic principles to bridge this gap and counts on hearer to invoke the same principles for the purpose of utterance interpretation. Implicatures, as an aspect of speaker

meaning by definition distinct from the non-logical inferences that the hearer draws.

Allerton (1979:267) illustrates that an essential aspect of implicature is the principle of economy, by which the speaker expresses what he wants to say in ordinary circumstances. He adds that such a case is variant from one context to another in a context where people are trying to get to know each other, for instance, speakers mention points they assume to be known by each other so as to establish a sense of solidarity between them. Thus, to maintain understanding, pragmatists uphold that people intuitively follow certain principles and conventions as those of Grice's *CP* and *Conversational Maxims* and Leech's *Politeness Principle*.

Baker (1992:223) states that "one of the most important notions which have emerged in text studies in recent years is that of implicature – the question of how it is that one comes to understand more than is actually said". The importance of such concept arises from more than one reference. Levinson (1983:97) mentions some sources that would grant implicatures such as salience and significance.

First of all, implicatures serve as a clear model of the nature and power of pragmatic explanations prescribed to linguistic phenomena. Implicature as a property of pragmatics provides an adequate clarification to a number of significant linguistic facts i.e. the semantic interpretation is not always enough to reach the meaning intended by a particular utterance, rather, there has to be a pragmatic explanation that catches what is implicitly included, linguistic pragmatics ,e.g.:

(3).

-A: Do you want some coffee?

-B: Coffee would keep me awake.

Here B implicitly turns down A's invitation.

Second, the concept of implicature provides an explicit account of how it is possible to mean more than what is merely said. The process of implicating is a quite natural one ever since the existence of human language. The theory of implicature states that much information may be more than what is explicitly said, is implicitly conveyed and one should not expect a semantic theory to provide more than a small part of an account of how speakers communicate by using language (ibid:98). Blakemore (2002:29) states that some of the thoughts are communicated explicitly, while others are communicated implicitly. She provides the following example as an instance where the answer in (B) explicitly communicates that Anna has a meeting and implicitly indicates that she is not here:

(4)

-A: Is Anna here?

-B: She's got a meeting.

Third, the concept of implicature offers a solution to the structural ambiguity of linguistic expression. Implicature allows one to claim that natural language expressions tend to have simple, stable and unitary senses, but that this stable semantic core often has an unstable, context-specific pragmatic overlay-namely a set of implicature. In this regard, Levinson (1983:97) believes that considering the pragmatic implications (implicatures) of an utterance would fade away the radical differences existing between logic and natural language. A theory of implicature is very important when trying to apply some meaning specifications to identify particles like 'well', 'any way'. Such particles enjoy a variety of meanings due to the different context in which they are used and the context which determines what implicature is intended can be the same criterion used to determine the meaning specifications of such particles.

Finally, a theory of implicature has a rather limited basic principle that provides a large array of apparently unrelated facts. Such explanations include the way metaphors, irony, etc., might work and also how a tautology like *war is war* can convey a meaning of some sort.

Verschueren (1999:26) remarks that the term 'implicit meaning' mainly refers to a range of meaning emerging from the contextually embedded action; Verschueren believes that implicature arises from three major things each of which has been deliberately considered in the set of definitions postulated by pragmatists.

First of all, an implicature arises from the impossibility of complete explicitness, i.e., the implicit part of language is richer than the explicit one. Much information is, actually, implicitly conveyed because background knowledge is already assumed to be shared between the addresser and the addressee.

Second, there is the conventional linguistic means that cope with such impossibility. Practically, interlocutors presuppose a lot of the information processed throughout a communication situation. Presupposition then is an assumption implicitly made by speakers and hearers and is necessary for the correct interpretation of utterances. Accordingly, the speaker implicates much of what s/he takes for granted as a presupposition on behalf of the hearer.

Finally, Verschueren considers inexplicitness a substantial strategy. Inexplicitness does not necessarily mean 'vague' or 'ambiguous'. It could be a way for one to justify why s/he is late? Consider, an utterance like *I didn't manage to get away* where the usual presupposition that is attached to the verb *manage*, gives the impression of *tried* (ibid: 31). Thus, implicature is considered a process of having the hearer keep on inferring.

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In short, implicature is a very important concept that explains great variety of semantic phenomena leading to make a shift from semantics to pragmatics.

## 2.4 Grice's Theory of Implicature


The term 'implicature' was first introduced by the philosopher P.H. Grice as a shorthand of 'implicating', 'to implicate', etc. it is an approach of how to comprehend a message when the speaker means more than s/he says. According to Grice (1968: 55), one must differentiate between saying something and implicating another thing. What is said must correspond to the components of the sentence as well as its syntactic behaviour, i.e., implicature is not to be found on the surface level of the sentence, rather it is to be inferred out of the general meaning of the proposition.

Lyons (1981: 192) observes that there seems to be enough regularity in the inference-forming behaviour of listeners for speakers to exploit this by implying something, rather than stating it; therefore, Grice strongly believes that a word acquires much of its meaning (or pragmatic meaning), just when it is uttered.

To propose a systematic approach, a distinction is made between two types of implicatures; the 'conversational (non-conventional) implicature' and the 'conventional implicature'. Conversational implicature is also subclassified into 'generalized' and 'particularized'. Included within the generalized conversational implicature, is the 'scalar implicature' (cf. Crystal, 1991:172).

The sum up of what is said in a sentence and what is implicated in an utterance of the same sentence is called the *Total Signification of*

*an Utterance* (Grice 1989:41). The relationship between these types of implicatures can be represented schematically as follows:



**Figure (1) Types of Implicatures (adapted from Grice, 1989:41)**

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### 2.4.1 Conversational Implicature

Conversational implicature is an implication or a suggestion deduced from the form of an utterance (Crystal: 1992:183). Rooy (2002:56) states that the idea of conversational implicature is based on the insight that one can communicate more with the use of a sentence than the conventional meaning associated with it by means of general principles of relational communication. What is communicated depends on the facts about the utterance situation, the linguistic context and the goals and preferences of the interlocutors of conversation and not only on syntactic and semantic rules. Lyons (1981:207) states that “much of the information that is conveyed from speaker to hearer in day-to-day conversation is implied, rather than asserted”.

Grice sees conversational implicature as part of a theory of rational, cooperative behaviour of which language use is only a part. Grice (1975: 38) states that “... one of my avowed aims is to see talking as a special case of purposive, indeed rational, behaviour...”. In considering how rationality and cooperativity might play a role in our use of language in conversation, Grice (ibid:26) states:

Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction.

Grice (ibid) develops the idea that rationality and cooperation underlie conversational behaviour by identifying three characteristics of cooperative transactions:

1. Participants have a common goal (for example, “each party should, for the time being, identify himself with the transitory conversational interests of the other”).
2. Interlocutor’s contributions should be “dovetailed”
3. Both parties must agree to terminate the exchange.

Grice summed up the cooperativity that characterizes conversations in the following principle:

### **2.4.1.1 The Cooperative Principle :**

One considers the following scenario:

There is a woman sitting on a park bench and on the ground a large dog lying in front of the bench. A man comes along and sits down on the bench.

(5).

- Man: Does your dog bite?

- Woman: No.

(The man reaches down to pet the dog and the dog bites his hand)

- Man: Ouch! Hey! You said your dog doesn’t bite.

- Woman: He doesn’t. But that’s not mine.

(Yule, 1996:36)

Communication is one of the problems in this scenario. This problem is caused by the man’s assumption that more was communicated than was said. The problem is not with presupposition because the assumption in ‘your dog’ (i.e. the woman has a dog) is true for both speakers. The problem is that man’s assumption that has question ‘Does your dog bite?’ and the answer of the woman is ‘No’. From the man's view, the woman’s answer proves less

information than expected (i.e. she might be expected to provide the information stated in the last line. Of course, if she had mentioned this information earlier, the story would not be as funny. The expected amount of information provided in the conversation above is just one aspect of the more general idea that people involved in a conversation will cooperate with each other. The woman in (5) may actually be indicating that she does not want to take part in any cooperative interaction with the stranger (Yule, 1996: 37).

Grice (cited in Renkema, 1993: 10) describes the CP as follows: “Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged”

The CP focuses on the purpose or direction of a conversation. According to Grice (cited in Wardhaugh, 1986:281-6; Hofmann, 1993:274-6; Renkema, 1993: 10; Ifantidon, 2001:37-49), in order to obey the CP, speakers follow the Maxims of conversation described below:

### **1. The Maxim of Quantity:**

- i. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
- ii. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

### **2. The Maxim of Quality**

Try to make your contribution one that is true; specifically:

- i. Do not say what you believe to be false.
- ii. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

### **3. The Maxim of Relation:**

Be relevant

**4. The Maxim of Manner:**

- i. Avoid obscurity of expression.
- ii. Avoid ambiguity.
- iii. Be brief.
- iv. Be orderly

One may incorrectly assume that the CP appears to exhort us to always be kind and to always cooperate with each other in the conventional sense of that word. Thomas (1995:62-3) states that:

Grice was simply noting that, on the whole, people observe certain regularities in interaction and his aim was to explain one particular set of regularities- those governing the generation and interpretation of conversational implicature.

To illustrate this, Thomas (*ibid*) offers the analogy of driving a car. The design of traffic rules and regulations creates a particular traffic system. Drivers assume that other drivers sharing the road are rational and that they understand and obey these traffic regulations, thus conforming their behaviour to the system. Without this assurance of cooperation, driving would be a chaotic and dangerous undertaking indeed. As Thomas points out, however, sometimes a driver does not conform to the system of whatever reason (emergency vehicle, drivers from foreign countries, and drunken drivers for example), at which time one reassesses and adjusts his assumptions. When one finds himself in a situation in which others are not following the same set of rules as ones do, accidents might happen. The conversational equivalent of this hypothetical accident is communication breakdown.

Hudson (2000:324) states how chaotic and unhelpful the conversation would be if the maxims were flouted or disobeyed. He adds that our consequent ability to rely on the maxims as strategies of interpretation explains much of the effectiveness of most talk, and our ability, by pragmatic infer, to get a lot of overtly unexpressed, but important meaning.

The maxims are best considered not as rules but as implicit principles on which successful communication is built. They are additional to what Finch regards as core requirements and they represent a kind of baseline for talking (Finch, 2000:160). Grice cited in (Lyons, 1977:193) confirms that these maxims are not rules like phonological or morphological rules, which people have to follow to speak a language, nor are they moral principles. What has to be the rule is the assumption of cooperation on the part of the speaker as well as the hearer.

Moreover, Grice illustrates that the maxims are not arbitrary conventions; rather they are rational means for conducting cooperative exchanges as they govern aspects of non-linguistic behaviour (Levinson, 1983:103).

Given the CP and the Maxims of Conversation, Grice (1975:30-1) proposed the following process through which implicatures arise:

S's saying that  $p$  conversationally implicates  $q$  if:

- i. S is presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the CP.
- ii. The supposition that S is aware that, or thinks that,  $q$  is required in order to make his saying  $p$  consistent with this presumption.
- iii. S thinks and would expect the H to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (ii).

### 2.4.1.2 Properties of Conversational Implicature

To distinguish the conversational implicature from the conventional one, Grice (1975) suggests a number of properties each of which is discussed in brief:

#### 2.4.1.2.1 Defeasibility (Cancellability)

Because inferences arise from the assumption that the speaker is not obeying the CP, it follows that generalized implicatures may be cancelled in specific instances in which the speaker is presumed not to be cooperative (Horn, 1994: 11).

According to Grice (1975: 39), an implicature can be cancelled either explicitly “by the addition of a clause that states or implies that the speaker has opted out” or contextually “by being used in a context that makes it clear that the speaker is opting out.” An example of this might be: “*X is meeting a woman tonight- I can’t say who.*” Court cases are typical contexts in which it is not always assumed that the speaker is being cooperative.

Yule (1996: 44) confirms that an implicature can be cancelled by adding further information, often following the expression ‘*in fact*’ . He provides the following example:

(6).

You have won five dollars; *in fact* you have won ten.

The proposition following ‘*in fact*’ cancels the one prior to it.

Grice 1967 (cited in Agerri & Korta: 1997: 5) states:

A putative conversational implicature that P is explicitly cancelable if, to the form of words the utterance of which putatively implicates that p, it is admissible to add but not p, or I do not mean to imply p, and it is contextually cancelable if one find situations in which the utterance of the form of words would simply

not carry the implicature. Now I think that all conversational implicatures are cancelable.

Conversational implicature can simply disappear in certain linguistic or non-linguistic contexts, i.e. they are cancelled if they are inconsistent with (i) semantic entailments, (ii) background assumptions, (iii) contexts, and/or (iv) priority conventional implicatures

(<http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-929837-8.pdf>).

First, conversational implicature evaporates in the face of inconsistency with semantic entailments, as in the following utterances.

(‘+>’ used to signify ‘con conversationally implicate’)

(‘~ +>’ used to signify ‘does not conversationally implicate’)

(7). His wife is often complaining.

+> His wife is not always complaining

(8). a. His wife is often, in fact/indeed always, complaining.

b. His wife is not only often but always complaining.

c. His wife is often, if not always, complaining.

~+> His wife is not always complaining.

All the utterances in (8) have the potential conventional implicature indicated in (7). However, all the sentences in (8) carry the semantic entailment that his wife is always complaining due to the use of phrases such as *in fact always*. Consequently, the potential conversational implicature is defeated by the inconsistent entailment.

(<http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-929837-8.pdf>).

Next, conversational implicatures are suspended if they are not in keeping with background or ontological assumptions, often referred to as real-world knowledge. This is the case with (9) and (10).

(9). John and Mary bought an apartment near the Louver in Paris.

+> John and Mary bought an apartment near the Louver in Paris together, not one each

(10). The Americans and the Russians tested an atom bomb in 1962.

~+> The Americans and the Russians tested an atom bomb in 1962 together, not one each.

According to our knowledge about history, it was impossible for the USA and the USSR to test an atom bomb together in 1962, because they were enemies at that time.

Third, conversational implicatures are annulled when they run contrary to what the immediate linguistic context of utterance tells us.

(11).

- John: This CD is eight euros, and I haven't got any money on me.

- Mary: Don't worry, I've got eight euros.

~+> Mary has got only eight euros.

Here, given the immediate linguistic context of utterance, Mary's response does not produce the usual conversational implicature that she has got only eight euros. This is because all the information needed here is whether or not Mary has enough money for John to buy the CD rather than the exact amount of money she might in fact have (<http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-929837-8.pdf>).

### 2.4.1.2.2 Nondetachability

If an utterance is to implicate a proposition, then all the other alternative propositions can implicate the same relevant utterance. Grice 1967 (cited in Simons, 2000: 5) observes that conversational implicatures are by necessity nondetachable from the content of whatever utterance gives rise to them. What this means is that if an utterance of a sentence with a particular content generates an implicature in a given conversational context, then the utterance of any other sentences with the same content will give rise to the same implicature. For example:

(12).

- Jane: Do you want to go out for a drink?
- Julia: I have to finish writing my paper.

In the context of Jane's question, Julia's utterance generates the implicature that she does not want to go out for a drink. However, the generation of the implicature is not dependent upon the form of Julia's utterance. Any other form which expresses more or less the same content would do just as well to produce the implicature. The responses in (13) are all possible candidates.

(13)

- a. ... I need to finish my paper.
- b. ... My paper needs to get finished tonight.
- c. ...I have to work on my paper.

(ibid)

Conversational implicatures are nondetachable because they are due to the expression of a particular content in a particular conversational content. They are –by definition- not conventionally associated with any expression, so naturally one does not expect that the expression of the same content in a different form will affect the implicature (Stalnaker,1974:55). Levinson

(1983:123) argues that "there are many utterances that differ on the surface structure but which share the same implicatures"

Some presupposition turns out to have this same property of nondetachability.

Consider another example with *stop*:

(14).

Jane didn't stop laughing.

The utterance of this sentence normally gives rise to the presupposition that Jane had been laughing immediately prior to the reference time of the sentence. We standardly say that this is due to the presupposition associated with *stop*. But notice that if the word *stop* is replaced with any of its synonyms, the presupposition remains:

(15).

- a. Jane didn't quit laughing.
- b. Jane didn't cease laughing.

(Simon, 2000: 5-6)

The same is true of the presuppositions of all other changes of state predicates. As further illustration, consider the synonymous sentences in (16). The utterance of any of these would normally give rise to the presupposition that Jane was in the house immediately prior to the reference time of the sentence.

(16).

- a. Jane did not leave the house.
- b. Jane did not quit the house.
- c. Jane did not go out the house.
- d. Jane did not exit the house.

These observations strongly suggest that the presuppositions of change of state predicates are nondetachable, that is, they attach to the content

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expressed, and not to any lexical item. But presuppositions or implications cannot attach to content by convention. Thus, these presuppositions must have a conversational source (Simons, 2000: 5-6).

### **2.4.1.2.3 Non-Conventionality**

Non-conventionality means that conversational implicatures, though dependent on the saying of what is coded, are non-coded in nature. In other words, they rely on the saying of what is said but they are not part of what is said. They are associated with speaker or utterance but not proposition or sentence (Bach, 1994:140).

### **2.4.1.2.4 Calculability**

Calculability means that conversational implicatures can transparently be derived via the CP and its component maxims.

([http://www.nytud.hu/cescl/abs/abstract\\_bottyán.pdf](http://www.nytud.hu/cescl/abs/abstract_bottyán.pdf))

## **2.4.1.2 Calculating Implicatures through the Maxims**

Unlike conventional implicature, Grice states that conversational implicatures are generated by certain kinds of failures with respect to the CP.

Grundy (1995:41) argues that any failure to observe a maxim may be referred to as ‘breaking a maxim’. When a speaker breaks a maxim, the hearer looks for the implicature since s/he assumes the CP to be in operation. Non-observance of the maxims is often used intentionally in order to evoke humour or to avoid discomfort. Grice (cited in Thomas, 1995) discussed five ways of not observing a maxim. To break a maxim “is the prototypical way of conveying implicit meaning”.

### 2.4.1.3.1 Flouting

When flouting a maxim, the speaker does not intend to mislead the hearer but wants the hearer to look for the conversational implicature, that is, the meaning of the utterance not directly stated in the words uttered. Therefore, when the speaker intentionally fails to observe a maxim the purpose may be to effectively communicate a message (Thomas 1995:65). Accordingly, if working under the CP the hearer will interpret the message and fill in the missing information relying on the context.

### 2.4.1.3.2 Violating

In contrast to flouting, when violating a maxim the speaker intends to mislead the hearer. The speaker speaks the truth but implies what is false (Thomas 1995:72). He (ibid:73-4) provides the following example:

(17). An English athlete, Dianne Modahl, the defending Commonwealth Games 800 metres champion, pulled out of her opening race and returned to England. Caroline Searle, press officer for the England team, said:

*‘She has a family bereavement; her grandmother had died.’*

The next day it was announced that Ms Modahl had been sent home following a positive test for drugs. What Ms Searl had said was true, but the implicature (that the reason for Modahl’s returning home was a bereavement) was false.

### 2.4.1.3.3 Opting Out

When opting out of a maxim the speaker is unwilling to cooperate and reveals more than s/he already has. The speaker chooses not to observe the maxim and states an unwillingness to do so. Opting out occurs frequently in public life, when the speaker cannot, perhaps for legal or ethical reasons, reply in (Thomas 1995:74). An example of opting out can be:

(18). If a doctor or a nurse, who has complete confidentiality regarding his/her patients, is asked by the police or the press to reveal something about the patient that s/he is treating, s/he will reply:

-A: I am sorry but I can't tell you anything.

The doctor or nurse opts out of the maxim of quantity when s/he gives less information than what is requested.

### 2.4.1.3.3.1 Opting out Hedges in English:

Yule (1996:39) states that the following hedges are good indications that the speakers want to show that they are trying to observe maxims and not only be aware of them. Such expressions also communicate the speakers' concern that their listeners judge them to be cooperative conversational partners.

#### a. Quality Hedges

*As far as I know,*

*I'm not sure if this is true,*

*I'm not sure if this is right, but*

*I may be wrong, but ...*

*This is just the word on the street; I can't vouch for this information.*

#### b. Relation Hedges

*Oh, by the way,*

*I'm not sure if this is relevant, but ...*

*I don't want to change the subject, but...*

*Anyway/ (well, anyway)*

Yule (ibid:38) gives some examples which act as hedges on the expectation of relevance as the following:

(19). *I don't know if this is important, but* some of the files are missing.

(20). *This may sound like a dumb question, but* whose hand writing is this?

(21) *Not to change the subject, but* is this related to the budget?

Yule (ibid) states that such relative markers can be found in the middle of speakers' talk and they go on saying to mention some potentially unconnected information during a conversation. Speakers also seem to use expressions like 'anyway', or 'well, anyway', to indicate that they may have drifted into a discussion of some possibly non-relevant material and want to stop.

### **c. Quantity Hedges**

*As you probably already know*

*I can't say more,*

*I probably don't need to say this, but*

*I can't tell you; I'm sworn to secrecy.*

*I won't bore you with the details, but...*

*No comment.*

### **a. Manner Hedges**

*I am not sure if this is clear, but*

*I don't know if this makes sense, but...*

*This may be a bit tedious, but...*

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*This may be a bit confused*

*I'm not sure how to say this, but...*

#### **2.4.1.3.4 Infringing a Maxim**

When the speaker infringes a maxim, s/he unintentionally deceives or fails to observe the maxim. The speaker does this with no intention of generating an implicature (Thomas, 1995: 74). Infringing occurs when the speaker does not know the culture or does not master the language well enough, as when s/he is incapable of speaking clearly, as for example:

(22) Someone learning English as a second language speaks to a native speaker.

- English speaker: Would you like ham or salad on your sandwich?

- Non-English speaker: Yes.

The interlocutor has not intentionally generated an implicature, s/he has not understood the utterance. However, the answer might be interpreted as non-operative (Mooney 2004:910).

#### **2.4.1.3.5 Suspending**

When one suspends a maxim, it is understood that what is said is not completely true or that there are things the speaker ought not to say, for example taboo words (Thomas 1995:77). It may be due to cultural differences that a speaker suspends a maxim or to the nature of certain events or situations. For example:

(23).

The speaker in this example is the daughter of a murdered man.

She is talking to Officer Jim Chee of the Navajo Tribal police:

‘Last time you were with the FBI man – asking about the one who got killed,’ she said, respecting the Navajo taboo of not speaking the name of the dead. ‘You find out who killed that man?’

In this example, the speaker fails to observe the maxim of Quantity. She refers vaguely to ‘the FBI man’, thereby generating the (true) implicature that she does not know his name. Then she refers in a similarly vague fashion to ‘the one who got killed’ and ‘that man’. Normally this would generate exactly the same implicature (that she does not know the name of the man). However, among the Navajo this implicature would not be generated in the case of a person who had died a violent or premature death, because to mention his or her name in these circumstances is taboo. In this case the non-observance of the maxim of Quantity generates no implicatures because all the participants know that it is suspended (Thomas, 1983: 76-77).

Grice (1975: 154) characterizes conversational implicature as follows:

A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that  $p$  has implicated that  $q$ , may be said to have conversationally implicated that  $q$ , provided that:

- (1) He is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the cooperative principle;
- (2) The supposition that he is aware that or thinks that  $q$  is required in order to make his saying or making as if to say  $p$  (or doing so in those terms) consistent with this presumption; and

(3) The speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) required.

Schiffrin (1994:367-8) stresses the importance and inevitability of the context and CP relationship in a discussion about the kinds of information that Grice considered critical for recognizing implicature:

- (1) The conventional meanings of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved
- (2) The CP and its maxims
- (3) The context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance
- (4) Other items of background knowledge.
- (5) The fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case.

Schiffrin (*ibid*) speculates that in (3), 'linguistic' can be taken to mean the linguistic code of the utterance, i.e., text, and the 'otherwise' to mean the situation in which the text is uttered. 'Other items of background knowledge' (4) could possibly mean the information that participants in the interaction possess about the world external to the text and the situation.

Schiffrin considers the CP (2) to be a part of the background knowledge that is mutually shared by the participants just as traffic rules and regulations are a part of the background knowledge that drivers draw upon when driving. Therefore, it appears that (2), (3), and (4) could be categorized as background knowledge derived from various sources.

Furthermore, if this background knowledge is mutually available (5) to both participants and both participants realize that it is mutually known and available to both participants, then, when a speaker intends to convey a message in uttering a proposition using words with conventional, literal meaning (1), the hearer draws upon his/ her background knowledge (2), (3), and (4) to arrive at an adequate interpretation of the speaker's implied meaning and, thus, the speaker's intention, assuming that S intended and attempted to generate implicature. When a hearer adequately infers speaker intention, it can be said that communication successful to the purpose at hand has been more or less achieved (*ibid*).

## 2.4.2 Types of Conversational Implicatures

### 2.4.2.1 Generalized Conversational Implicature

According to Grice (1989:37), some conversational implicatures are 'generalized', i.e. they do not arise in virtue of special features of the context, but are normally carried by saying a certain form of words in the absence of special circumstances.

Under the heading of generalized conversational implicature, Grice (*ibid*:38) lists a number of sentences containing an indefinite noun phrase.

(23). X is meeting a woman this evening.

(24). X went into a house yesterday and found a tortoise inside the front door.

Grice says that the utterance of (23) carries the implicature that the woman that X is meeting is someone other than X's wife, mother, sister, or perhaps

even close platonic friend. In a similar fashion, (24) normally implicates that the house that X entered is not his or her own.

Grice (1975:38) states that the emergence of these implicatures is explained in the following way:

When someone, by using the form of expression *an X*, implicates that X does not belong to or is not otherwise closely connected with some identifiable person the implicature is present because the speaker has failed to be specific in a way in which he might have been expected to be specific, with the consequence that it is likely to be assumed that he is not in a position to be specific.

In other words, the assumption that (23) and (24) only seemingly breach the first maxim of quantity requires the above suppositions.

Another example is:

(25).

I walked into a house  
+ > the house was not mine.

(Levinson, 1983:162)

The important thing to note here is that in generalized conversational implicature, the implicature that arises is associated with the use of a specific form rather than being dependent upon a particular context. Furthermore, a number of generalized implicatures are communicated on the basis of a scale implicatures.

### 2.4.2.2 Particularized Conversational Implicature

Yule (1996:42) believes that most of the time our conversation takes place in very specific contexts in which locally recognized inferences are assumed. Such inferences are required to work out the conveyed meanings

which result from particularized conversational implicatures. As an illustration, Yule (ibid: 43) provides the following example:

(26).

- Rick: Hey, coming to the wild party tonight?
- Tom: My parents are visiting.

In this example, Yule adds, Tom's response does not appear on the surface to adhere to relevance (A's relevant answer would be 'yes' or 'No'). In order to make Tom's response relevant, Rick has to draw on some assumed knowledge that Tom is expected to have. Tom will be spending that evening with his parents, and time spent with parents is quiet consequently implicates that Tom cannot come to the party.

Particularized conversational implicatures are sometimes just called implicatures due to their being the most common.

Yule (ibid) also provides another example where flouting of the maxim of manner takes place:

(27).

- Ann: where are you going with the dog?
- Sam: to the V.E.T.

In the local context of these speakers, the dog is known to recognize the word 'vet', and to hate being taken there, so Sam produces a more elaborate spelled out (i.e. less brief) version of his message, implicating that he does not want the dog to know the answer to the question just asked.

Two more other entertaining examples Yule (ibid) provides are:

(28).

- Bert: Do you like ice-cream?
- Ernie: Is the Pope Catholic?

(29).

- Bert: Do vegetarians eat hamburgers?
- Ernie: Do chickens have lips?

The responses initially appear to flout the relevance maxim. In (28) however, Ernie's response does not provide a 'yes' or 'no' answer. Bert must assume that Ernie is being cooperative, so he considers Ernie's 'pope question' and clearly the answer is 'yes'. So, the answer is known, but the nature of Ernie's response also implicates that the answer to the question was obviously 'yes'. An additional conveyed meaning in such a case is that, because the answer was so obvious; the question did not need to be asked. In example (29), Yule provides the same type of inferring with an answer 'Of course no' as part of the implicature (ibid: 44).

In the last two examples above, the second person answers the first person with another question, as in the following formula

Question 1+ Question2= Answer

The following are some examples of the pope question formula:

(30).

- Does a monkey build a house?            +> (No)
- Does the sun rise in the west?            +> (No)
- Can a pig fly?                                    +> (No)
- Does a frog have hair?                        +> (No)
- Do cats grow horns on their noses?        +> (No)
- Do fish walk?                                    +> (No)

(Broersma, 1994:26)

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## 2.5 The Formalization of the Maxims

### 2.5.1 The Maxim of Quality

#### 2.5.1.1 The First Maxim of Quality

Grice (1989: 27) saw the first maxim of Quality “***Do not say what you believe to be false***” as the most important of all the maxims. He says:

It is obvious that the observance of some of these maxims is a matter of less urgency than is the observance of others; a man who has expressed himself with undue prolixity would, in general, be open to milder comment than would a man who has said something he believes to be false.

Brasoveanu (2006: 25) states that this maxim states that each participant’s contribution should be truthful i.e. the hearer assumes that the speaker is not knowingly telling a lie or fantasizing, for example:

(31).

- A: I might win the lottery
- B: Yes, and pigs might fly.

The obviousness of the untruth of B's reply gives our cognitive system a huge nudge. B is flouting the maxim of quality, so there must be something else going on, and so one starts a hunt for likely inferences he can make. Here, of course, one quickly settles on the implication that A's chances of winning the lottery are about the same as pigs' flying. Flouting the maxim of quality is the driving force in irony. Irony occurs when we say one thing and mean the exact opposite (ibid).

Another example from literature:

(32).

- Student: Reno is the capital of Nevada.
- Instructor: Yeah, and London is the capital of New Jersey.

The instructor's utterance raises an implicature. The student reasons (unconsciously) as follows: the instructor said that London is the capital of New Jersey; he knows that is not true. He appears to be flouting the maxim of Quality; there must be a reason for him saying something false. The inference (i.e., the implicature) the student draws is that his answer is false (i.e., Reno is not the capital of Nevada) (Parker & Riley, 2005:11).

### 2.5.1.2 The Second Maxim of Quality

For the second maxim of Quality "*Do not say that for which you lack evidence*" Grice (1975: 32-3) provides the following example, in which the first maxim of Quantity clashes with the second Quality maxim, and the Quality maxim wins.

(33). A is planning with B an itinerary for a holiday in France. B knows that A wants to see his friend C.

- A: Where does C live?
- B: Somewhere in the south of France.

Grice adds, there is no reason of supposing that B is opting out; his answer is, as he well knows, less informative than is required to meet A's needs. This infringement of the first maxim of Quantity can be explained only by the supposition that B is aware that to be more informative would be to say something that infringed the second maxim of Quality. "Do not say what you lack adequate evidence for," so B implicates that he does not know exactly in which town C lives. The Quality implicature here is that B does

have adequate evidence that C lives somewhere in the South of France, even if he does not know exactly where.

Harnish (1976:343) points out that the maxim of quality is important to cooperation: "... truly groundless information has at least a good chance of being wrong as right, and as such would probably not be helpful-thereby violating the [cooperative principle]"

## 2.5.2 Maxims of Quantity

### 2.5.2.1 The First Maxim of Quantity

Grice gives (1975: 38) the following example of an implicature that arises due to the First Maxim of Quantity *"Make your contribution as informative as is required"*.

(34). When someone, by using the form of expression an X, implicates that the X does not belong to or is not otherwise closely connected with some identifiable person, the implicature is present because the speaker has failed to be specific in a way in which he might have been expected to be specific, with the consequence that it is likely to be assumed that he is not in a position to be specific.

In describing how the maxim of Quantity guides rational behavior, Grice (ibid: 28) gives the following example:

(35).

If you are assisting me to mend a car, I expect your contribution to be neither more nor less than is required. If, for example, at a particular stage I need four screws, I expect you to hand me four, rather than two or six.

If the assistant offered two screws, s/he would be violating the first maxim of quantity. This is similar to the pattern in the *South of France* example in

which by violating the first maxim of Quantity, B implicates that s/he does not know in which town C lives.

The reasoning process involved in arriving at the implicatures described in these examples is characteristic of all the implicatures that arise from the first maxim of Quantity. This process involves comparing what the speaker did say to alternative utterances that are informationally stronger relative to the purposes of the exchange, and inferring that for some reason the speaker could not have provided the informationally stronger statement.

Levinson (1983:135) states:

Inference pattern underlying (weak) Quantity 1 implicature:

- i. The speaker said  $p$
- ii. There is an alternative utterance  $q$ , informationally stronger than  $p$  (relative to the current purpose of the conversation), which the speaker might have provided.
- iii. Quantity 1 would require the speaker to provide  $q$  if s/he were in a position to do so, so there must be some reason that the speaker could not have said  $p$ .

Where Quantity1 refers to the first maxim of Quantity.

This part of the inference pattern is found in all implicatures that arise via Quantity 1.

Many Quantity 1 implicatures that arise due to the inference patterns falls into a subcategory that has been termed '*Scalar Implicature*'. But not all of the implicatures that arise based on the first maxim of Quantity are scalar implicatures.

Most early accounts of Quantity 1 implicatures have treated them as generalized implicatures rather than particularized ones. The role of context has for the most part been ignored or minimized.

Horn (1972: 111) developed the first formal account of the implicatures that arises due to the first maxim of Quantity. His account focused on the type of implicature that arises when a value on a quantitative scale has been asserted; namely, an implicature that the speaker could not have asserted a higher value on the scale.

Quantitative scales may be based on entailment, with higher values on the scale entailing the lower values on the scale or may be based on less obvious relations. Horn gives examples of a variety of types of scales which can give rise to implicatures, including adjective scales (*beautiful* if not *pretty*, *warm* if not *hot*), temporal scales (*midnight* if not *earlier*, *sick* if not *dying*), and quantificational scales (*some* if not *all*).

Having given a range of examples of implicatures that arise based on quantitative scales; Horn (ibid: 112) provides the following formalization of scalar implicature:

We shall assume that on quantitative scales with defined end-points the negation of this end-point (or strongest element) must be inferred by the listener from the stipulation of any weaker element on the scale, while the negation of non-terminal elements may be inferred from the stipulation of relatively weaker elements....

More specifically, Horn gives the following example: “if we are told by someone that *some of his best friends are Zoroastrains*, it is safer for us to conclude that it is not the case that *most* of them are than that not *many* are, i.e. that at least some are not Zoroastrains” (p.112). The following diagram of the relevant scale will aid in relating the definition to the examples (ibid).




Figure 2 (quantifier scale)

(36).

Bill: What do you think of the class?

Julie: It is ok.

Bill: What don't you like about it?

To illustrate this type of implicature in the example above, one considers the following words:

< awful, bad, could be better, so-so, okay, fine, great, wonderful >

These words form a range of evaluations from really *terrible* to *really good*. So in Julie's response "it is ok", she means that she is not *fine*, *great*, or *wonderful* (Broersma, 1994: 25).

It is the same for numbers

(37).

<1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10>

He (ibid) adds:

If I choose a number from this list to describe something, I mean that I do not have more. In other words, if I say that I have 5 books, then I also have 4 books (because 4 is a part of 5), but I do not say I have 6 books.

### 2.5.2.2 The Second Sub Maxim of Quantity

Grice uses the second maxim of Quantity *“Do not make your contribution more informative than is required”* to consider a contribution’s informativeness in terms of the purpose of the exchange – just as in the first maxim of Quantity, which it immediately follows “Make your contribution as informative as necessary for the purpose of the exchange”.

Grice (1975: 26-7) states:

It might be said that to be overinformative is not a transgression of the CP but merely a waste of time. However, it might be answered that such overinformativeness may be confusing in that it is liable to raise side issues; and there may also be an indirect effect, in that the hearers may be misled as a result of thinking that there is some particular point in the provision of the excess of information.

### 2.5.3 The Maxim of Relation (Be Relevant)

Grice (cited in Brown & Yule, 1983: 32) provides two examples in which implicatures arise based on the assumption that the speaker is obeying this maxim.

(38). A is standing by an obviously immobilized car and is approached by B; the following exchange takes place:

- A: I am out of petrol.
- B: there’s a garage around the corner.

B would be infringing the maxim “be relevant”. So he implicates that the garage is, or at least may be open.

(39).

- A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days.
- B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately

B implicates that Smith has, or may have, a girlfriend in New York.

(40).

- A: Is Betsy in?
- B: Her light is on.

(Hurford and Heasley, 1983: 286)

Which implies that Betsy's light being on is usually a sign of she is in.

### 2.5.4 The Maxims of Manner

Grice (1975:37) gives an example for the first maxim of Manner (**Be brief**) in which they are flouted.

(41).

- (a) Miss X sang "Home Sweet Home."
- (b) Miss X produced a series of sounds that correspond closely with the score of "home Sweet Home"

Grice states:

Why has [the reviewer] selected that rigmarole [in (b)] in place of the concise and nearly synonymous sang? Presumably, to indicate some striking difference between Miss X's performance and those to which the word singing is usually applied. The most obvious supposition is that Miss X's performance suffered from some hideous defect. The reviewer knows that this supposition is what is likely to spring to mind, so that is what he is implicating.

In this case, it could be argued that the word *sing* implies a certain level of musicality, and that the reviewer believed that ascribing this level of

musicality to the performer would violate the first maxim of Quality. By using a longer and more precise form, he is creating the implicature that Miss X's performance couldn't be called singing.

Levinson (1983: 104) (cited in

<http://www.sil.org/linguistics/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/WhatIsAFloutingImplicature.htm>) provides an example for the next maxim of manner “**Avoid Obscurity of Expression**”.

(42).

Suppose you overheard two parents say to each other

- A: Let's get the kids something
- B: OK but not I-C-E C-R-E-A-M [spelling it out]

B is going out of their way to be a bit obscure, spelling out the words rather than simply saying them. B is utterly failing to co-operatively follow the maxim of clarity and conciseness. B is being so flagrant that A can infer that there must be a special reason for being so uncooperative: the likely inference, of course, is that B doesn't want the kids to complain that they're being denied a treat (ibid).

Another example, in which an implicature arises based on the assumption that an interlocutor is obeying the Maxim of Manner “Be orderly,” can be discerned from Grice's overall discussion of implicature. This is the “temporal succession” implicature that is often associated with the use of the word *and*, as seen in the following example (Grice, 1989: 8).

(43).

He got into bed and took off his trousers.

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Harnish (1976: 359) suggests the following as more specific versions of the Maxim of Manner.

**Super Submaxim**

Be representational; in so far as possible, make your sayings mirror the world.

He then suggested the following submaxims, one of which relates to Grice's maxim "be orderly":

**Submaxim of Time**

In so far as possible, make the order of saying reflect the order of events.

(44).

1. They got married and they had many children.
2. They had many children and they got married.

The difference between the utterance meaning of (1) and (2) is obvious: it is a difference concerning the temporal order of the events. Instead of explaining it by postulating a semantic ambiguity of 'and' the Gricean framework situates the difference at the level of implicatures. Concerning what is said, an utterance of (1) and an utterance of (2) do say the same thing, namely, i.e. *Mary and John had many children*; the change in order does not affect what is said: the (truth-conditional) meaning of the natural language conjunction. The difference then at the level of implicatures, in which the Submaxim of order would generate different implicatures for (1) and (2) (Korta, 2004: 44).

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## 2.6 Principle of Politeness:

This principle was suggested by G. Leech 1983 as a way of explaining why people feel the need to be indirect in conveying what they mean (Finch, 2000: 161).

Speakers frequently withhold information that would be offensive or disappointing to the hearer, violating the Maxim of Quantity. Speakers often exaggerate in order to please or flatter, and utter white lies (*I am terribly sorry but we've got something on already tonight*) which one giving offence (Leech, 1983: 79-84), i.e. violating the Maxim of Quality. People pick safe topics e.g. the weather to stress agreement and communicate an interest in maintaining good relations- but violating the maxim of Relation. Euphemisms avoid mentioning the unmentionable, but in the process violate Manner and Quantity (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature/>).

Given the possibility of clashes among these principles, speakers often conversationally implicate something even though they are presumed to be observing the principles of Style or Politeness rather than the CP. In the case of (45), Alan may correctly presume that Barb is simply making an excuse, or even trying to mislead him into thinking that she is not going. Barb may realize that Alan will presume such a thing. That does not stop her from meaning that she has to work and implicating that she will not be at Paul's party (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature/>).

(45).

- Alan: are you going to Paul's party?
- Barb: I have to work.

Leech (1983:108) points out, the more indirect a speech act is the more polite it tends to be, because the indirect speech acts will increase the degree of optionality. He lists a number of examples in which the

indirectness and politeness is in increasing order: *Answer the phone; I want you to answer the phone; will you answer the phone?; can you answer the phone?; would you mind answering the phone?; Could you possibly answer the phone?*.

## 2.4.2 Conventional Implicature

Not all implicatures have to be conversational, that is to say, entirely dependent on the context of particular language use (or conversation). There are certain expressions, which are when considered in isolation, implicate certain states of the world that cannot be attributed to one's use of language, but are rather manifested by such use (Mey 1993:103). These expressions are called Deixis and are highly characterized of conveying conventional implicatures of various types (e.g., temporal, spatial, social and discourse).

A conventional implicature is a non-truth-conditional inference which is not deductive in any general, natural way from the saying of what is said, but arises solely because of the conventional features attached to particular lexical items and/or linguistic constructions (Bottyan, 1997:5).

Levinson (1983:33) states that the conventional implicature is not derived from superordinate pragmatic principles like the maxims but is simply attached by conventions to particular lexical item or expressions.

The conventional meaning of the words will determine what is implicated, besides helping to determine what is said  
(<http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-929837-8.pdf>).

Examples:

(‘+>>’ used to stand for conventionally implicate)

(46).  $p$  therefore  $q$       (+ >>  $q$  follows from  $p$ )

He is a Chinese; therefore knows how to use chopsticks.

(47).  $p$  but  $q$       (+>>  $p$  contrasts with  $q$ )

- a. John is poor but he is honest.
- b. Our sales have gone up but theirs have gone down.

(48). Even  $p$  (+ >> contrary to expectation)

Even his wife didn't think that John would win the by-election.

(49).  $p$  moreover  $q$  (+>>  $q$  is in addition to  $p$ )

John can read German. Moreover, he can write poems in the language.

(50).  $p$  so  $q$  (+>>  $p$  provides an explanation for  $q$ )

Mary is taking Chinese cookery lessons. So her husband has bought her a wok.

In (46), the conventional implicature is triggered by the use of *therefore* is that being Chinese provides some good reason for knowing how to use chopsticks. In (47) there is a conventional implicature of contrast between the information contained in  $p$  and that contained in  $q$ . In (48) *even*, being epistemic in nature, conventionally implicates some sort of unexpectedness, surprise or unlikeness. In (49), the use of *moreover* brings in the conventional implicature that the statement made in  $q$  is additional to the statement made in  $p$ . Finally in (51), the conventional implicature contributed by *so* is that the fact that Mary is learning how to cook Chinese food explains why her husband has bought her a wok (<http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-929837-8.pdf>).

Other representative lexical items that are considered to engender conventional implicatures in English include *actually*, *also*, *anyway*, *barely*, *besides*, *however*, *manage to*, *on the other hand*, *only*, *still*, *though*, *although*, *too*, *yet*, *well*, *furthermore* and *oh* and some social deictic items

such as: *sir, madam, mate, your honour, sonny, hey* and *oi* (Levinson, 1983:128).

Levinson (1983:128) provides an example for the discourse particle *Oh* in English. He states, in press (Oh) appears as an utterance initial particle, which is generally produced by one speaker just after another has announced some news, i.e. it is the conventional signal in English to indicate that news has been received and recognized, but it has no propositional content that could be analysed truth-conditionally in itself.

### 2.4.2.1 The Properties of Conventional Implicature

Properties of conventional implicature can best be characterized in contrast to those of conversational implicature. The main similarity between conventional implicature and conversational implicature is that they do not make any contribution to truth conditions.

Example:

(51).

- a. We want peace and they want war.
- b. We want peace but they want war.

As one can see, (51b) shares the same truth conditions with (51a), though it contains the conventional implicature of contrast triggered by the use of the connective *but*. This indicates that a conversational implicature like a conventional implicature does not contribute to the truth condition of its corresponding sentence. A second similarity is that both conventional implicature and conversational implicatures are associated with speaker or utterance rather than proposition or sentence

(<http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-929837-8.pdf>).

On the other hand, there are number of important differences between conventional implicature and conversational implicature. First of all, conventional implicatures are not derived from the co-operative principle and its component maxims, but are attached by convention to particular lexical items or linguistic constructions. They are therefore an arbitrary part of meaning, and must be learned ad hoc. By contrast, conversational implicatures are derived from the co-operative principle and its attendant maxims. Hence, they are non-conventional by definition, that is, they are motivated rather than arbitrary (ibid).

Secondly, conventional implicatures are not calculable via any natural procedure, but are rather given by convention, thus they must be stipulated. By comparison, conversational implicatures are calculable using the pragmatic principle, contextual knowledge, and background assumptions. (ibid)

Third, conventional implicatures are not cancelable, that is, they cannot be defeated. By contrast, conversational implicatures are cancelable. (Sadock, 1991: 372).

Fourth, conventional implicature is detachable, because it depends on the particular linguistic items used (e.g. if *and* substituted for *but* we lose the conventional implicature but retain the same truth condition. By comparison, conversational implicatures are non- detachable, because they are attached to the semantic content, but not to the linguistic form of what is said (<http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-929837-8.pdf>).

# Chapter Three

## Data Collection

### 3.1 Introduction

In order to achieve the aims of this study, a test has been presented and administrated. Throughout this chapter the researcher presents a description of the test including its objectives, design, material selection, and the subjects on whom the test has been applied. In addition, it describes the pilot test and the main administration of the test along with the scoring scheme adopted.

### 3.2 Objectives of the Test

Heaton (1988:5) states that a test may be constructed primarily as a means of assessing students' performance in language. Hence, the construction of the present test is primarily meant to investigate the performance of Iraqi EFL university students in interpreting the conversational implicature and the extent to which they master this kind of implicature. This test is a diagnostic one. It aims to find out the strong and weak points of the performance of the students and to measure the areas of difficulty faced by them by identifying the reasons behind their errors so that appropriate remedial suggestions and recommendations can be proposed depending on the findings of the test.

### 3.3 Material Selection

All the items of the test have been selected from the books mentioned in Chapter Two. They are assumed to cover the types of conversational

implicature. The selection of the test items has been approved by a jury of nine experienced university lecturers (<sup>1</sup>).

### 3.4 Test Design

The test consists of four questions with a total of forty items that assess the subjects' ability in interpreting the conversational implicature at the recognition and production levels. Each item of the test is composed of a situation and a question concerning the meaning of the implicature within that situation. The conversation is presented to the subjects by using the slides show program in which they can see and hear the conversation in front of them; native speakers' voice is used for this purpose.

The subjects are given one and a half minute for each item in order to be answered, after that the slide will be changed automatically moving to the

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(1)

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next item and so on. The first question has ten multiple-choice items in which four choices are given to each item where only one choice is correct. The second question is yes/no question in which the subjects are given sentences in two columns and they are asked to state whether the sentence in the first column implies the one in the other column or not. These types of questions are designed to measure the students' receptive knowledge, this elicits intuitional data about the subjects under study.

The last two questions are designed to measure the productive knowledge of the subjects. The third question consists of ten items, after each item there is a question about the meaning of the implicature in that item. The fourth question consists of ten items of completion type.

### 3.5 Test Virtues

The most important features of a good test are validity, reliability, and practicality (Harrison, 1983:10). Bell (1981:198) summarizes the virtues of the three test features as follows:

The test, which measures what we want to measure and measures it in a manner which we find acceptable, is a *valid* test. If it does this without significant variation when the examiners and other test conditions are not altered, it is a *reliable* test. And if it can do this with ease and economy, it is a *practical* test.

Practicality is achieved by conducting a test with economy (i.e. saving time and effort) and ease (i.e. showing smoothness of administration, responding to its items, and scoring). Validity and reliability are illustrated in the following section.

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### 3.5.1 Validity and Reliability

Test validity refers to the degree to which the test actually measures what it claims to measure. Test validity is also the extent to which inferences, conclusions, and decisions made on the basis of test scores are appropriate and meaningful.

([http://cc.yosu.edu/~rlhoover/OPTISM/reliability\\_validity.html](http://cc.yosu.edu/~rlhoover/OPTISM/reliability_validity.html))

To achieve the validity of the test, it must meet two criteria: face and content validity.

*Face validity* of a test involves its physical appearance. As Bachman (1990) and Jafarpur 1995 (cited in Khodaday, 1999: 141) state that the appearance of a test has an important role in its application. Therefore, test takers do not take the test seriously enough to try their best when face validity is flimsy. Through administering a questionnaire, face validity is always determined.

*Content validity* is concerned with designing test items in such a way as to allow the subjects' performance to truly reflect the language skills acquired for genuine communication in that language (Bell, 1981:198)

In order to evaluate the test face validity and content validity, the test has been submitted to a jury of experts (**see section 3.3**). The jury has judged the test as being valid to measure the purposes for which it is designed. The jury offered some suggestions which have been taken into consideration; accordingly certain instructions have been modified and others have been replaced.

Test reliability, on the other hand, refers to the degree to which a test is consistent and stable in measuring what it is intended to measure. Simply put, a test is reliable if it is consistent within itself and across time. The

reliability coefficient is an index of reliability: it is a proportion that indicates the ratio between the true score variance on a test and the total variance ([http://cc.ysu.edu/~rlhoover/OPTISM/reliability\\_validity.html](http://cc.ysu.edu/~rlhoover/OPTISM/reliability_validity.html)).

Test validity is requisite to test reliability. If a test is not valid, then reliability is moot. In other words, if a test is not valid there is no point in discussing reliability because test validity is required before reliability can be considered in any meaningful way. Likewise, if a test is not reliable it is also not valid (ibid).

The method used for estimating the reliability in this test is Kuder-Richardson as represented by the following formula:

$$R = \frac{N}{N-1} \left( 1 - \frac{M(N-M)}{NX^2} \right)$$

where

r = reliability

N = the number of items in the test.

m = the mean of the test scores.

x = the standard deviation of the test scores.

The computation of this formula has yielded that the reliability coefficient of the present test is **(0.95)** which a highly positive correlation.

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### 3.6 The Subjects

The sample of the study consists of 50 subjects (7 males and 43 females) of the fourth academic year (2007-2008) of the Department of English at the College of Education, University of Babylon.

The sample represents about 50% of the total of the students' population. They are native speakers of Arabic. A care was taken in choosing the subjects to ensure that the students had the same linguistic background and that no erroneous factors were allowed to affect the results of the test.

The fourth year students are preferred to apply the test because the topic under investigation has been taught in their fourth year of study at the university. The textbook adopted is '*Pragmatics*' by George Yule. Moreover, they are the most advanced learners of English on the university level before graduation.

### 3.7 Pilot Administration

Prior to the final administration of the test, a pilot test was applied on the thirty-first of January, 2008. This test was administrated to ten randomly selected subjects from the fourth year students at the University of Babylon who were excluded from the main test. The reasons behind this test are to check the clarity of the items and directions to the subjects in order to know whether some of the items are in need of modification, to ensure that the allotted time is enough for the subjects to finish all the test items.

In this sense, Weir (1993:24) states: "a reasonable amount of time must be provided for the majority of the test takers to be able to complete the task. If too little time is made available, stress will result and we will not

elicit the students' best performance." and finally to analyze the items to determine their effectiveness in terms of item difficulty and item discrimination power.

The pilot administration is a good indicator of the applicability of the test and the plausibility of the results it is hoped to yield.

The pilot test has shown that the students have encountered no special difficulty in understanding how to respond to the four questions since no questions were asked in this respect. It has also shown that the time allotted to the test is long and it is reduced from one and a half hour to only one hour.

All the results obtained from the pilot administration of this test have incorporated into the final version of the test.

### **3.8 Item Analysis**

Davies (1968:162) states that "item analysis is a means of estimating how much information each single item contributes to the information provided by the test as a whole."

Item analysis is the systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of the individual items on a test. This is usually done for the purpose of selecting the best items that will remain on a revised and improved version of the test. However, item analysis is used to find out how well the items on a test are working with a particular group of students (Brown, 1996:50).

The aim of item analysis of this study is to determine the following criteria: (i) whether the items have a suitable level of difficulty, and (ii) whether they differentiate between good and poor students.

### 3.8.1 Facility Value

Facility value of an item simply shows how easy or difficult the particular item proved in the test (Heaton, 1988: 178). It is calculated by using the following formula:

$$FV = R/N$$

FV = Facility Value

R = the correct answers

N = the number of students taking the test.

The application of this formula has yielded that the item difficulty in the present study ranges between **(0.28 - 0.78)**. In this respect, Brown (1996:95) points out that “a good spread of results can be obtained if the items vary in difficulty from **(0.20 to 0.80)**”. Therefore, the item difficulty of the present test is satisfactory (**See Table 1**).

### 3.8.2 Item Discrimination (ID)

Heaton (1988:179) mentions that “the discrimination index of an item indicates the extent to which the item discriminates between the testees, separating the more able testees from the less able”. He also states that the (D) tells us whether those students who perform well on the whole test tend to do well or badly on each item in the test. Moreover, if the good students tend to do well on an item and the poor students badly on the same item, then the item is a good one since it distinguishes the good from the bad in the same way as the total test score.

The formula below to be adapted from (Heaton, 1988: 180) is used to calculate the (D) of the items of this test:

$$D = \frac{\text{Correct}U - \text{Correct}L}{n}$$

Where:

D: Discrimination index;

U: Upper half;

L: Lower half;

n: Number of candidates in one group.

**Table (1)**

**The Facility Value and the Discrimination Index of the Test Items**

<b>NO. of Question</b>	<b>NO. of Item</b>	<b>FV</b>	<b>D</b>
<b>1</b>	1	0.34	0.44
	2	0.44	0.24
	3	0.74	0.36
	4	0.28	0.32
	5	0.48	0.24
	6	0.38	0.28
	7	0.48	0.24
	8	0.68	0.32
	9	0.40	0.32
	10	0.68	0.24

<b>2</b>	1	0.76	0.48
	2	0.48	0.32
	3	0.56	0.32
	4	0.64	0.24
	5	0.62	0.28
	6	0.76	0.24
	7	0.78	0.36
	8	0.72	0.48
	9	0.58	0.28
	10	0.72	0.24
<b>3</b>	1	0.64	0.48
	2	0.34	0.36
	3	0.48	0.24
	4	0.42	0.28
	5	0.68	0.32
	6	0.46	0.44
	7	0.60	0.32
	8	0.56	0.24
	9	0.52	0.32
	10	0.38	0.36
<b>4</b>	1	0.42	0.28
	2	0.52	0.32
	3	0.68	0.24
	4	0.72	0.32
	5	0.78	0.44
	6	0.58	0.28
	7	0.44	0.24
	8	0.46	0.28
	9	0.68	0.24
	10	0.48	0.32

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### 3.8 Final Administration

The main test was carried out on the seventh of February during the academic year 2007-2008. The time allocated for the test was one hour. The subjects were assured that the test was purely for research purposes and had no bearing on their marks.

The subjects were asked to answer on the sheet which was provided only with the answers to save time and avoid “possible errors arising from the mental transfer of the answer sheet itself” (Heaton, 1988: 158), since the conversation and the questions are presented in front of them by the slide show programme. In addition, illustrative examples are given for each question to the subjects.

The subjects are encouraged to respond to the test and they can ask about any information that they need to explain any ambiguity. In order to avoid embarrassment, the subjects were asked not to write their names on the test sheet.

### 3.9 Scoring Scheme

In order to obtain objectivity and reliability, a definite scoring scheme has been adopted.

The entire test has been scored out of 80. The scores have been distributed in such a way as to give two scores for each correct answer and zero score for the incorrect one. The items that are left by the subjects with no answer have also been given a zero score since they predicate that the subjects have failed to give any answer. Irrelevant mistakes, such as grammatical and spelling ones were ignored.

The scoring scheme adopted for the present test can be illustrated in the following table:

**Table (2)**  
**Distribution of the Scores of the Test**

No. of Questions	No. of items	Scores	Percentage
1	10	20	25
2	10	20	25
3	10	20	25
4	10	20	25
Total	40	80	100

# **Chapter Four**

## **Data Analysis and Discussion**

### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter aims at describing the set of procedures followed in analyzing and discussing the data so as to reach conclusions. Thus, it starts with the analysis of the selected data. Through this analysis, the errors that the subjects have made in interpreting the conversational implicature have been identified as well as tabulated statistically.

From the interpretation of the data, attempts are made to find out the areas in which Iraqi EFL university students face difficulties.

### **4.2 Data Analysis**

This section is devoted to present the results of the subjects' performance on each question of the test. These results are of great importance because they will be the basis upon which the researcher's aims will be achieved and the hypotheses that are mentioned in section (1.3) will either be verified or refuted.

#### **4.2.1 Subjects' Performance of the First Question**

The first question is constructed to measure the subjects' responses on the recognition level of conversational implicature. This question has ten multiple-choice items in which four choices are given to each item where only one choice is correct. The results obtained after analyzing the subjects' performance on each item in this question are presented in the following table:

**Table (3)**  
**Subjects' Performance at the Recognition Level In Question (1)**

Q1	Type of Maxim	Type Of Implicature	Context of Implicature	Correct Responses	%	Incorrect Responses	%
1	Quantity - Understated Criticism	Generalized	Well, what can I say, the typing is good.	17	34	33	66
2	Relevance	Particularized	There is a football game on TV.	22	44	28	56
3	Quantity –Understated Criticism	Generalized	Well, it had a nice mailbox.	37	74	13	26
4	Relevance	Particularized	And miss the mountain climbing trip.	14	28	36	72
5	Quality-Pope Question	Particularized	Do cows fly?	24	48	26	52
6	Quality-Pope Question	Particularized	Do I need a haircut?	19	38	31	62
7	Relevance	Particularized	What do you have back there, Pigeons?	24	48	26	52
8	Relevance	Generalized	That is more than double since the last elections.	34	68	16	32
9	Relevance	Particularized	Have you seen any good movies lately?	20	40	30	60
10	Quantity-Be Sufficiently Informative	Generalized	Well, I have to be there by 6 o'clock.	34	68	16	32
Total				245	49	255	51

It is apparent from table (3) that the subjects' performance of the maxims' types is varied. The results indicate that the rate of the total number of the correct responses to quality (43, 43%) and relevance (114, 45.6%) is lower than that of quantity (88, 59%). This suggests that the subjects face more difficulty in interpreting 'pope question' (43, 43%) and 'be relevant' (114, 45.6%) than 'understated criticism' (54, 54%) and 'be sufficiently informative' (34, 68%) as shown in the following table:

**Table (4)**  
**Subjects' Performance of the Types of the Maxims in Question (1)**

Types of Maxims		Total No. of responses	No. of correct responses	%
Quantity	Understated criticism	100	54	54
	Be sufficiently informative	50	34	68
Total		150	88	59
Relevance	Be relevant	250	114	45.6
Quality	Pope question	100	43	43

#### 4.2.2 Subjects' Performance of the Second Question

The second question is constructed to measure the subjects' responses on that level. This question is yes/no question in which the subjects are given sentences in two columns and they are asked to state whether the sentence in the first column implies the one in the other column or not. Table (5) displays the subjects' responses to each item in this question.

**Table (5)**  
**Subject's Performance at the Recognition Level In Question (2)**

<b>Q2</b>	<b>The Type of the Maxim</b>	<b>Type of Implicature</b>	<b>Context of Implicature</b>	<b>Correct Responses</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Incorrect Responses</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>1</b>	Quantity-Be Sufficiently Informative	Generalized	He intended to.	38	76	12	24
<b>2</b>	Relevance	Particularized	Do you have Aladdin's lamp?	24	48	26	52
<b>3</b>	Relevance	Particularized	The light in his office is on.	28	56	22	44
<b>4</b>	Relevance	Particularized	I wouldn't drive any expensive car.	32	64	18	36
<b>5</b>	Relevance	Particularized	My parents are visiting.	31	62	19	38
<b>6</b>	Quantity- Scalar	Generalized	I've brushed my teeth.	38	76	12	24
<b>7</b>	Quantity-Scalar	Generalized	Come on, you're not fat!	39	78	11	22
<b>8</b>	Quantity-Scalar	Generalized	Well, I 'm staying with my mother.	36	72	14	28
<b>9</b>	Relevance	Particularized	Coffee would keep me awake	29	58	21	42
<b>10</b>	Quantity-Be Sufficiently Informative	Generalized	I saw Mr. James having dinner with a woman yesterday.	36	72	14	28
<b>Total</b>				<b>331</b>	<b>66.2</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>33.8</b>

The results suggest that the subjects' performance on quantity, (187, 74.8%), is better than that of relevance (144, 57.6%), as the following table shows:

**Table (6)**  
**Subjects' Performance of the Types of Maxims in Question (2)**

Types of Maxims		Total No. of responses	No. of correct responses	%
Quantity	Be sufficiently informative	100	74	74
	Scalar	150	113	75.3
Total		250	187	74.8
Relevance	Be relevant	250	144	57.6

This suggests that the subjects face more difficulty in interpreting 'be relevant' (144, 57.6%) compared with 'be sufficiently informative' (74, 74%) and that of 'scalar' (113, 75.3%).

Table (7) illustrates the subjects' total performance at the recognition level.

**Table (7)**  
**Subjects' Total Performance of the Types of Maxims at the Recognition Level, Questions (1 and 2)**

Types of Maxims		Total No. of responses	No. of correct responses	%
Quantity	Understated Criticism	100	54	54
	Be Sufficiently Informative	150	108	72
	Scalar	150	113	75.3
Total		400	275	69
Quality	Pope Question	100	43	43
Relevance	Be Relevant	500	258	51.6

The results show clearly that, at the recognition level, the subjects have faced more difficulties in interpreting ‘pope question’, ‘be relevant’ and ‘understated criticism’ since the rates of their correct responses were (43,43%), (258, 51.6%) and (54, 54%) respectively.

Table (8), on the other hand, illustrates the differences between the subjects’ performance of the two types of conversational implicature at the recognition level.

**Table (8)**  
**Subjects’ Performance of the Types of Implicatures at the Recognition level**  
**Question (1 and 2)**

<b>Types of Implicature</b>	<b>Total No. of responses</b>	<b>No. of correct responses</b>	<b>%</b>
Generalized	450	309	69
Particularized	550	267	49

The results indicate that the rate of the total number of correct responses to particularized implicature (267, 49%) is lower than that of generalized implicature (309, 69 %). Which suggests that the subjects face more difficulty in interpreting particularized implicature than generalized conversational implicature

### **4.2.3 Subjects’ Performance of the Third Question**

This question is constructed primarily to measure the subjects’ performance at the production level. This question consists of ten items in which the subjects are given a question after each item about the meaning of the implicature in that item and they are required to write the implied meaning in each item. Table (9) presents the analysis of each item in this question.

**Table (9)**  
**Subject's Performance on the Production Level In Question (3)**

Q3	The Type of maxim	Type of Implicature	Context of Implicature	Correct responses	%	Incorrect responses	%
1	Quantity-Understated Criticism	Generalized	Well . . . It's really difficult to give a good presentation sometimes, isn't it?	32	64	18	36
2	Quality-Pope Question	Particularized	Do chickens have lips?	17	34	33	66
3	Relevance	Particularized	It seems like you've been watching it all night. I hope it's over by 9:30.	24	48	26	52
4	Quality- Irony	Particularized	He's really a scholar, isn't he?	21	42	29	58
5	Quantity-Scalar	Generalized	I invited Bella.	34	68	16	32
6	Quality-Irony	Particularized	And London is in America, I suppose.	23	46	27	54
7	Quality-Irony	Particularized	The children were in your room this morning	30	60	20	40
8	Quantity-Be Sufficiently Informative	Generalized	Um . . . I think I need to improve my interview skills.	28	56	22	44
9	Relevance	Particularized	How is your homework getting along Johnny?	26	52	24	48
10	Relevance	Particularized	How much did it (the water) cost?	19	38	31	62
Total				254	50.8	246	49.2

It is apparent from this table that most learners are incompetent in interpreting ‘irony’ (74, 49.33%), ‘pope question’ (17, 34%), ‘be relevant’ (69, 46%) and ‘be sufficiently informative’ (28, 56%) since the rate of their correct responses is lower than those of ‘understated criticism’ (32, 64%), “scalar” (34, 68%) and. as shown in the following table:

Table (10)

Subjects’ Performance of the Types of Maxims in Question (3)

The Type of the Maxim		Total No. of responses	No. of correct responses	%
Quantity	Understated criticism	50	32	64
	Be sufficiently informative	50	28	56
	Scalar	50	34	68
Total		150	94	63
Relevance	Be relevant	150	69	46
Quality	Irony	150	74	49.3
	Pope question	50	17	34
Total		200	91	45.5

#### 4.2.4 Subjects’ Performance of the Fourth Question

This question is constructed to measure the subjects’ productive knowledge in interpreting conversational implicature. This question consists of ten items of completion type. Table (11) presents the analysis of each item in this question.

**Table (11)**  
**Subject's Performance at the Production Level In Question (4)**

Q4	Type of Maxims	Type of Implicature	Context of Implicature	Correct Responses	%	Incorrect Responses	%
1	Quality-Irony	Particularized	Mary is a nice friend.	21	42	29	58
2	Relevance	Particularized	He has been visiting New York lately.	26	52	24	48
3	Quantity- Understated Criticism	Generalized	The tires are nice.	34	68	16	32
4	Quantity- Be Sufficiently Informative	Generalized	Somewhere in the south of France.	36	72	14	28
5	Manner	Generalized	She sits at the piano, pushes the keys and the keys make noise.	39	78	11	22
6	Relevance	Particularized	I'm in the bath, honey.	29	58	21	42
7	Quality- Irony	Particularized	He's such a quit guy!	22	44	28	56
8	Relevance	Particularized	The cat looks happy.	23	46	27	54
9	Quantity-Be Sufficiently Informative	Generalized	I can't say that it doesn't.	34	68	16	32
10	Quantity- Understated Criticism	Particularized	She has a nice makeup set.	24	48	26	52
Total				288	57.6	212	42.4

The results indicate that the total number of the correct responses to quality is (43.43%) and relevance (78, 52%) whereas that of quantity (128, 64%) and manner (39, 78%). This suggests that the subjects face more difficulty in interpreting “irony” (43.43%) and “be relevant” (78, 52%) than “Be sufficiently informative” (70, 70%) and that of “be orderly” (39, 78%), as shown in the following table

Table (12)

Subjects' Performance of the Types of Maxims in Question (4)

Types of Maxims		Total No. of responses	No. of correct responses	%
Quantity	Understated Criticism	100	58	58
	Be Sufficiently Informative	100	70	70
Total		200	128	64
Relevance	Be Relevant	150	78	52
Quality	Irony	100	43	43
Manner	Be Orderly	50	39	78

Table (13) illustrates the subjects' total performance at the production level.

Table (13)

Subjects' Total Performance of the Types of Maxims at the Production Level, Question (3 and 4)

Types of Maxims		Total No. of Responses	No. of correct Responses	%
Quantity	Understated Criticism	150	90	60
	Be Sufficiently Informative	150	98	65.33
	Scalar	50	34	68
Total		350	222	63.42
Relevance	Be relevant	300	147	49
Quality	Irony	250	117	46.8
	Pope Question	50	17	34
Total		600	134	22.33
Manner	Be Orderly	50	39	78

The results show clearly that, at the production level, the subjects have face more difficulties in interpreting ‘pope question’, ‘irony’ and ‘be relevant’ since their rates were (17,34%), (117, 46,8%) and (147, 49%) respectively.

Table (14), on the other hand, illustrates the differences between the subjects’ performance of the two types of conversational implicature at the production level.

**Table (14)**  
**Subjects’ Performance of the Types of Implicatures at the Production level**  
**Question (3 and 4)**

<b>Types of Implicature</b>	<b>Total No. of Responses</b>	<b>No. of correct Responses</b>	<b>%</b>
Generalized	350	237	68
Particularized	650	305	47

The results indicate that the rate of the total number of correct responses to particularized implicature, (305, 47%), is lower than that of generalized implicature (237, 68 %). The results suggest that the subjects face more difficulty in interpreting particularized implicature than generalized conversational implicature

#### **4.2.5 Subjects Performance in the Whole Test**

The results of the subjects’ performance on the whole test is presented in the following table with regard to the recognition and production levels:

Table (15)

## Subjects' Performance of the Types of Maxims on the Whole Test

Types of Maxims		Total No. of responses	No. of correct responses	%
Quantity	Understated criticism	250	144	57.6
	Be sufficiently informative	300	206	69
	Scalar	200	147	73.5
Total		750	497	66.26
Relevance	Be relevant	800	405	51
Quality	Irony	250	117	46.8
	Pope question	150	60	40
Total		400	177	44.25
Manner	Be orderly	50	39	78

From the analysis, it is found that it is easy for most of the subject to interpret the implicatures concerning 'be sufficiently informative' (206,69%), 'scalar' (147, 73.5%), and 'be orderly' (39, 78%), whereas it is found that the subjects find a difficulty to interpret the implicatures which are sensitive to cultural differences and suprasegmental features as seen in 'pope question' (60,40%), 'irony' (117.46.8%), 'be relevant' (405.51%) and 'understated criticism' (144.57.6%) validating by that the first hypothesis which says that most of Iraqi EFL university students face difficulties in interpreting conversational implicature that are sensitive to cultural context and suprasegmental features.

Table (16)

## Subjects' Performance of the Types of Implicatures on the Whole Test

Types of Implicature	Total No. of responses	No. of correct responses	%
Generalized	800	546	68.25
Particularized	1200	572	48

On the other hand, the results clearly show that the subjects have faced more difficulties in interpreting particularized implicature than those of generalized implicature. Since the total number of their correct responses to particularized implicature, (572, 48%), is lower than that of generalized implicature, (546, 68.25%),. Accordingly, the second hypothesis which states that most of Iraqi EFL university students face more difficulties in interpreting particularized implicature than the generalized implicature is verified.

### **4.3. Factors behind Pragmatic Failure**

Within this section there would be a general survey and analysis for the responses made by the Iraqi EFL students as far as their ability of interpreting conversational implicature is concerned. The analysis would include identifying the sociopragmatic and pragmalinguistic failure and then illustrating why such failure occurs showing the factors that lead to such a failure.

#### **4.3.1. Sociopragmatic Failure**

Within this aspect of knowledge, most of the subjects were seen to have defects and inefficiency as far as their sociopragmatic knowledge is concerned. Such inefficiency leads them to fail to interpret the required conversational implicature. Mainly, they failed because of certain causes and factors which are clearly evident in their performance. Such factors and causes can be grouped as in the following:

##### **A- The Influence of L1 Culture**

Within this factor, the subjects are using different types of sociopragmatic knowledge to interpret the required implicatures i.e., using their L1 culture

as a resource for the sociopragmatic knowledge. Such a failure can be seen in the following table:

**Table (17)**  
**The Influence of LI Culture**

Q/Item	Maxim's Type	Context of Implicatures
Q1/7	Relevance	What do you have back there, Pigeons?
Q2/2	Relevance	Do you have Aladdin's lamp?
Q4/10	Understated-criticism	She has a nice makeup set.

According to conversation analysis, conversation usually consists of a sequence of turns, and specific interactional constraints which determine what is relevant in the next turn. The concept of adjacency pairs in conversation analysis explains how the second pair-part in a conversation is constrained by the first pair-part. Responses which do not agree with the expectation from the first pair-part might lead to communication breakdown. It is the case in Table (17) in which the subjects failed to seek relevance cues of the seemingly irrelevant reply because in Iraqi culture (Islamic Arabic), the person usually provides the requested information when asked for it. The results revealed that some of the subjects did not pick up such cues; instead, they focus on the meaning of the individual words reflecting their mother tongue. For example, in item (2), Q2 most of the subjects failed to make an association between B's response *'Do you have Aladdin's lamp?'* and A's utterance *'200 people are coming to my party tonight'* rather they made an association between the meaning of the individual words like *'tonight'* in A's utterance and *'lamp'* in B's response and interpreted B's response as B is offering A his lamp. In item (10), Q4 most of the subjects failed to interpret B's response *'she has a nice make up set'* as understated criticism; instead, they

interpreted the phrase *'nice makeup set'* as an equivalent meaning to *'beautiful'* whereas B was implying that the girl is not beautiful by praising a quality of relatively minor things (i.e. her makeup set).

Furthermore, Interpretation and comprehension of sentences and utterances do not depend solely on semantic factors, that is, on lexical meaning and grammatical structures alone, but on a number of contextual factors. The translation strategy that subjects used led them to the wrong interpretation, because it is so focused on only lexical meaning of the expression without the consideration of other possible non-linguistic cues. For example, in item (7), Q1 the subjects interpret the situation out of the context, i.e. most of the subjects interpreted the utterance *'what do you have back there, pigeons?'* as that the speaker inquires whether the restaurant is serving pigeons. Whereas the speaker implies that the serving of eggs is too small.

### **B- Lack of the Social Norms of the Target Culture**

According to Clark and Clark (1977:99), in coming to an interpretation, listeners must first input the message, form a hypothesis about what routine is being enacted, and then rely on social background knowledge and expectations to evaluate what intended and conveyed. Due to the differences in the expectations of the behaviors in different cultures, speakers from different cultures can interpret the same utterance in the same context differently. Within this factor, subjects showed that they lack some social norms of the target language as shown in table (18).

Table (18)

## The Lack of the Social Norms of the Target Culture

Q/Item	Maxim's Type	Context of Implicatures
Q1/5	Quality/Polite question	Do cows fly?
Q1/9	Relevance	Have you seen any good movies lately, Cathy?
Q3/6	Quality-irony/sarcasm	And London is in America, I suppose.
Q4/7	Quality-irony/sarcasm	He's such a quit guy!

Most of the subjects in the sample failed to interpret item (5), Q1 since they did not figure out the relation between Suzan's and Cathy's questions because in the Iraqi culture the second person's question can never be an answer to the first person's question whereas in the target culture, the second person can answer the first person with another question. In item (5), Q1 for example, Suzan asks, *'So, do you think Mr. John will increase my salary?' (Question1). Cathy answers, "Do cows fly?" (Question2)*. Since the obvious answer to Question2 "No" (the cows can not fly), then Cathy's answer to Suzan is also "No" i.e. (John will not increase Suzan's salary). The cultures discrepancies led most of subjects to wrong interpretation.

On the other hand, the majority of the subjects interpreted the sarcasm as humour without the negative implication that undergirds sarcasm. For example, subjects misunderstood the implicatures found in Table (18) as which was intended to be a sarcastic remark, to be humorous. Sarcasm was used to highlight the witty nature of the speaker through a negative evaluation at the expense of the person or thing being criticized. The subjects considered sarcasm as a light joke that could be said in the presence of the person being evaluated without threat to the person losing face.

The lack of the norms in the target language may lead the subjects to interpret the situations literally. It is the case in item (9), Q1 in which the subjects interpret the situation by stating that Cathy wants to watch movies, but for the target culture it is clearly a case of 'it is none of your business,' because in the foreign culture the cost of things and salaries are considered inappropriate topics to be inquired about, whereas Iraqi culture, the people seem to have more open attitudes about such topics.

The researcher notices that (530) errors are attributed to sociopragmatic failure, i.e., (60%) of the total number of the subjects errors.

### **4.3.2. Pragmalinguistic failure**

According to Thomas (1983:99), pragmalinguistic failure occurs when the pragmatic force planned by a speaker onto a certain utterance is thoroughly different from the force most frequently assigned to it by native speakers of the target language, or when speech act strategies are improperly transferred from the speaker's native language to the target language .Such a failure may arise from learning strategy.

#### **4.3.2.1. Learning Strategy**

Despite the positive opportunities which the instruction may offer, it may also influence learners' pragmatic competence negatively. Classroom instruction may inhibit pragmatic acquisition by putting constraints on input or interaction in the following aspects:

#### 4.3.2.1.1. Grammar-Oriented Pedagogy (focus on form)

Kasper & Rose (2002: 212) argue that it is not the instructional setting that determines the quality of pragmatic input; both teacher-fronted and student-centered setting have the potential to provide acquisitionally relevant pragmatic input. So the key to pragmatic acquisition is the quality of pragmatic input.

In Iraq, a large number of colleges are following the grammar-oriented pedagogy, which is teacher-fronted rather than student-centered. In such cases, both the quantity and quality of pragmatic input is a problem.

The class is mainly teacher presentation. The focus is still on vocabulary and grammar, which are basic skills for subjects to master. Practicing oral English is very limited. As a result it appears that subjects have more difficulty interpreting conversational implicature that are sensitive to suprasegmental features such as intonation and tone. For example depending on how one says '*Mary is a nice friend*' and the context of the situation, this statement could be an implicature through which a sarcastic inference might be made or it could be taken at the face value. In item (1), Q4 the findings showed that most of the subjects took the utterance at its face value and failed to take the sarcastic remark indicated by the speaker's intonation. Furthermore, responses diverge from the expectation tend to be marked with hesitation markers such as *well, um, uh, ah*. The results revealed that some of the subjects did not pick up such hesitation markers as shown in item (1), Q1 and item (8), Q3.

**Table (19)**  
**Learning Strategy**

Q/Item	Type of Implicature	Context of Implicatures
Q3/8	Quantity/Be sufficiently informative	Um...I think I need to improve my interview skills
Q4/1	Quality- Irony	Mary is a nice friend.
Q1/1	Quantity/Understated criticism	Well, what can I say, the typing is good.
Q3/9	Relevance	How is your homework getting along, Johnny?

The subjects seemed to be less sensitive to the suprasegmental features of language use and more focused on the semantics of the lexical items used. This speaks to a lack of training and emphasis on the ways in which suprasegmental features are used to carry meaning in addition the lexicon.

Learners are aware of their linguistic shortcomings, and, consequently, lack confidence. As a result, they tend to pay more attention to the propositional level of the utterance. More simply, they are preoccupied with understanding the meaning of individual words. The findings showed that the hearing of a key word is the most common processing level for lower proficiency L2 listeners. Weak listeners tend to make the first choice of key word and go directly to the first association of the key word and the referent. Conversely, more proficient listeners appear to explore several possibilities of the associations between the words and referents before making the final decision. Item (1), Q1, illustrates that most of the subjects made the wrong key word choice, and as a result, made a wrong inference. Weak students based their decision on the key words “well”, “good”. Proficient students on the other hand made the association between the content of the research and the good typing and infer that the Mr. Smith

implied that the research was not good by praising a quality of relatively minor things.

Requiring learners to produce full, over-explicit or uniform answers at all times (e.g. for the sake of practising a certain structure) can also prove to be problematic. Uniform answers may create the impression that there is only one correct/ acceptable way of expressing an intended meaning. Learners should be taught not only the 'sense' but also the potential 'force' of a structure. The misunderstanding arise not from any inability on the part of the hearer to understand the intended sense/reference of the speaker's work in the context in which they are uttered, but from an inability to recognize the force of the speaker's utterance when the speaker intended that this particular hearer should recognize it, such a problem can be seen in item (9), Q3. Although the utterance is syntactically a question, but semantically a directive (to finish his homework before doing anything else). Most of the subjects understood the mother's response as a question. Although the response is grammatically a question, it does not function as one. That is, the mother does not require a report on the progress of Johnny's homework, as it is clear that Johnny is not working on it right now but her response as a command for Johnny to finish his homework before doing anything else. On the other hand, most of the subjects interpreted the utterance in item (2), Q1 as a statement rather than an apology, i.e. the speaker is not informing the hearer that there is a football game on TV but he is apologizing for not going with them.

The total number of errors that might be related to using such strategy is (352, 40%) of the total number of subjects' errors.

# Chapter Five

## Conclusions, Recommendations, and Suggestions

### 5.1 Introductions

This chapter sums up the main conclusions arrived at through the theoretical work of this study as well as the results of the test. In addition, these conclusions are meant to serve as a basis for the recommendations and suggestions for further investigations in the area of conversational implicature.

### 5.2 Practical Conclusions

The empirical work of the study has come up with the following conclusions:

1. It has been found that Iraqi EFL university students at the fourth year at both levels face difficulties in interpreting conversational implicature which is sensitive to cultural differences and suprasegmental features since the rates of their correct responses are ‘pope question’ (60,40%), ‘irony’ (117.46.8%), ‘be relevant’ (405.51%) and ‘understated criticism’ (144.57.6%). This validates the first hypothesis which says that most of Iraqi EFL university students face difficulties in interpreting conversational implicatures that are sensitive to cultural context and suprasegmental features.
2. The subjects’ performance in the whole test has also revealed that EFL university students have faced more difficulties in interpreting particularized implicature than that of generalized implicature since the rate of their correct responses to particularized implicature ,(572,48%), is lower than that of their correct responses to generalized implicature, (546,68.25%). This validates the second hypothesis

which says that Iraqi EFL university students face more difficulties in interpreting particularized conversational implicature than the difficulties they face in interpreting generalized implicature.

3. The plausible causes underlying the subjects' pragmatic failure can be ascribed to the following factors:

1. Sociopragmatic failure whereby the subjects use their mother tongue in an attempt to interpret the required implicature. In this respect, the use of literal interpretation is the most common phenomenon. Sociopragmatic failure constitutes the majority of the subjects' errors as it accounts for (60%) of the total of errors.

2. Pragmalinguistic failure: this type of error occurs when the pragmatic force planned by a speaker onto a certain utterance is different from the force most frequently assigned to it by native speakers of the target language. The rate of error pertaining to such failure is (40%) of the total errors.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

In the light of the findings arrived at in this study, the following implications can be recommended:

#### **1. Grammar**

It would be wise to combine the manipulation of grammatical structures (e.g. transformations) with awareness-raising regarding the potential implicatures (particularly conventional ones) that may arise from different surface structures. Learners should be taught not only the 'sense' but also the potential 'force' of a structure. Presenting language through texts (as opposed to model sentences in isolation) will facilitate this objective.

Requiring learners to produce full, over-explicit or uniform answers at all times (e.g. for the sake of practising a certain structure) can also prove to be problematic. Uniform answers may create the impression that there is only one correct/ acceptable way of expressing an intended meaning. The use of over-explicit language by learners may lead native listeners/ readers to understand unintended implicatures. Similarly, if learners expect over-explicit messages, they may be confused and discouraged by the elliptical nature of every day language.

## 2. Lexis

Although teaching vocabulary through lexical relations (synonymy, antonymy, hyponymy) can be a very effective technique, learners need to be aware of the differences as well as the similarities within lexical sets. Particularly regarding antonymy, learners need to understand that negating the opposite of a word does not always give the original meaning (e.g. '*not bad*' does not communicate the same meaning as '*good*'). Therefore, it seems that apart from the meaning of lexical items, learners need to be taught their *use*, so that they do not lead native listeners/ readers to draw unintended conventional implicatures.

## 3. Listening & Reading

EFL Learners are preoccupied with understanding the meaning of individual words. Therefore, they may fail to work out intended implicatures, and, as a result, fail to understand the intended meaning of the speaker/ writer. Since communication depends on more than the meaning of lexis and grammatical structures, reading and listening lessons should help learners move beyond merely understanding isolated lexis/ structures.

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The main goal of learners is to be able to understand texts targeted at native speakers language. But speakers/ writers will assume certain shared knowledge/ assumptions with their listeners/ readers, which learners may not have. Learners may be helped by the following:

**1-** If the learners' level permits, authentic texts should be used. When specially constructed texts are deemed necessary, care should be taken so that they are not unnaturally explicit (i.e. containing only straightforward propositions).

**2-** Receptive skills lessons should not focus solely on facts/ ideas that have been explicitly expressed or conventionally implicated. Students need to be guided to identify and work out the speaker's/ writer's non-conventional implicatures.

**3-** Effective listening skills development needs to incorporate awareness-raising on how stress, intonation and tone of voice can provide clues for the speaker's intended implicatures.

#### **4. Speaking**

The students can take a few minutes to come up with examples of implicatures in their mother languages. These examples can be shared with the class, and they can serve multiple purposes: they give the instructor evidence that the students in fact understand the implicature; help students to reflect on the ways implicature is present in their own languages; and give students a chance to practise the new information they were learning. In addition to examples from their own language, students are asked to make and perform dialogues of their own in English to illustrate the use of the

implicature they were working on. The teacher can also highlight implicatures which happen naturally in the classroom.

#### **5.4. Suggestions for Further Research**

The following topics are suggested for further research in the area of conversational implicature:

1. A study can be conducted to investigate the students' ability in interpreting the conventional implicatures.
2. A similar study can be conducted to measure the students' ability to translate English texts containing implicatures into Arabic.
3. A contrastive study between Arabic and English implicatures can be investigated.

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# Appendix I

## The Test Before Modification

**Q1: Choose the appropriate response in each of the following situations.**

**1. Two teachers are talking about a student's research.**

Mr. Ranger: Have you finished with Mark's research yet?

Mr. Smith: Yes, I have. I read it last night.

Mr. Ranger: What do you think of it?

Mr. Smith: Well, it is well typed.

**What did Mr. Smith think of Mark's research?**

- a. He liked it. He thought it was good.
- b. He thought it was important that the paper was well typed.
- c. He really did not read it well enough to know.
- d. He did not like it.

**2. When Jack got home, he found that his wife was limping.**

Jack: what happened to your leg?

Wife: I went running.

**Another way the wife could have said the same thing is.....**

- a. Today, I finally got some exercise running.
- b. I hurt it running.
- c. It's nothing serious. Don't worry about it.
- d. I want to change the subject because it is embarrassing.

**3. George and Jane are looking for a house to buy. Jane just went to look at a house in their price range and reporting back to George.**

George: So, what do you think of the house?

Jane: Well, it had a nice mailbox.

George: Are there any other houses we can visit?

**Jane means:**

- a. The house wasn't good enough
- b. They were looking for a good mailbox

- c. The house was good
- d. She wanted to change the topic.

**4. Sarah and Cathy are colleagues at work. Cathy turns to Sarah and says:**

Cathy: By the way, how much are you getting this year? I heard you got a really nice raise.

Sarah: Have you seen any good movie lately, Cathy? I'd really like to see one.

**What does Sarah mean by her comment?**

- a. She does not want to talk about how much money she makes.
- b. She hasn't seen any good movies for a long time.
- c. She didn't understand what Cathy says.
- d. She likes to talk about her raise.

**5. Two roommates are talking about their plans for the summer.**

Fran: My mother wants me to stay home for a while, so I can be there. When our relatives come to visit us at the beach.

John: Do you have a lot of relatives?

Fran: Is the sky blue?

**How can we interpret Fran's question?**

- a. Fran thinks her relatives are all blue.
- b. Fran is new to the area and is trying to find out what the summers are like.
- c. Fran has a lot of relatives.
- d. Fran doesn't have a lot of relatives.

**6. Ken bought a new car and his friend Charles, came to see it. Charles drove it around for an hour near Ken's house.**

Ken: What do you think of this new car?

Charles: Well the colour is fine, but .....

Ken: Thanks.

**How can we interpret Ken's response?**

- a. Ken appreciates Charles for driving Ken's car.
- b. Ken is happy to have this fantastic car.
- c. Ken feels happy, because Charles praises the color of the car.
- d. Ken does not want to hear any other criticism for Charles.

**7. Two friends are working together in a construction site. After Bill finished his job, he asked John, who is totally bald.**

Bill: Can I give you a hand?

John: Do I need a haircut?

**How can we interpret John's answer?**

- a. John means that Bill is a good hairdresser
- b. John thinks that he needs to have his hair cut.
- c. John does not need any help
- d. John is trying to change the subject.

**8. A woman has just ordered two scrambled eggs for breakfast in a restaurant. When the eggs arrive they look very small.**

Marlene: Are these really two eggs or just one?

Waitress: That's two eggs.

Marlene: What do you have back there, Pigeons?

**Marlene means .....**

- a. The eggs are small.
- b. She likes to talk with the waitress.
- c. The eggs are big.
- d. She doesn't like eggs.

**9. Suzan and Cathy are discussing their boss who is very unpleasant.**

Suzan: So, do you think Mr. John will increase my salary?

Cathy: Do cows fly?

**What does Cathy mean?**

- a. She means that John will increase Suzan's salary
- b. She doesn't know whether the cows fly or not.
- c. Suzan likes to talk about cows.
- d. She means that John will not increase Suzan's salary.

**10. Mr. Rose was murdered at his house. A police officer conducted the following interview:**

Police officer: Mrs. Rose, what did you see after you heard the shot?

Mrs. Rose: I saw a man running out of the house and then changing his clothes once outside.

Rose's son: No, I saw the man first changed his clothes and ran out of the house.

Mrs. Rose: well, I don't remember it that way.

**Who said the correct story?**

- a. Mrs. Rose.
- b. Mrs. Rose's son
- c. Both are right.
- d. Neither of them is right.

**Q2. Of the following sentences, say whether the one in column A implies the one in column B.**

**Example:**

A	B	Answer	
Jack: <i>who was that you were talking to?</i> Tom : <i>That was my mother's husband</i>	<i>Tom's mother's husband is not Tom's father.</i>	Yes	No

A	B	Answer	
1. Steve: <i>Did your brother do the reading for this week's seminar?</i> Peter: <i>He intended to.</i>	<i>Peter's brother did the reading for this week's seminar.</i>	Yes	No
2. <b>A:</b> <i>Are you going to buy James's car?</i> <b>B:</b> <i>Are you crazy?</i>	B is going to buy James's car	Yes	No
3. John: <i>Where's Peter?</i> Mary: <i>The light in his office is on.</i>	<i>Peter is in his office.</i>	Yes	No
4. Peter: <i>would you drive a Mercedes?</i> Mary: <i>I wouldn't drive ANY expensive car.</i>	<i>A Mercedes is an expensive car therefore Mary wouldn't drive it.</i>	Yes	Yes

<p>5. Mathew: <i>Are you coming to the party tonight?</i>  Bill: <i>My parents are visiting.</i></p>	<p><i>Bill is coming to the party.</i></p>	<p><i>Yes</i></p>	<p><i>No</i></p>
<p>6. Clint : <i>Have you brushed your teeth and tidied your room ?</i>  Sam: <i>I've brushed my teeth.</i></p>	<p><i>Sam has tidied his room.</i></p>	<p><i>Yes</i></p>	<p><i>No</i></p>
<p>7. Jack: <i>who was that your were talking to?</i>  Tom: <i>That was my mother's husband.</i></p>	<p><i>A is ugly</i></p>	<p><i>Yes</i></p>	<p><i>No</i></p>
<p>8. John: <i>So, are you staying with your parents?</i>  Larry: <i>Well, I 'm staying with my mother.</i></p>	<p><i>Larry staying with both of her parents.</i></p>	<p><i>Yes</i></p>	<p><i>No</i></p>
<p>9. Peter: <i>Do you want some coffee?</i>  James : <i>Coffee would keep me awake</i></p>	<p><i>James does not want any coffee.</i></p>	<p><i>Yes</i></p>	<p><i>No</i></p>
<p>10. A: <i>I saw Mr. James having dinner with a woman yesterday.</i>  B: <i>Really?</i></p>	<p><i>A implies that the woman Mr. James was having dinner with was not his wife.</i></p>	<p><i>Yes</i></p>	<p><i>No</i></p>

**Q 3 Read the following situations and answer the questions underneath each one.**

**Situation 1:**

Joe: would you like to dance?

Mary: I 'd love to. Do you know anyone else who would like to?

**What does Mary mean?**

**Situation 2: Larry and Charlene are talking about a test they recently took.**

Charlene: Do you think you got an "A" on the test?

Larry: Do chickens have lips?

**What does Larry mean?**

**Situation 3: A husband has been watching a football game on TV for the past two hours.**

Wife: That programme on drug abuse is excellent, honey.

Husband: About 30 more minutes – may be more.

Wife: It seems like you've been watching it all night. I hope it's over by 9:30.

**What does the wife want to do?**

**Situation 4: Jack and Steve are talking about a friend, Fred, who is failing in all of his classes.**

Jack: I don't know why Fred wastes his time and money going to school.

Steve: He's really a scholar, isn't he?

**What does Steve really think about Fred?**

**Situation 5.**

A: Did you invite Bella and Cathy?

B: I invited Bella.

**What does B mean?**

**Situation 6.**

Student: Tehran is in Turkey, isn't it, teacher?

Teacher: And London is in America, I suppose.

**What does the teacher mean?**

**Situation 7.**

Husband: Where is my Box of chocolate?

Wife: The children were in your room this morning.

**What is the wife trying to say?**

**Situation 8:**

A: Will Sally be at the meeting this afternoon?

B: Her car broke down.

**What does B mean?**

**Situation 9:**

Johnny: Hey Ron, let's play marbles.

Mother: How is your homework getting along Johnny?

**What is the mother trying to say?**

**Situation 10.**

You have asked for a drink of water, and your host returns with a very small cup.

B: how much did it (the water) cost?

**What does B try to say?**

**Q4:** Write what the speaker in the **boldface type** is trying to say.

**Example:**

Alan: Are you going to Paul's party?

Barb: **I have to work.**

Barb means that he can not go to Paul's party.

1. Mary always tells lies to Tim.

Tim: **Mary is a nice friend.**

Tim means .....

2. A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days .

B: **He has been visiting New York lately.**

B means .....

3. A: Do you like my new car?

B: **The tires are nice.**

B means .....

4. A: Do you know where Sam lives?

B: **Somewhere in the south of France.**

B means .....

5. A: Does your daughter play the piano?

B: **She sits at the piano and pushes the keys and the keys make noise...**

B: means .....

6. Kathy: Can you answer the phone?

Bob: **I'm in the bath.**

Bob means.....

7. Kim: I told Hassan a secret, and he told it to everyone.

Dave: **He's such a quiet guy!**

Dave means .....

8. A: Where's the fish?

B: **The cat looks happy.**

B means .....

9. A: Does my smoking disturb you?

B: **I can't say that it doesn't.**

B: means .....

10. A: Do you think this girl is beautiful?

B: **She has a nice make-up set .**

B: means .....

# Appendix I I

## The Test After the Modifications

**Q1: Choose the appropriate response in each of the following situations.**

**1. Two teachers are talking about a student's research.**

Mr. Ranger: Have you finished with Mark's research yet?

Mr. Smith: Yes, I have. I read it last night.

Mr. Ranger: What do you think of it?

Mr. Smith: Well, what can I say, the typing is good.

**What did Mr. Smith think of Mark's research?**

- a. He liked it. He thought it was good.
- b. He thought it was important that the paper was well typed.
- c. He really did not read it well enough to know.
- d. He did not like it.

**2.**

Woman: Would you prefer to go to the library or to attend that lecture about film making.

Man: There is a football game on TV.

**What does the man imply?**

- a. He'd like to attend a football game.
- b. He wants to stay home.
- c. He prefers to see a film
- d. He's already been to the library

**3. George and Jane are looking for a house to buy. Jane just went to look at a house in their price range and reporting back to George.**

George: So, what do you think of the house?

Jane: Well, it had a nice mailbox.

George: Are there any other houses we can visit?

**Jane means:**

- a. The house wasn't good enough

- b. They were looking for a good mailbox
- c. The house was good
- d. She wanted to change the topic.

4. Man: Do you want to come with us to hear the dean speech.  
 Woman: And miss the mountain climbing trip?

**What does the woman imply?**

- a. She hasn't seen the dean in along time.
- b. She'd prefer to hear the speech.
- c. She doesn't want to miss the climb.
- d. She'll speak to them after the climb.

**5. Suzan and Cathy are discussing their boss who is very unpleasant.**

Suzan: So, do you think Mr. John will increase my salary?

Cathy: Do cows fly?

**What does Cathy mean?**

- a. She means that John will increase Suzan's salary
- b. She doesn't know weather the cows fly or not.
- c. Suzan likes to talk about cows.
- d. She means that John will not increase Suzan's salary.

**6. Two friends are working together in a construction site. After Bill finished his job, he asked John, who is totally bald.**

Bill: Can I give you a hand?

John: Do I need a haircut?

**How can we interpret John's answer?**

- a. John means that Bill is a good hairdresser
- b. John thinks that he needs to have his hair cut.
- c. John does not need any help
- d. John is trying to change the subject.

**7. A woman has just ordered two scrambled eggs for breakfast in a restaurant. When the eggs arrive they look very small.**

Marlene: Are these really two eggs or just one?

Waitress: That's two eggs.

Marlene: What do you have back there, Pigeons?

**Marlene means .....**

- a. The eggs are small.
- b. She likes to talk with the waitress.
- c. The eggs are big.
- d. She doesn't like eggs.

**8.**

Woman: Fifty students voted in the club elections in the meeting last night

Man: That is more than double since the last elections.

**What does the man imply?**

- a. At least twenty-five student voted.
- b. Over a hundred students took part in the last elections.
- c. Club participation in student election has increased.
- d. More than half the students have joined clubs.

**9. Sarah and Cathy are colleagues at work. Cathy turns to Sarah and says:**

Cathy: By the way, how much are you getting this year? I heard you got a really nice raise.

Sarah: Have you seen any good movie lately, Cathy? I'd really like to see one.

**What does Sarah mean by her comment?**

- a. She does not want to talk about how much money she makes.
- b. She hasn't seen any good movies for a long time.
- c. She didn't understand what Cathy says.
- d. She likes to talk about her raise.

**10.**

Man: could you give me a lift to the football game at the university stadium tonight

Woman: well I have to be there by 6 o'clock to set up the concession stands. If that's too early for you, I think Patty might be going around by 7:30

**What does the woman mean?**

- a. The man doesn't want to get a lift.
- b. She can't take the man to the game.
- c. Patty is taking her to the game.
- d. Patty might be leaving earlier than she is.

**Q2. Of the following sentences, say whether the one in column A implies the one in column B.**

**Example:**

A	B	Answer	
<p>Jack: <i>who was that you were talking to?</i> Tom : <i>That was my mother's husband</i></p>	<p><i>Tom's mother's husband is not Tom's father.</i></p>	<input checked="" type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> No

A	B	Answer	
<p>1. Steve: <i>Did your brother do the reading for this week's seminar?</i> Peter: <i>He intended to.</i></p>	<p><i>Peter's brother did the reading for this week's seminar.</i></p>	<input type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> No
<p><b>A:</b> <i>200 people are coming to our party tonight</i> <b>B:</b> <i>Do you have Aladdin's Lamp?</i></p>	<p><i>Too many people are invited to the party</i></p>	<input type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> No
<p>3. John: <i>Where's Peter?</i> Mary: <i>The light in his office is on.</i></p>	<p><i>Peter is in his office.</i></p>	<input type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> No
<p>4. Peter: <i>would you drive a Mercedes?</i> Shaun: <i>I wouldn't drive any expensive car.</i></p>	<p><i>A Mercedes is an expensive car and Shaun wouldn't drive it.</i></p>	<input type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> Yes
<p>5. Mathew: <i>Are you coming to the party tonight?</i> Bill: <i>My parents are visiting.</i></p>	<p><i>Bill is coming to the party.</i></p>	<input type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> No
<p>6. Clint : <i>Have you brushed your teeth and tidied your room ?</i> Sam: <i>I've brushed my teeth.</i></p>	<p><i>Sam has tidied his room.</i></p>	<input type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> No
<p>7. <b>A:</b> <i>Look at me! I'm fat and ugly.</i> <b>B:</b> <i>Come on, you're not fat!</i></p>	<p><i>A is ugly</i></p>	<input type="radio"/> Yes	<input type="radio"/> No

<p>8. John: <i>So, are you staying with your parents?</i>  Larry: <i>Well, I 'm staying with my mother.</i></p>	<p><i>Larry staying with both of her parents.</i></p>	<p><i>Yes</i></p>	<p><i>No</i></p>
<p>9. Peter: <i>Do you want some coffee?</i>  James : <i>Coffee would keep me awake</i></p>	<p><i>James does not want any coffee.</i></p>	<p><i>Yes</i></p>	<p><i>No</i></p>
<p>10. A: <i>I saw Mr. James having dinner with a woman yesterday.</i>  B: <i>Really?</i></p>	<p><i>A implies that the woman Mr. James was having dinner with was not his wife.</i></p>	<p><i>Yes</i></p>	<p><i>No</i></p>

**Q 3 Read the following situations and answer the questions underneath each one.**

**Situation 1:**

Susan: I'm so glad that my presentation is over. I was really nervous. What did you think of my presentation?

Dr. John: Well . . . It's really difficult to give a good presentation sometimes, isn't it?

**What does Dr. John mean?**

**Situation 2: Larry and Charlene are talking about a test they recently took.**

Charlene: Do you think you got an "A" on the test?

Larry: Do chickens have lips?

**What does Larry mean?**

**Situation 3: A husband has been watching a football game on TV for the past two hours.**

Wife: That programme on drug abuse is excellent, honey.

Husband: About 30 more minutes – may be more.

Wife: It seems like you've been watching it all night. I hope it's over by 9:30.

**What does the wife want to do?**

**Situation 4: Jack and Steve are talking about a friend, Fred, who is failing in all of his classes.**

Jack: I don't know why Fred wastes his time and money going to school.

Steve: He's really a scholar, isn't he?

**What does Steve really think about Fred?**

**Situation 5.**

A: Did you invite Bella and Cathy?

B: I invited Bella.

**What does B mean?**

**Situation 6.**

Student: Tehran is in Turkey, isn't it, teacher?

Teacher: And London is in America, I suppose.

**What does the teacher mean?**

**Situation 7.**

Husband: Where is my Box of chocolate?

Wife: The children were in your room this morning.

**What is the wife trying to say?**

**Situation 8:**

Susan: How was your interview? Did you get the job you applied for?

Tom: Um . . . I think I need to improve my interview skills.

**Did Tom get the job?**

**Situation 9:**

Johnny: Hey Ron, let's play marbles.

Mother: How is your homework getting along Johnny?

**What is the mother trying to say?**

**Situation 10.**

You have asked for a drink of water, and your host returns with a very small cup.

B: how much did it (the water) cost?

**What does B try to say?**

**Q4: Write what the speaker in the boldface type is trying to say.****Example:**

Alan: Are you going to Paul's party?

Barb: **I have to work.**

Barb means that he can not go to Paul's party.

1. Mary always tells lies to Tim.

Tim: **Mary is a nice friend.**

Tim means .....

2. A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days .

B: **He has been visiting New York lately.**

B means .....

3. A: Do you like my new car?

B: **The tires are nice.**

B means .....

4. A: Do you know where Sam lives?

B: **Somewhere in the south of France.**

B means .....

5. A: Does your daughter play the piano?

B: **She sits at the piano and pushes the keys and the keys make noise...**

B: means .....

6. Kathy: Can you answer the phone?

Bob: **I'm in the bath.**

Bob means.....

7. Kim: I told Hassan a secret, and he told it to everyone.

Dave: **He's such a quiet guy!**

Dave means .....

8. A: Where's the fish?

B: **The cat looks happy.**

B means .....

9. A: Does my smoking disturb you?

B: **I can't say that it doesn't.**

B: means .....

10. A: Do you think this girl is beautiful?

B: **She has a nice make-up set .**

B: means .....

## Appendix III

### The Possible Answers of the Test Items

#### Q1.

1. d. He did not like it.
2. a. He'd like to attend a football game.
3. a. The house wasn't good enough
4. c. She doesn't want to miss the climb.
5. d. She means that John will not increase Suzan's salary.
6. c. John does not need any help
7. a. The eggs are small.
8. c. Club participation in student election has increased.
9. a. She does not want to talk about how much money she makes.
- 10.b. She can not take the man to the game.

#### Q2.

1. No
2. Yes
3. Yes
4. Yes
5. No
6. No

7. No
8. No
9. Yes
10. Yes

**Q3.**

1. Dr. John means that she did not give a good presentation
2. Larry means that he will not get an “A” on the test.
3. The wife wants to watch the programme on drug abuse
4. Steve means that Fred is not good scholar
5. B means that s/he did not invite Cathy.
6. The teacher means that Tehran is not in Turkey
7. The wife is trying to say that the children ate the chocolate
8. Tom did not get the job
9. The mother is trying to say to Johnny to do his homework before playing marbles.
10. B tries to say that it is a small amount.

**Q4.**

1. Tim means she is not a nice friend
2. B means Smith probably has a girlfriend in New York
3. B means he does not really like the car
4. B means he does not really know exactly where Sam lives.
5. B means she does not know how to play the piano
6. Bob means he can not answer the phone
7. Dave means that he can not keep the secrets.
8. B means the cat ate the fish
9. B means A's smoking disturbs him/her
10. B means she is not beautiful

جامعة بابل

تفصي الصعوبات التي يواجهها طلبة الجامعة العراقيين الدارسين للغة الانجليزية  
لغة اجنبية في تفسير التلويح الحوارية

ضياء كريم علي حسين

بإشراف

أ.م. عادل العكام

أ.م.د. عاصم الدليمي

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